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ABSTRACT  
   
This dissertation seeks to theorize small state strategic culture with special 
reference to the attitude of the ASEAN states toward institutionalizing regional 
cooperative security architectures. The quantitative case studies show that in 
small states where historically rooted strategic preferences may be limited, 
material influences and situational considerations take precedence over ideational 
factors in the making of the state‘s strategic culture. Second, the content of small 
state strategic culture focuses primarily on foreign and security policy issues that 
originate in their neighborhood. Lastly, Small states‘ threat perceptions from the 
neighborhood over time dictate the formation of strategic culture (provocative vs. 
cooperative). The qualitative case studies demonstrate that small Southeast Asian 
states (Singapore, Thailand, and Malaysia) exhibit a higher tendency for conflict. 
Multilateral cooperation is at best selective. Bilateral means is still the preferred 
policy approach when dealing with other states. This dissertation concludes with a 
pessimistic remark on the prospects for the development and maturation of the 
ASEAN Political-Security Community. At its current stage, the APSC appears to 
be a policy instrument created only to reinforce ASEAN‘s centrality in charting 
the region‘s security architecture. This is no small accomplishment in itself 
nonetheless.  
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Chapter 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
While the initiation of the ASEAN-China Free Trade Agreement on 
January 1
st
, 2010 marks the latest chapter in the development of an ASEAN 
Economic Community, tangible efforts to deepen defense and security 
cooperation among ASEAN states remain fairly limited. Ongoing discussions 
about some forms of cooperative security either as a less costly alternative or a 
supplement to individual national military buildups reflect region-wide concern 
about the potential destabilizing effect that a transitory balance of power may 
have on regional security.
1
 The slow progress in institutionalizing any security 
regime since its inception led observers to claim that ―[t]he ASEAN Regional 
Forum was never intended to provide a means for conflict-management nor 
should it be depended upon to do so.‖2 Thus far, the vision for an ASEAN 
Political-Security Community with the goals of political development, conflict 
prevention, and conflict resolution, to name just a few, also remains in blueprint 
stage.
3
 If any unilateral attempt at security seeking runs the danger of a security 
dilemma which may easily worsen the already fragile intramural trust among 
                                                 
1
 Sheldon W. Simon, ―The Limits of Defence and Security Cooperation in Southeast Asia,‖ 
Journal of Asian and African Studies 33, no. 1 (1998), 62-75. 
2
 Patrick M. Cronin and Emily T. Metzgar ―ASEAN and Regional Security,‖ Strategic Forum 85 
(October 1996): 4.  
3
 The ASEAN Political-Security Community is one part of a larger project to create an ASEAN 
Community. Other divisions of the project include the construction of an ASEAN Economic 
Community and an ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community. Consult the ASEAN web portal for 
details, http://www.asean.org.  
   2 
ASEAN states, if not rapidly degenerate into a regional arms race, why are 
ASEAN members still reluctant to see the emergence of any concrete cooperative 
security architecture in the region?  
 
Cooperative Security 
Since the coinage of the term in the 1988 Pacific Basin Symposium, the 
concept of cooperative security have been interpreted and defined in different 
ways in different times.
4
 The concept, however, gained wider provenance in the 
Asia-Pacific after its reference in the North Pacific Co-operative Security 
Dialogue (NPCSD), launched in 1990 by President Mulroney of Canada. The 
rationale for holding a region-wide forum was to fashion a new security 
arrangement to replace the World War II mode of defence and deterrence based 
on bipolarity. 
According to Dewitt and Acharya, the three fundamental elements of 
cooperative security discussed in NPCSD consist of inclusivity, the habit of 
dialogue, and cooperative actions.
5
 First, the element of inclusivity recognizes the 
role both state and non-state actors, especially international organizations, can 
play in providing and enhancing security. Here, a broader conceptualization of 
                                                 
4
 For a comprehensive review on the conceptual evolution of the term, see David H. Capie and 
Paul M. Evans, The Asia-Pacific Security Lexicon (Singapore, Institute of Southeast Asian 
Studies, 2002), 98-107.  
5
 David B. Dewitt and Amitav Acharya, Cooperative Security and Developmental Assistance: the 
Relationship between Security and Development with Reference to Eastern Asia (North York, 
Ontario, Canada: University of Toronto - York University Joint Centre for Asia Pacific Studies, 
1996). 
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―security‖ is adopted to include not only traditional security issues such as 
militarized inter-state disputes but also the increasingly prevalent non-traditional 
security concerns such as developmental issues and transnational crimes. 
Although the term ―human security‖ was not specifically referred to in the forum, 
it has later become a standard component of cooperative security.   
Second, any arrangement for cooperative security begins with dialogues, 
the habit of dialogue between participants in particular. States should take part in 
carrying out routine discussions, bilateral and multilateral, regarding shared 
security concerns and the best approaches available to address these concerns. 
Over time, the habit of dialogue may bring about openness, transparency, 
reassurance, and predictability while minimizing potential conflict due to 
misunderstanding. Lastly, the concept of cooperative security highlights the fact 
that many contemporary security problems cannot be solved by any one state 
alone. As its name suggests, cooperative actions are required among affected 
states (and non-state actors) to ameliorate security issues facing all members. In 
sum, the three ideals of cooperative security present an alternative to balance of 
power practice as well as a basis for the ―rejection of ‗deterrence mind-sets‘ 
associated with great power geopolitics of the Cold War.‖6 
 Two other security related concepts often appear in tandem with 
cooperative security, if not used interchangeably. Some distinction here is 
necessary to avoid confusion. The development of cooperative security owes 
                                                 
6
 Amitav Acharya, ―Reordering Asia: Cooperative Security or concert of Powers?‖ IDSS Working 
Paper 3 (Singapore: Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies, July 1999), 8. 
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much of its origin to the concept of comprehensive security. Comprehensive 
security is also a post World War II attempt to better appreciate new security 
challenges beyond security considerations based on bipolar rivalries. Specifically, 
it entails at the same time an outward focus on the external community at large 
(geoeconomics and ecopolitics) and an inward shift from state to individual 
citizen (human development).
7
 The dual shifts converge to provide the 
comprehensive security that one needs to feel secure. The twofold conceptual 
stretch up and down the ladder of unit of analysis (state to community and state to 
individual) expands the hitherto state-centric focus in security studies. The 
globalization discourse further extends this conceptual stretch ―intermestically‖ to 
juxtapose individual security alongside the wellbeing of state and community, 
taking into consideration that increasing number of new threats that crop up at the 
intersection of internal and external security domains, and the calculation of 
relative capability is ever more complex and non-linear.
8
  
ASEAN states were quite receptive to the notion of comprehensive 
security. For example, Malaysia had adapted and enshrined the doctrine of 
comprehensive security (three pillars) into its security policy as early as 1984: 
                                                 
7
 James Hsiung, Comprehensive Security: Challenge for Pacific Asia (University of Indianapolis, 
IN: University of Indianapolis Press, 2004), 3-11. 
8
 Victor Cha, ―Globalization and the Study of International Security,‖ Journal of Peace Research 
37, no. 3 (2000): 391-403. 
   5 
The first is a need to ensure a secure Southeast Asia. The second is to 
ensure a strong and effective ASEAN community. The third, and most 
basic, is the necessity to ensure Malaysia is sound, secure, and strong 
within.
9
 
 
 More importantly, comprehensive security shares with cooperative 
security the assumption that an increase in security in some participating states 
should not be detrimental to others as security is inextricably interrelated while 
acknowledging the fact that the security interest of each individual state may 
differ (ergo their commitment to the security regime)
10
. The zero-sum calculus 
typically associated with the realist security dilemma appears somewhat 
anachronistic. Both comprehensive and cooperative security tap into the heart of 
the neo-neo debate over cooperation and the utility of institutions: it is not about 
how much cooperation there is, but how much is possible.
11
 However 
sophisticated, comprehensive security remains at best a conceptual approach from 
which researchers and policy elites contemplate new sources of ―insecurity.‖12 It 
does not devise concrete methods to achieve the goals and objectives prescribed 
by the concept. 
                                                 
9
 ―Speech Given in Singapore by Deputy Minister Musa Hitam on 2 March, 1984,‖ cited in 
Foreign Affairs Malaysia 17, no. 1 (March 1984): 97.  
10
 Kees Homan, ―European Views on Comprehensive Security,‖ in Comprehensive Security In 
Asia: Views From Asia and the West On A Changing Security Environment, eds. Kurt W. Radtke 
and Raymond Feddema (Leiden, The Netherlands: Brill, 2000), 430. 
11
 Robert Jervis, ―Realism, Neorealism, and Cooperation,‖ International Security 24, no. 1 (1999), 
42-63. 
12
 Joseph A. Camilleri, Regionalism in the New Asia Pacific Order (Northampton, MA: Edward 
Elgar Publishing, 2003), 309. 
   6 
 Other than comprehensive security, cooperative security is often paired 
with collective security. Collective security is best understood as ―the function of 
a legal order‖ regarding some collective reaction against ―aggression,‖ however 
defined.
13
 The degree and extent of collective reaction depend on the severity and 
gravity of the said aggression. The League of Nations Covenant and arguably the 
resolutions of United Nations Security Council best exemplify the utilization of 
collective security. Unlike cooperative security or comprehensive security, either 
of which aims at preventing ―insecurity‖ from arising or aggravating, collective 
security takes a ―reactive approach‖ to tackle a specific problem, the delict.14 In 
general, a delict is a willful wrong, typically with malignity, that inflicts some 
damage to others. The malign intension of the transgression gives rise to a legal 
obligation for all the responsible parties to make reparation. The legal order, as 
agreed upon by participating members, may explicitly contain sanction, be it 
economic and/or military, against the aggressor. The goal is not to deter but to 
punish the perpetrator, though the existence of the legal order itself may carry the 
force to later discourage others from committing a similar crime. The deliberate 
attempt at eschewing sanctions is what distinguishes cooperative security from 
collective security.
15
  
                                                 
13
 Hans Kelsen, Collective Security under International Law (Clark, NJ: The Lawbook Exchange 
Ltd., 2001), 10. 
14
 Ralf Emmers, ―Security Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific,‖ in Asia-Pacific Security Cooperation: 
National Interests and Regional Order, eds. See Seng Tan and Amitav Acharya (New York: M.E. 
Sharp, 2004), 7. 
15
 Ralf Emmers, Cooperative Security and the Balance of Power in ASEAN and the ARF (New 
York: Routledge Curzon, 2003), 4. 
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Cooperative Security and ASEAN 
The Dewitt and Acharya definition of cooperative security largely 
resonates with the vision and goals of the ASEAN Regional Forum and the 
ASEAN Political-Security Community. When applied specifically to the current 
Southeast Asian setting, Emmers adds that cooperative security allows for a slow 
and gradual institutionalization of security relations. Moreover, even at its 
maturation, a cooperative security regime should not be expected to replace the 
existing bilateral relations as well as to depose the narrow focus on, if not fear of, 
military security of certain states.
16
 
While the habit of dialogue is seen in various Track I and Track II 
activities, the ARF purposely shies away from the inclusion of non-state actors as 
a way to uphold the principles of state sovereignty and non-interference in states‘ 
internal affairs, the so called ASEAN way. The state-centric ASEAN Political-
Security Community Blueprint, while emphasizing regional cooperation, does not 
mention possible inclusion or collaboration with non-state actors in carrying out 
security provisions. 
ASEAN states‘ failure to address the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis 
collectively, inaction during the East Timor crisis in 1999, divergent views over 
how to approach Myanmar (formerly Burma), and most importantly, the salience 
of lingering intra-mural tensions rooted in history, religion, and ethnicity all point 
to the inability, if not unwillingness, on the part of the member states to devise 
                                                 
16
 Ibid, 5. 
   8 
and implement cooperative actions. The lack of concerted cooperative security 
architecture or any progress toward crafting one is perplexing given the fact that 
the Association is at the same time boldly pushing for the creation of a ―regional 
security complex‖ as envisaged in the ASEAN Political-Security Community 
Blueprint.
17
 In Buzan and Wæver‘s words, such a complex can be understood as 
―durable patterns of amity and enmity taking the form of subglobal, 
geographically coherent patterns of security interdependence.‖18 Southeast Asia 
today is equally confronted by the security challenges facing other regions, 
namely, 1) conflicts are increasingly changing in character; 2) actor are different 
and multifaced, and 3) approaches to security are no longer an exclusive political-
military state-to-state affairs.
19
 In light of a region-wide acknowledgement of 
security interdependence, this dearth of security cooperation both in spirit and 
action also casts some doubt over the much extolled ―ASEAN Regionalism‖ vis-
à-vis global and other regional forces. Regionalism, in Job‘s words, is after all a 
blanket term describing ―the nature of, and the extent to which, member states 
                                                 
17
 The 2009 APSC Blueprint is an adaptation of the 2003 ASEAN Security Community Plan of 
Action, the 2004 Vientiane Action Programme (VAP), and relevant decisions by various ASEAN 
Sectoral Bodies. See the ASEAN website for a copy of the Blueprint 
http://www.aseansec.org/5187-18.pdf; Plan of Action, http://www.aseansec.org/16826.htm; and 
VAP, http://www.aseansec.org/VAP-10th%20ASEAN%20Summit.pdf. 
18
 Barry Buzan and Ole Wæver, Regions and Powers: The Structure of International Security 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 45. 
19
 Kees Homan, ―European Views on Comprehensive Security,‖ 428. 
   9 
and/or other key actors share commonality of norms, identities, interests and 
collective actions.‖20  
  Thus far, various International Relations (IR) theories have failed to 
account for this conundrum, namely, the lack of a concerted cooperative security 
regime or strong region-wide activism toward fashioning one. Consisting mainly 
of small and weak states, ASEAN‘s aversion toward security multilateralism 
clearly contradicts structural balance-of-power theory which emphasizes 1) small 
states will form alliances with their peers to oppose stronger powers
21
 and that 
―alliances are a necessary function of the balance-of-power operating in a 
multiple state system.‖22  
 Another second image theory, balance of threat by Walt,
23
 is unable to 
explain ASEAN states‘ behavior either. Even when China, with its ―charm 
offensive‖ doctrine,24 was once perceived as a threat to the region, enthusiasm for 
an ASEAN military pact has never been high. Conversely, there was no visible 
attempt at bandwagoning by any single state in the region either to appease 
                                                 
20
 Brian L. Job, ―Grappling With An Elusive Concept,‖ in Security Politics in the Asia Pacific, ed. 
William T. Tow (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 38.  
21
 Kenneth Waltz, The Theory of International Politics (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1979). 
22
 Hans Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace (New York: 
Knopf, 1967), 175. 
23
 Stephen Walt, ―Alliance formation and the Balance of World Power,‖ International Security 9, 
no. 4 (1985): 3-43; The Origin of Alliance (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1987). 
24
 Amitav Acharya, ―Regional Security Arrangements in a Multipolar World?‖ FED Briefing 
Paper (Berlin: Fredrich-Ebert-Stiftung, 2004), 3, accessed on Aug. 1
st
, 2010, 
http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/iez/global/50101.pdf.  
   10 
possible Chinese domination or siding with China for profit.
25
 Southeast Asian 
governments balance rising Chinese influence by deftly adopting a hedging 
strategy: establishing links with extra-regional powers (United States, South 
Korea, and Japan for example) and diligently practicing low-intensity balancing 
with the United States against Beijing.
26
  
 Moreover, the absence of joint security cooperation in the region challenges 
a long-term empirical finding that small states tend to minimize the costs of 
foreign policy by initiating more joint actions as well as by participating in multi-
actor forums.
27
 Katzenstein argues that the perception of vulnerability, economic 
or otherwise, commonly shared by small states induces a greater tendency in them 
to practice corporatist politics based on the ideology of social partnership.
28
 In 
addition to defusing dependence, small states voluntarily participate in complex 
political arrangements in the hope to form consensus over cooperative regulations 
regarding conflict resolution, as well as to build interpenetrating relationships 
between different actors to accentuate interdependence.
29
 Judging from the 
                                                 
25
 Walt, The Origin of Alliance; Randal Schweller, ―Bandwagoning for Profit: Bringing the 
Revisionist State Back In,‖ International Security 19, no. 1 (1994): 72-107.  
26
 Danny Roy, ―Southeast Asia and China: Balancing or Bandwagoning,‖ Contemporary 
Southeast Asia 27, no. 2 (2005): 305-322. 
27
 Maurice East, ―Size and Foreign Policy Behavior: A test of Two Models,‖ World Politics 25, 
no. 4 (July 1973): 556-576; Robert L. Rothstein, Alliances and Small Powers (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1968).  
28
 Peter J. Katzenstein, ―Small States and Small States Revisited,‖ New Political Economy 8, no. 1 
(2003): 9-30. 
29
 Peter J. Katzenstein, Small States in World Markets: Industrial Policy in Europe (Ithaca, NY: 
Cornell University Press, 1985).  
   11 
lukewarm activism, if not the absence of enthusiasm, in speeding up the 
institutionalization of cooperative security, the Southeast Asian states, unlike their 
European counterparts, eschew corporatist politics and instead prefer unilateral 
and state-centric security provisions. 
In light of the increasing inability of any one ASEAN state to tackle 
regional security issues (traditional or non-traditional) single-handedly, this 
dissertation explores why, despite added military security and other non-military 
benefits such as increased trade and technology transfer,
30
 ASEAN states 
insistently favor unilateral actions. For example, Jakarta‘s action plan to form a 
regional peace keeping force encountered strong objections during the 18
th
 Asia 
Pacific Roundtable (May 30 to June 2
nd
, 2004 in Kuala Lumpur) where member 
states continued their discussion on the proposed ASEAN Security Community. 
Notably in their objections, Singapore argued that ASEAN is the wrong entity to 
play a peacekeeping role as ASEAN should not be seen as a defense or security 
organization; Malaysia claimed that issues such as peacekeeping should be 
excluded from the agenda especially when defense cooperation between members 
has always been on a bilateral basis; and lastly, Thailand deemed the mobilization 
of such a force unwarranted simply because there is no threat of commensurable 
gravity facing the region.
31
    
                                                 
30
 Werner Bauwens, Armand Clesse, and Olav F. Knudsen, eds., Small States and the Security 
Challenge in the New Europe (London: Potomac Books, 1996); Heinz Gartner, ―Small State and 
Alliances: Introduction,‖ in Small States and Alliances, eds. Erich Reiter and Heinz Gartner (New 
York: Physica-Verlag Heidelberg, 2001), 3. 
31
 Adrian Kuah, ―The ASEAN Security Community: Struggling with Details,‖ IDSS 
Commentaries 21 (Singapore: Institute of Defense and Strategic Studies, June 15, 2004). 
   12 
This dissertation seeks to explain this puzzle from the premise of strategic 
culture, namely, the culture of strategic decision making. The regional norm 
against interference and use of force, commonly known as the ASEAN Way, 
should not be taken as representative of the views of individual member states. 
This dissertation hypothesizes that, in a conflict-ridden region and amid a strong 
intramural distrust, the distinctive attribute of ASEAN states, smallness, has 
fostered a two-tiered strategic culture. At the regional level, ASEAN states seek to 
maximize latitude under the rubric of state sovereignty while maintaining a 
nominal coalition against outside (stronger) powers. At the state-level, the 
propensity to conflict is stronger and the right to use force is carefully guarded to 
protect a highly securitized state vis-à-vis (distrustful) neighbors.  
9/11 and its aftermath have paradigmatically shifted how national and 
international security are perceived.
32
 The broadened conceptualization of 
―human security‖ has underscored some degree of perceived security 
interdependence between nations of the world as well. In addition, the rise of the 
―securitization‖ discourse on how a particular issue is politicized and transformed 
by actors into a matter of security has also challenged the merit and utility of the 
conventional security focus solely on the material dispositions of threat.
33
 With a 
renewed U.S. interest in multilateralism, greater engagement with ASEAN, 
                                                 
32
 Kuniharu Kakihara,―The Post-9/11 Paradigm shift and its Effect on East Asia,‖ IPPS Policy 
Paper 292E (Tokyo: Institute of International Policy Studies, 2003). 
33
 Barry Buzan, Ole Waever, and Japp de Wilde, Security: A New Framework for Analysis 
(Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1998). 
   13 
especially in security matters, is expected.
34
 Appreciating the logic behind 
ASEAN states‘ unwillingness to commit to at least a concert arrangement is thus 
imperative to our understanding of the scope and extent of regionalization and 
securitization in Southeast Asia in particular and the greater Asia Pacific in 
general.  
 
The Benign Neglect 
The academic interest in Southeast Asian security issues has long mirrored 
the U.S. ―benign neglect‖ of the region.35 Of the few published works on ASEAN 
states‘ reluctance to build cooperative security, much of the research resorts to a 
constructivist explanation. The almost rigid adherence to and the ―enmeshing‖ 
normative influence of the ―ASEAN Way‖ create a conservative identity that not 
only limits creative diplomatic proposals and constrains integrative initiatives but 
also justifies inaction.
36
 These assorted norms have been popularized since the 
inception of the Association to reinforce sovereign equality through consensual 
                                                 
34
 Evans Feigenbaum and Robert Manning, ―The United States in the New Asia,‖ Council special 
Report 50 (New York: Council on Foreign Relations Press, 2009). 
35
 Diane Mauzy and Brian Job, ―U.S. Policy in Southeast Asia: Limited Re-Engagement after 
Years of Benign Neglect,‖ Asian Survey 47, no. 1 (2007): 622-41. 
36
 Markus Hund, ―From ‗Neighborhood Watch Group‘ to Community?: The Case of ASEAN 
Institutions and the Pooling of Sovereignty,‖ Australian Journal of International Affairs 56, no. 1 
(2002): 99-122; Jurgen Haacke, ―ASEAN‘s Diplomatic and Security Culture: A Constructivist 
Assessment,‖ International Relations of the Asia Pacific 3 (2003): 57-87; Hiro Katsumata, 
―Reconstruction of Diplomatic Norms in Southeast Asia: The Case for Strict Adherence to the 
‗ASEAN Way‘,‖ Contemporary Southeast Asia 25, no. 1 (2003): 104-121; Amitav Acharya, 
―Why Is there No NATO in Asia?: The Normative Origins of Asian Multilateralism,‖ WCIA 
Working Paper 05-05 (Cambridge: Weatherhead Center for International Affairs, 2005); Sheldon 
Simon, ―ASEAN and Multilateralism: the Long, Bumpy Road to Community,‖ Contemporary 
Southeast Asia 30, no. 2 (2008): 264-292.  
   14 
decision making, non-interference in members‘ internal affairs, avoidance of 
legally binding commitments, and voluntary enforcement of regional decisions. 
Yet, the ASEAN Way explanation has proven to be a myth.
37
 It cannot account 
for the continued efforts led by individual states such as Thailand, Singapore, 
Philippines, and Indonesia to further reinvent, if not to break away from, the 
ASEAN way in the forms of flexible intervention, enhanced interaction, 
constructive engagement, ASEAN security community, and most recently, critical 
disengagement.
38
   
Unlike the constructivists, realists attribute the absence of a credible 
military bloc to the lack of an identifiable external threat to the region.
39
 There is 
in fact ―no single, overarching menace like Soviet communism‖ to bind Asian 
states to each other.
40
 It is understandable that ASEAN does not wish to effect a 
formal military alliance. Such an arrangement entails an agreed threat and 
consensus on how to deal with it. However, most ASEAN militaries insistently 
                                                 
37
 Tobias I. Nischalk, ―Insights from ASEAN‘s Foreign Policy Co-Operation: The ASEAN Way, 
A Real Spirit or Phantom?‖ Contemporary Southeast Asia 22, no. 1 (2000): 107.  
38
 Carlyle A. Thayer, ―Reinventing ASEAN: From Constructive Engagement to Flexible 
Intervention,‖ Harvard Asia Pacific Review 3, no. 2 (1999): 67-70; Jurgen Haacke, ―The Concept 
of Flexible Engagement and the Practice of Enhanced Interaction: Intramural Challenges to the 
‗ASEAN Way‘,‖ The Pacific Review12, no. 4 (1999): 581-611; Lee Jones, ―ASEAN‘s Albatross: 
ASEAN‘s Burma Policy, From Constructive Engagement to Critical Disengagement,‖ Asian 
Survey 4, no. 3 (2008): 271-293. 
39
 Michael Leifer, ―The Paradox of ASEAN: A Security Organization Without the Structure of an 
Alliance,‖ The Round Table 68, no. 271 (July 1978): 261-268; Shaun Narine, Explaining ASEAN: 
Regionalism in Southeast Asia (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2002); Beverly Loke, ―The ASEAN 
Way: Towards Regional Order and Security Cooperation?‖ Melbourne Journal of Politics 30 
(2005-6): 8-37.   
40
 Derek Chollet, ―Time for an Asian NATO?‖ Foreign Policy 123 (March/April 2001): 92.  
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prefer not to work together even when numerous non-traditional security threats 
such as terrorism and transnational crime have growing salience. Simon once 
observed in 2005 that ―there are no ongoing exercises or patrols involving the 
armed forces of three or more Southeast Asian states that either cross national 
boundaries or operate on the high seas or in international air space.‖41 It was not 
until very recently that some joint patrol activities by several littoral states in the 
Malacca Strait occurred, though prior consultation is still required when entering 
other‘s territorial water.42  
In addition, modernization theorists posit that the European nation-state 
and the Asian nation-state are at different stages of development
43
. Whereas the 
European political and economic systems are characterized by an exceptionally 
high degree of interdependence, similar development is less progressive in 
Southeast Asia. On one hand, such high degree of interdependence compels states 
to voluntarily transfer sovereignty to supranational regimes tasked to handle 
outstanding inter-state conflicts of various kinds.  On the other hand, states 
involuntarily lose sovereignty ―to the market and the subsequent efforts to 
recapture that sovereignty via membership in international institutions that 
                                                 
41
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facilitate multilateral governance and joint problem solving.‖44 Accordingly, it is 
neither necessary nor useful for Southeast Asian states to embed themselves in a 
web of contractual obligations until the region reaches the level of development 
comparable to current day Europe. 
Lastly, the highly personalized politics and strong-man leadership style 
traditionally found in ASEAN states led many to hypothesize that with Soeharto 
of Indonesia, Lee Kwan Yew of Singapore, and Mahathir of Malaysia no longer 
in leadership positions, no current ASEAN leaders can construct a regional 
security arrangement acceptable to all ASEAN states.
45
 However, even when the 
―big three‖ were in power, no region-wide security cooperation existed.  
 
Theoretical Framework and Research Questions  
This dissertation seeks to explain the lack of cooperative security in 
Southeast Asia from the premise of strategic culture. The study of strategic 
culture is a specific attempt by IR scholars to ―engage with and go beyond realism 
by reasserting the importance of cultural, ideational, and normative influences on 
the motivations of states and their leaders.‖46 This is also an effort by IR scholars 
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to study foreign policy behavior from the local or national political context.
47
 
More notably, the strategic culture approach complements the rationality 
assumption.
48
 ―It allows that most actors are likely rational, but insists that 
rationality must be understood within a cultural context.‖49 
Strategic culture is defined as a distinctive set of socialized, internalized, 
and legitimized beliefs, assumptions, and behavior patterns regarding the 
appropriate means and ends chosen by members of the national security 
community to achieve the security and defense objectives of the state.
50
 Strategic 
community consists of the groups of people responsible for making strategic 
decisions in a given state. Through socialization, internalization and 
legitimatization, these shared beliefs, assumptions, and behavior patterns over 
time have attained ―a state of semi-permanence that places them on the level of 
‗culture‘ rather than policy.‖51 This strategic culture acts as an intervening 
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variable through which the strategic community derives a permissible boundary to 
formulate their strategies to the security and defense problems at hand.
52
  
Combining the theoretical framework of strategic culture and the 
empirical findings about small state decision making process, this dissertation 
hypothesizes that the distinctive attribute of ASEAN states, smallness, has 
fostered a two-tiered strategic culture. Where threat to the region as a whole has 
been historically low, the region has socialized, internalized, and legitimized a 
passive and defensive strategic culture to engage external pressures. At the state-
level where intramural distrust has not receded, the highly securitized ASEAN 
states have developed a reactive and provocative strategic culture with higher 
propensity to conflict and lower propensity to cooperate. The push and pull of two 
diagonal tendencies inhibit the genuine establishment of cooperative security in 
the region. 
As Southeast Asia has been labeled the ―second front of terrorism,‖ 
external powers such as the U.S. have been increasingly pressing the region for 
enhanced military and security cooperation. However, one should understand, 
after reading this dissertation, that ASEAN is not NATO. ASEAN is devoid of 
genuine trust internally, a prerequisite for security cooperation. Confidence 
building must precede military cooperation. 
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A secondary goal of this dissertation is to examine small state behavior in 
the strategic culture context. For the same reason that IR scholars study strategic 
culture of great powers, this dissertation attempts to create a conceptual 
framework through which we may better understand why certain policy options 
are chosen and pursued by small states. The role of small powers has been 
increasingly magnified in an ever-globalized international community to an extent 
where ―their number alone may come to signify powerful coalitions capable of 
resisting and even curbing the influence of what are traditionally perceived as 
larger powers.‖53 Yet, the absence of empirical studies and under-theorization on 
small state decision making processes reflect the general research trend in the 
field overall. Christmas-Møller once lamented that ―the small state approach 
never became… that sort of fashionable approach which attracts the attention of 
the ‗big shots‘ within the discipline.‖54 This dissertation shows that not only size 
matters, but also how and why it matters.   
There are many justifications for small states studies in general, but four 
are particularly relevant in the IR context.
55
 The first and most obvious 
justification is that we live in a world where the great majority of the legally 
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sovereign states are small in their absolute size and/or relative power.  Second, the 
conventional focus on states with capabilities and their assumed pending actions 
has long been criticized and challenged as incomplete from a global perspective. 
Third, from an institutionalist point of view, smaller powers may be capable of 
shaping international institutions as they are also participants of the international 
system. Lastly, to lend support to the third justification, institutions should be 
seen not only as the outcome of great-power bargains, but also in terms of all 
actors‘ relations. A world sharing a strategic culture with lower propensity to 
conflict and higher propensity to cooperate is less prone to interstate violence than 
a world beset with a belligerent strategic culture.  Moreover, recent events have 
shown that small state behavior has major consequences for regional security. In 
regional security forums such as the EU Military Committee (EUMC) and the 
United Nations General Assembly, small states have not only actively participated 
in the construction and maintenance of such forums, but also continuously shaped 
the rules and laws of regional governance in their favor.  After all, as Coplin once 
said, all states—large or small—do have interests beyond their immediate 
border.
56
 
 
Structure of the Dissertation 
Chapter 2 offers a thorough survey of the conceptual development of 
strategic culture and a critique of previous attempts at operationalizing the 
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concept. The chapter proceeds with three hypotheses regarding small state 
strategic culture in general and three auxiliary hypotheses on Southeast Asian 
state behavior in particular. The chapter ends with discussions of research design, 
methodology, and foreseeable problems confronting the research.  
Chapter 3-5 are the narrative part of computerized content analysis on 
security related documents of the three chosen cases: Singapore, Thailand, and 
Malaysia. The choice of these three countries is justified on several grounds. First, 
these countries have all met the combined definitional requirement of small states: 
objective smallness and self-perceived smallness. Second, these three countries 
are among the founding member of ASEAN and later the supporters for the 
initiation of ARF. If the rationale for establishing a regional cooperative security 
regime in Southeast Asia is to mitigate the fears shared by these small states due 
to a heightened sense of vulnerability, differences in regime type, and lingering 
intramural suspicion based on past grievances, the corporatist strategies practiced 
by their European peers should find equal, if not stronger, manifestation in the 
three. Yet, the lack of activism both in action and spirit of these three countries in 
pushing for a regional cooperative security architecture have all defied the 
theoretical and empirical expectations of small state behavior. Third, the puzzle is 
ever more perplexing especially when all three countries have reiterated in their 
contribution to the annual ARF Security Outlook the importance of bilateral and 
multilateral cooperation in the face of a new and shifting security environment.  
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Chapter 6 examines how the strategic culture of Malaysia and Singapore, 
approximated by propensities for conflict and cooperation, affect their 
participation in several operationalized maritime security regimes in the region. 
Chapter 7 traces the Thai-Cambodia border conflict over the Preah Vihear Temple 
as the event unfolds. Special attention is given to the reasoning behind the Thai 
rejection to third-country mediation while insisting on solving the conflict through 
bilateral means. Chapter 8 concludes with a remark on the prospects for the 
development and maturation of the ASEAN Political-Security Community.   
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Chapter 2 
STRATEGIC CULTURE, SMALL STATES, AND ASEAN 
 
The ongoing debate over the hegemony of realism in elucidating state 
strategic behaviors prompts many scholars to search for alternative 
interpretations.  The conventional reduction of culture into ―a dues ex machina 
variable that either ‗mops up‘ residual variance or deals with discomfort 
deficiencies of existing research programmes‖ fails to appreciate the wider 
literature on the relationships between ideational influences and policy outputs.
57
 
However, analyses that over-rely on cultural variables without being theoretically 
compelling and empirically sound tend to fall prey to cultural particularism. ―The 
weakness of the cultural explanation,‖ says Barrington Moore ―is not in the 
statement of such facts…, but in the way they are put into the explanation.‖58 
While this is not the place to peruse the meaning of culture, its epistemological 
stance, and ontological status, this dissertation adopts Geertz‘s definition and 
states that culture ―consists of socially established structures of meaning in terms 
of which people do… things.‖59   
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The study of strategic culture is a specific attempt by numerous scholars to 
―engage with and go beyond realism by reasserting the importance of cultural, 
ideational, and normative influences on the motivations of states and their 
leaders.‖60 While scholars disagree on the definition of the term, the logic of 
strategic culture appears to be highly complementary to realist explanations of 
state strategic behaviors. More importantly, the strategic culture approach is 
highly compatible with rationality.
61
 Specifically, ―[i]t allows that most actors are 
likely rational, but insists that rationality must be understood within a cultural 
context.‖62  
Though the concept of strategic culture is still hotly contested and its 
applicability widely questioned, researchers have largely concurred that culture 
can be taken as an alternative explanation for either interstate or intrastate 
behavior.
63
 While culture as a concept or variable may be too broad as to explain 
nothing, there is definitely something ―out there‖ through which people derive 
thoughts and articulate preferences.
64
 Warm feelings toward ideational 
explanations notwithstanding, the only agreed upon direction for studying 
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strategic culture thus far consists of a consensus on embracing culture as a 
variable in analyzing foreign policy and security decision making.
65
 This 
consensus, however, should not be seen as an endorsement for over-privileging 
ideational variables at the expense of non-ideational ones.   
In effect, there are two common misconceptions about what strategic 
culture really is. First, the study of strategic culture is not just about how ―culture‖ 
influences strategic policy output. According to Gaddis, strategy is the process by 
which ends are related to means, intensions to capabilities, and objectives to 
resources.‖66 To be correct, strategic culture is about the ―culture‖ of strategic 
decision making. Strategic culture thus should reflect the rationale and logic 
behind why specific policy is chosen to address a given problem.  Moreover, as 
suggested by Haglund, ―strategy‖ should be understood as ―a rational link 
between ends and means [as one] attempts to correlate, in a manner that can pass 
basic-cost-benefit muster, your goal with the resources at your disposal, and vice 
versa.‖67  
Secondly, the misconception that strategy is all about ―things martial‖68 is 
unfortunate but understandable. Such misconception can be attributed to the fact 
that historically states often use military forces to solve inter-state conflicts. The 
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corollary infatuation International Relation researchers place on relative 
capabilities dwarfs the value and merit of other elements of power in comparison. 
As the facet of ―insecurity‖ increasingly diversifies, so do the strategies at states‘ 
disposal. Use of deadly force and preemption (the so-called things martial), as 
suggested by the principle of Just War, has gradually become the last resort. The 
second misconception points to the fact that the conventional focus on military 
strategy in security studies in general and strategic culture research in particular 
negates the possibility of states preferring, exploring and, adopting non-military 
strategies. 
Due to the traditional interest international relations scholars hold in great 
powers (typically with long history and extensive war experience) and the surge 
of culture-friendly researches in the last three decades, the existing empirical 
studies often produce variations of ideationally based strategic cultures found in 
great powers. In effect, the existing literature offers a ―one-for-all‖ formula to 
uncover the relationship between strategic culture and state behavior. Little 
attempt has been made to differentiate which, how, and when strategic culture 
influences strategic decision making in small states. The effect of this discrepancy 
is most deeply felt when one tries to study the strategic culture of ASEAN in 
general and how such culture affects the intramural cooperation in the security 
realm in particular. This dissertation thus challenges the conventional wisdom that 
strategic culture is mainly ideationally defined, largely derived from history and 
past war experience. In small states where historical experience or historically 
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rooted strategic preferences may be limited, material influences and situational 
considerations should take precedence over ideational factors. However, this 
should by no means be taken as a refusal to consider the potential of ideational 
variables in formulating a small state‘s ranked strategic preferences. Given that no 
methodological attempt has been made to determine the relative importance each 
type of factors has on the formation of a state‘s strategic culture, this dissertation 
proposes to adopt computer-assisted conceptual and relational content analysis to 
gauge the relative weight of the constituent elements of strategic culture (see the 
methodology section below). A better understanding of small state strategic 
culture will ultimately shed light over our main question: why is there still no 
concrete cooperative security regime in Southeast Asia. 
 
A Critique on Strategic Culture: Concept and Methodology 
The strategic culture literature can be divided temporally into four 
generations (the late 1970s, the 1980s, the mid-1990s, and post-2000), albeit not 
without some overlaps and omissions.
69
 The term ―strategic culture‖ was first 
coined by Jack Snyder in his study of Soviet nuclear doctrines. He defines the 
term broadly as ―the sum total of ideals, conditional emotional responses, and 
patterns of behavior that members of the national strategic community have 
acquired through instruction or imitation and share with each other with regard to 
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nuclear strategy.‖70 However, it should be especially noted that in Snyder‘s usage, 
strategic culture is a generic term. It does not prioritize ideational factors over 
other non-ideational variables. Writers on strategic culture tend to use the terms 
―culture,‖ ―ideational,‖ and ―normative‖ interchangeably without clearly 
differentiating the three.   
Snyder notices that, though strategic culture is articulated by the elites, it 
should nevertheless be a product of the collective, a reflection of the communal 
experience, and a manifestation of public opinion. A strategic culture emerges as 
elites socialize these collective properties into a distinct mode of strategic 
thinking. ―[A]s a result of this socialization process, a set of general beliefs, 
attitudes and behavior patterns with regards to nuclear strategy has achieved a 
state of semi-permanence that places them on the level of ‗culture‖ rather than 
policy.‖71 In other words, through this socialization process, ―a‖ culture is 
developed regarding strategic decision making. Snyder‘s conceptualization of 
strategic culture provides the basis for the concept to develop and progress.  What 
follows are four generations of scholarly efforts dedicated to analyze the concept 
in depth, both theoretically and methodologically.   
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The 1
st
 Generation: Strategic Culture as Context 
  Colin Gray, a representative of the first generation, shares a similar 
passion with Snyder in fusing the notion of culture into the field of security 
studies. Gray‘s article, Strategic Culture as Context, is a direct reply to recent 
criticisms by third-generation theorists of strategic culture.
72
 In particular, Gray 
finds that the third generation‘s positivist model rests upon a misunderstanding of 
the nature, character, and ―working‖ of strategic culture. In his article, Gray 
suggests that the concept provides context for understanding, rather than 
explanatory causality, of state strategic behavior. 
To support his point, Gray employs a dualistic definition of context. On 
one hand, Gray argues that context can be considered as something ―out there,‖ 
typically in concentric circles, meaning ―that which surrounds.‖ On the other 
hand, Gray asserts that context can be understood as ―that which weaves 
together.‖ To Gray, definitional clarity is not always necessary because the 
dimensions of strategy interpenetrate. The decisions made by a security 
community are affected by culturally shaped, or ―encultured‖ people, 
organization, procedures and weapons. Gray, too, treats strategic culture as a 
property of the collective. Such product embraces the ―modes of thought and 
action with respect to force, which derives from perceptions of the national 
historical experience, from aspirations for responsible behavior in national 
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terms… and the civic culture and way of life.‖73  Accordingly, strategic culture 
can be conceived as ―a context out there that surrounds, and gives meaning to, 
strategic behavior, as the total warp and woof of matters strategic that are 
thoroughly woven together, or as both.‖74   
Unlike Snyder, Gray is less clear on which agent is responsible for 
formulating strategic culture and who is in charge of applying it in foreign policy 
making. Given that both Snyder and Gray‘s work on nuclear strategies and 
superpower relations can only be understood in the Cold War context, the 
transferability of their conceptualization of strategic culture outside of the Cold 
War context is questionable. Later comparative works on strategic culture by 
Roland Ebel et al., Thomas Berger, Ken Booth and Russell Trood, Sten Rynning, 
and Christoph Meyer, however, demonstrate that such transferability is not only 
desirable, but also possible.
75
   
Yet, Gray‘s conceptualization of strategic culture leaves three other 
questions unanswered. First, strategic culture as context implies that the society 
from which strategic culture derives its contextual sources is homogeneous. Gray 
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does not consider ―society‖ as the amalgamation of diverse agents with 
potentially conflicting interests. No matter how these agents behave, they are 
inevitably ―encultured,‖ and thus, their interaction necessarily yields a 
homogenous strategic culture. Moreover, once strategic culture is formed, no one 
in the society would challenge or object to its content. Second, by treating all 
agents as being culturally bound, Gray rules out the possibility of a disjunction 
between strategic culture and behavior. There is no discussion in Gray‘s article on 
why strategic culture would always exist a priori to condition the making of 
strategic decisions. Third, Gray is equally vague on the processes of deriving an 
observable strategic culture. Against the ―encultured‖ backdrop, how can strategic 
culture be distinguished from the ―Big C culture‖?  This first generation literature 
on strategic culture also lacks methodologies to distinguish the concept from other 
ideational variables.           
 
The 2
nd
 Generation: the “Strategic Use of Culture” on the Part of Elites           
The second generation scholars preoccupy themselves with the ―strategic 
use of culture‖ on the part of elites. According to them, the first generation is less 
appreciative of ―firstly, the inherently constructed nature of identity and culture 
and secondly, the role of agency in producing such structure.‖76 This generation 
begins thus ―from the premises that there is potentially a vast difference between 
what leaders think and say they do, and the deeper motives for doing what they in 
                                                 
76
 Edward Lock, ―Refining Strategic Culture: Return of the Second Generation,‖ Review of 
International Studies 36, no. 3 (2010): 692. 
   32 
fact do.‖77 Researchers such as Bradley Klein, Charles Kupchan, Robert Lukham, 
and Chaim Kaufmann, to name just a few, focus their research agenda on the 
instrumentability of strategic culture.
78
 These scholars, in Gray‘s opinion, ―[seek] 
the cunning coded messages behind the language of strategic studies.
79
 They draw 
heavily from sociology on culture and preference formation.
80
 Culture is seen as 
―a tool kit‘ of symbols, stories, rituals, and world views, which people may use in 
varying configurations to solve different kind of problems.‖81    
In other words, the second generation focuses their studies on the 
instrumentability of strategic culture. Jeffery Lantis‘ article, Strategic Culture and 
National Security Policy, points to the fact that leaders have the ability ―to choose 
when and where to stake claims of strategic culture traditions and when and 
where to consciously move beyond previous boundaries of acceptability in 
foreign policy behavior.‖82 According to Lantis, strategic culture is at best a 
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―negotiated reality‖ among elites.83 The history of Western countries provides the 
second generation scholars with ample evidence of elites ―ris[ing] above strategic 
cultural constraints to solve different kind of problems.‖84 For example, 
Kaufmann shows that the emphasis on pre-emptive strike within the U.S. strategic 
culture is seen as an attempt to reframe security issues with exaggerated threat 
perception and to justify organized state violence.
85
 
However, Lantis‘ observation on the elites‘ strategic use of culture 
assumes that elites are virtually omnipotent in their ability to manipulate and 
stretch cultural constraints. The second generation scholars fail to see that 
strategic constraints can backfire by trapping decision makers in the strategic 
culture they helped create in the first place. Snyder concurs with Johnston on the 
semi-permanent feature of strategic culture. Even if it does transform, ―it does so 
slowly, lagging behind changes in ‗objective conditions.‖86 By and large, it takes 
time as well as articulation for culture to penetrate ―all matters strategic.‖ In this 
case, elites are not as free as predicted by the second generation theorists in their 
ability to generate and replace one strategic culture after another. In addition, the 
second generation literature does not address the (re)emergence of a new culture 
and its influence on a state‘s strategic orientation. Nor does it discuss the form, 
speed and effect of the adjustment process. On the whole, the second generation 
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theory fails to tackle one of the most crucial questions in the study of strategic 
culture, namely, what does it mean for a society to have a strategic culture that is 
susceptible to frequent changes? 
Moreover, Johnston‘s brief discussion on the second generation 
conceptualization of strategic culture brings to our attention two other conceptual 
conundrums.
87
 First, due to the heavy emphasis on agency, it is not entirely clear 
from the second generation theorization whether we should anticipate strategic 
discourse to influence policy outcome at all. The causal linkage between culture 
and behavior becomes problematic when elites are at the same time the source of 
strategic culture and the medium in (re)interpreting its content. Second, the elite-
centric approach cannot confidently reject the neorealist assumption that to 
maximize security, ―elites around the world ought to share similarly militaristic or 
realpolitik strategic preferences.‖88 If the quests for power and security do 
mandate elites world-wide to opt for similar strategic preferences, no cross-
national differences in operational strategy can be expected. In this case, the 
influence of strategic culture on any state‘s strategic behavior becomes quite 
miniscule, if not irrelevant.  
 
The 3
rd
 Generation: Falsifiable Theory and Competitive Theory Testing 
The third generation shifts its attention away from both context and 
instrumentability to a new search of a more falsifiable theorization of strategic 
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culture. This generation also focuses more narrowly on particular strategic 
decisions as dependent variables. Most notably, the third generation definition of 
―culture‖ explicitly excludes behavior as an element, thereby avoiding the 
―encultured‖ trap of the first generation. The debate between Gray and Johnston 
best illustrates the divergent approaches that the two generations take to study and 
apply strategic culture. ―[T]he key point of contention… is whether their referent 
object of study should be used to try to ‗understand‘ [Gray] or ‗to explain‘ 
[Johnston] the strategic behavior of states in security and defense affairs‖89.  
 Johnston‘s first article, Thinking About Strategic Culture, prescribes a 
positivist model for linking strategic culture to state strategic behavior. He defines 
strategic culture as ―an integrated system of symbols that acts to establish 
pervasive and long-lasting grand strategic preferences by formulating concepts of 
the role and efficacy of military force in interstate political affairs, and by clothing 
these conceptions with such an aura of factuality that the strategic preferences 
seem uniquely realistic and efficacious‖90 Johnston‘s goal is to identify causal 
linkages between idea and behavior. To do so, he assumes that behavior can be 
separated from ideas and that cultural variables can be distinguished from non-
cultural ones.  For example, political culture, defense budget, and regime type that 
were once seen only as part of ―the context‖ are now contextual sources for 
strategic culture. Two forms of content analysis, cognitive mapping and symbol 
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analysis, are useful in discerning variables contributing to the making of strategic 
culture.   
By adopting the Goldstein-Keohane approach to ideational factors, 
Johnston is able to pit cultural variables against non-cultural ones and 
consequently weed out those variables that have no bearing on the content of 
strategic culture.
91
 In his later article, Strategic Culture Revisited, Johnston makes 
clear that the pitting process will continue until ―your tests accounted for the 
possibility that strategic culture might not matter, or that it might not exist 
intersubjectively across large numbers of decision makers, or that it might be 
transnational, class-based, or gender-based rather than ethno nationally-based.‖92   
Furthermore, Johnston urges his colleagues and readers to be open-minded 
about the relationship between strategic culture and other exogenous independent 
variables. In Johnston‘s view, while strategic culture may provide a limited range 
of choices and tendencies, a situational character such as geography may act as an 
intervening variable to determine which tendency kicks in and when. Second, 
strategic culture may appear as a consistent set of ranked preferences, persisting 
over time and across strategic context. Third, strategic culture may mediate or 
moderate the effects of other independent variables. Lastly, strategic culture may 
remain symbolic in nature and have no appreciable effect on state strategic 
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behavior. Notably, Johnston‘s broad conception of the ―working‖ of strategic 
culture is in direct contrast to the first generation‘s over-deterministic 
interpretation in which strategic culture presides over the interaction of and the 
decisions made by the members of strategic community. Nonetheless, Johnston is 
uncertain about how a specific decision is chosen from the ranked preferences. Do 
political agents in Johnston‘s model exercise the same power as those described 
by the second generation scholars? After all, it is a ranked preference and 
someone has to make a choice.          
Johnston‘s positivist approach is not without limitations. In his reply to the 
Gray-Johnston debate, Stuart Poore finds Johnston‘s model short of compelling 
mechanisms to measure the pervasiveness of strategic culture or to denote the 
internalization process of strategic culture by decision-makers.
93
 On top of 
Poore‘s critique, Johnston‘s model can be replicated only if researchers 
unconditionally accept Johnston‘s assumption that behavior can be separated from 
a priori strategic culture. Johnston later addresses this specific point in his reply 
to Colin Gray by admitting that only by accidentally conceding that ―behavior at 
time t can be separable from an a priori strategic culture it becomes obvious that 
there are other, non strategic culture variables‖ that help explain state strategic 
behavior
94
. Yet, this supposition is inherently contradictory to his theorization of 
strategic culture. Specifically, the existence of a strategic culture a priori denies 
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the possibility that strategic culture may not exist. In fact, it is a common 
theoretical blindfold shared by all three generations of scholars who have left 
unexplored the possibility of strategic decisions without an overarching strategic 
culture. 
 
The 4th Generation: Issue Specific and Non-State Actors 
 While the previous three generations examine strategic culture on a macro 
scale with state as the unit of analysis, the fourth generation strategic culture 
scholars take a rather ―micro‖ approach, narrowing the unit of analysis to non-
state actors in specific security issue areas such as terrorist groups and the 
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. The late comers concentrate not on 
theory development but the application of the theory and how this theory may 
help us to better understand the newest sources of insecurity as well as their 
perpetrators.  
Specifically, much research interest is placed on the proliferation of 
weapons of mass destruction. The ―WMD strategic culture‖ can be organized into 
five categories: proliferation (general), religion/theology, actor-specific, sociology 
and psychology.
95
 Associated with the interest in WMD is the focus on terrorism 
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in general and certain terrorist groups such as Al Qaeda in particular.
96
 Lastly, the 
political-security integration of Europe, culminated in the development of the 
European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP), also proves to be a fertile ground 
for scholars to inquire about the emergence and nature of a Euro-centric strategic 
culture through which European governments deal with new sources of 
insecurities.
97
 In addition, there is also a notably trend in exploring quantitative 
measures to operationalize the concept of ―culture‖ and its effect on behavior.98 
Because the scholarly outputs produced are actor- and issue-specific, it is 
perceivably harder to transfer the insights into other areas of security studies. The 
methodological improvement is commendable but not without some criticism, 
especially those coming from adherents to qualitative methods. 
 
Strategic Culture and Small states 
 All these debates on theoretical and methodological issues 
notwithstanding, the bulk of the empirical case studies have been centered on 
great powers with extensive war experience or long history. In essence, the 
relationship between strategic culture and small state behavior is under-theorized. 
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The lack of empirical studies and under-theorization on small state decision 
making processes reflect the general research trend in the field of International 
Relations overall. Christmas-Møller once lamented that ―the small state approach 
never became… that sort of fashionable approach which attracts the attention of 
the ‗bit shots‘ within the discipline.‖99 Given the origin of strategic culture, the 
most popular candidates have been the United States and the Soviet Union.
100
 
China, Japan, Germany, India, for examples, have later attracted attention from 
the community as these countries re-emerge on the world stage as aspiring great 
powers.
101
   
However, as early as 1973, East had already rejected the assumption that 
the general process of decision making in small states is the same as those found 
in large states.
102
 He tested two competing models using a dataset of foreign 
policy events initiated by 32 states of varying sizes and levels of economic 
development in the time period from 1959 to 1968. East‘s findings suggest that 
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small states tend to minimize the costs of foreign policy by initiating more joint 
actions and by participating in multi-actor forums. Katzenstein, in his studies on 
how small European states devise their industrial policies, also found that the 
perception of vulnerability, economic or otherwise, commonly shared by small 
states compels them to practice corporatist politics with actors within and outside 
the state.
103
 In other words, small states are more willing to negotiate and 
cooperate in complex political arrangements in hopes defusing lopsided 
dependency while at the same time highlighting the benefit, risk, and cost of 
breaking away from the web of interdependence. 
 On the whole, the strategic culture literature presents a lengthy debate on 
theory building while researchers have made little improvement on the 
methodologies to uncover strategic culture. In particular, the literature offers a 
―one-for-all‖ formula to unveil how ideational factors influence states‘ strategic 
policy output. No attempt has been done to distinguish the impact of strategic 
culture on small states. The closest studies extant are those on how security 
identity influences foreign policy behavior of the small European states, 
especially in relation to EU integration.
104
 Security identity is broadly understood 
as ―a product of past behavior and images and myths linked to it which have been 
internalized over long periods of time by the political elite and the population of a 
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state.‖105  These studies however do not necessarily focus on ―strategic‖ policy or 
security per se. Their interests spread across various topics of foreign policy 
including international trade, human security, participation in international 
regimes, global governance, etc.   
  Yet, given the distinctive difference of these states—namely, smallness, 
whether in their absolute size or power, there is room for us to doubt the 
applicability of the one-for-all conceptualization of strategic culture on small 
states‘ foreign policy making, especially those without extensive military 
experience or long history. In the small-state literature, the terms ―small,‖ ―weak,‖ 
and ―insecure‖ are often used interchangeably.106 However, an obvious difficulty 
in devising a research program for ―small states studies‖ is that ―small‖ and 
―large‖ are relative concepts, subject to different interpretation.107 Geser 
distinguishes three kinds of small state nations: first, substantial smallness refers 
to the ―objective‖ absolute small size of a country‘s resources such as territory or 
population (e.g. Monaco, Tunisia); second, the relational concept implies relative 
smallness in comparison to other countries (e.g. Costa Rica vs. U.S., Laos vs. 
China); and third, attributive smallness denotes the ―subjective‖ small size in the 
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perception of either oneself or others (e.g., Singapore, Luxembourg).
108
 Although 
resource capabilities necessarily constrain the scope and domain of foreign policy 
of small states, Koehane argues that ―a psychological dimension must therefore be 
added for the sake of clarity as well as in recognition of the fact that ‗objective 
reality‘ does not determine statesmen‘s behavior directly.‖109 In other words, the 
corresponding ―smallness‖ must be recognized and internalized by the state 
concerned. This subjective understanding in the perception of either oneself or 
others necessarily affect how small states act and how others deal with these 
states. The countries to be selected for this dissertation thus will meet both 
criteria: objective smallness and self-perceived smallness. 
 
Strategic Culture and ASEAN 
 The Southeast Asia states fair poorly in comparison to their Northeast 
Asian and European peers in attracting scholarly attention in the field of strategic 
culture study. The only book available on the subject, The Strategic Cultures in 
the Asia-Pacific, was edited and published in 1999 by Ken Booth and Russell 
Trood.
110
 The paucity of research can be attributed to the much acclaimed 
ASEAN Way and how it has been conveniently mistaken as the strategic culture 
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of all member states. For the purpose of upholding the sanctity of state 
sovereignty and territorial integrity, the Southeast Asian governments have 
incorporated the principles of consensus-based decision-making and non-
intervention into their dealings with neighboring countries. As already discussed 
in the previous chapter, the regional norms should not be taken as representative 
of the views of individual member states. More importantly, it is careless, if not 
incorrect, to assume the uniform institutionalization of the norms by each member 
state both in terms of scope and extent. If ASEAN way is indeed the 
representative strategic culture of the region and peaceful resolution of intramural 
conflict the norm, the initiative to push for further political-security integration 
should have received higher popularity and support. 
 
Research Design 
 For clarification, this paper takes on Mahnken and Glen‘s definition 
because both interpretations allow for a rational link to be established between 
means and ends in a cultured context. Strategic culture is defined as a distinctive 
set of socialized, internalized, and legitimized beliefs, assumptions, and behavior 
patterns regarding the appropriate means and ends chosen by members of the 
national security community to achieve the security objectives of the state
111
. 
Strategic community refers to the groups of people responsible for making 
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strategic decisions in a given state.
112
 The shared beliefs, assumptions, and 
behavior patterns over time have attained ―a state of semi-permanence that places 
them on the level of ‗culture‘ rather than policy‖113 through contested 
socialization, internalization and legitimatization by the strategic community. This 
strategic culture acts as an intervening variable through which the strategic 
community derives a permissible boundary to formulate their ranked strategies 
(martial and otherwise) to the security problems at hand.
114
  
Other than the rationalist disposition, the Mahnken and Glen definition 
permits the possibility that strategic culture may be subject to both internal and 
external forces of contestation and change.
115
 Moreover, the definition avoids the 
almost tautological question of ―what is context‖ from the first generation. It also 
escapes the criticism of over-determinism that is often launched against the third 
generation scholars.  It has been argued that ―[s]trategic culture scholars have 
largely been guilty of assuming the existence of natural, stable and unitary 
security communities (states) that each possesses a unique strategic culture.‖116 
By making strategic culture susceptible to endogenous and exogenous factors, 
Mahnken and Glen‘s conceptualizations correct the tendency of prevailing 
understandings of strategic culture to presume the continuation of the status quo.  
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Hypotheses 
This dissertation seeks to explain the lack of cooperative security in 
Southeast Asia from the premise of strategic culture. Combining the theoretical 
framework of strategic culture and the empirical findings about small state 
decision making process, three general hypotheses can be derived along with 
three subsidiary hypotheses regarding ASEAN states. 
First, given that many of the small states are post-World War II creations, 
such as those found in Southeast Asia, these states may lack the time required for 
historical or ideational factors to take root. One may contend that the impact of 
colonialism may still have some lingering effect on the formation of strategic 
culture. However, as states go through decolonization and eventually claim 
independence, their security concerns should no longer mirror that of the 
colonizers and their strategic preferences should adjust accordingly. The 
configuration of strategic culture in newly formed small states thus should be 
shaped by factors that reflect the new ideals, conditional responses, and patterns 
of behaviors shared by the post-colonial national strategic community with regard 
to foreign and security policies.  
In other words, strategic culture of small states may be situationally 
defined.  However, this hypothesis cannot be taken to imply a reaffirmation of the 
realist argument that the strategic choices of small states are primarily the 
reflection of external constraints and opportunities irrespective of internal push 
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and pull.
117
 To avoid overburdening the research with trivial variables, this 
dissertation proceeds with great caution in uncovering potential candidates that 
may inform the development of strategic culture. As suggested by Gray, in order 
to merit the rubric ―culture,‖ the variables under consideration must have a 
somewhat lasting nature and effect even when ―[i]ts roots might not be very deep, 
and the plant might be a recent development…‖118 
H1: In small states where historical experience or historically rooted 
strategic preferences may be limited, material influences and 
situational considerations should take precedence over ideational 
factors in the making of the state‘s strategic culture.  
H1a: Ideational factors should matter less in ASEAN states‘ strategic 
culture. 
It has been traditionally argued that small states, such as those in 
Southeast Asia, are more sensitive to ongoing developments in the international 
system due to their limited resources and heightened vulnerability.
119
 These 
countries, characterized by objective smallness and/or self-perceived smallness 
are essentially ―local powers whose demands are restricted to their own and 
immediate adjacent areas.‖120 We thus surmise that  
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H2: The content of small state strategic culture should focus primarily on 
foreign and security policy issues that originate in their neighborhood. 
H2a: The formation of ASEAN states‘ strategic culture should be heavily 
subject to regional security   considerations.  
Although institutionalists argue that regional cooperative security 
arrangements offer small powers various advantages such as transparency, 
predictability, pooled resources, and joint planning
121
, their willingness to join 
others in the region and establish some form of cooperative security is a function 
of how they securitized themselves vis-à-vis each other. Thus, in a highly charged 
region, a heightened threat perception from the immediate adjacent areas over 
time will lead to the development of a highly reactive and provocative strategic 
culture.  
H3: Small states‘ threat perceptions from the neighborhood over time 
dictate the formation of strategic culture (provocative vs. cooperative). 
H3a: ASEAN states should develop a provocative strategic culture vis-à-
vis each other. 
In short, the central thesis of this dissertation is that the distinctive 
attribute of ASEAN states, smallness, has fostered a two-tiered strategic culture. 
Where threat to the region as a whole has been historically low, the region has 
socialized, internalized, and legitimized a cooperative strategic culture to engage 
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external pressures. At the state-level where intramural distrust has not receded, 
the ASEAN states have developed a reactive and provocative strategic culture 
over time that in turn inhibits the genuine establishment of cooperative security in 
the region. 
 
Operationalization 
Strategic culture is an intervening variable through which the strategic 
community derives a permissible boundary for formulating their ranked responses 
to the threat at hand.  However, even with the modified definition from Mahnken 
and Glen, two distinct problems remain. First, the modified definition does not 
specify what strategic culture comprises. In fact, the literature is equally vague on 
what aspects of ―security‖ strategic culture is concerned with and how it is 
internalized by policy makers.  
In order for strategic culture to be researchable, Gray argues that the 
definition of the term and the methodology to be employed ought to be driven by 
the nature of the subject matter one is trying to find.
122
 Suppose the socialized, 
internalized, legitimized beliefs, assumptions, and behavior patterns are what feed 
into strategic culture, and the targeted behavioral outcome is a state‘s propensity 
for cooperative security, the rational linkage between the appropriate means and 
ends chosen by the security community is thus affected, if not determined, by the 
push and pull of a state‘s predispositions to cooperate and conflict.  
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The two predispositions are proxies for measuring strategic culture. States 
with higher predisposition to cooperate are expected to participate more willingly 
in cooperative security regimes (cooperative). On the contrary, states showing a 
higher tendency for conflict will opt for unitary actions to address security issues 
(provocative). The assumption of the co-existence of both predispositions allows 
one to avoid the over-deterministic either-or situation and the possibility of 
exploring the nuance behind the push and pull of the two predispositions (see 
figure 2.1 below). 
 
 
Figure 2.1: Strategic Culture and Propensity for Cooperative Security 
 
Second, the literature provides little clue on how to determine and reduce 
the wide range of variables that may serve as potential inputs for strategic culture. 
―Studies under the rubric of ‗strategic culture‘ range the spectrum, some focusing 
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primarily on organizational culture within particular security bureaucracies, and 
others taking in the entire horizon of ideational and material influences on a 
country.‖123  Johnston is most adamant in claiming that ―ahistorical or ‗objective‘ 
variables such as technology, capabilities, levels of threat and organizational 
cultures are all of secondary importance: it is the interpretative lens of strategic 
culture that gives meaning to these variables.‖124 In the American example, Mead 
singles out the popular ideals of Alexander Hamilton, Thomas Jefferson, Andrew 
Jackson, and Woodrow Wilson as the main conceptual bases for American 
strategic culture, ideals that have not only been held by the top decision makers 
but also shared by the population as a whole.
125
  
Similarly, Johnson argues that material influences such as access to 
technology and natural resources are the building blocks of state identity, value, 
and perception of reality, and thus should be incorporated into ideational 
factors.
126
 In stark contrast, the authors in Booth and Trood‘s edited volume place 
equal weight on ideational and non-ideational variables that may possibly inform 
the formation of strategic culture.
127
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 Writers on strategic culture, however, have traditionally privileged 
―ideational‖ factors over non-ideational ones. Cultural factors are found abundant 
in many of the enduring great powers. As a result, strategic cultures produced by 
the existing empirical studies are largely ideationally based, building on historical 
experiences and historically rooted strategic preferences. In addition, ideational 
influences in the traditional sense become so expansive and omnipotent that all 
non-ideational variables are subordinate to ideational ones. Following Booth and 
Trood‘s equal-weight approach, this dissertation leaves open the possibility that 
ideational factors may be limited in a small state to form the country‘s strategic 
culture, or that, non-ideational influences are at least equally influential as 
ideational ones.    
One contribution this dissertation makes is to identify how strategic 
culture is processed and adopted by the strategic community in a given state. It is 
assumed by the literature that strategic culture, if it exists, tends to be 
automatically internalized by the elites. Morgan was the first researcher to bring 
in the dimension of government process into his model of strategic culture. 
However, Morgan wrote vaguely that ―[t]he formal structure of that process is a 
function of the… nation‘s form of government.‖128 He did not elaborate on how 
the process of internalizing strategic culture varies by governments with different 
political structures. Although he later qualifies his statement by adding that the 
strategic community ―carr[ies] out their deliberations within a social framework 
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created by the shared scripts that comprise their decision-making custom,‖ this is 
not much different from how strategic culture is (subliminally) internalized in the 
conceptualization of the first generation or third generation scholars.   
Analogous to how a corporation makes strategic business decisions, for 
strategic culture to be internalized, it must go through process of strategic option 
evaluation (see figure 2.2 below). Government strategic decision making is very 
similar to corporate or military decision making in which three appraisal criteria 
are commonly used for strategic option evaluation: suitability, feasibility, and 
acceptability.
129
 In the corporate world, suitability is concerned with whether a 
strategic option addresses the issues relating to the strategic position of the 
organization. If a strategic option helps the firm to improve or overcome an 
existing strategic weakness, such an option would be suitable for implementation. 
It is thus important to first identify the situation at hand and the current stand on 
the issue. The proposed actions must be deliverable with the capabilities/resources 
currently possessed and willingly committed by the state. Strategic options that 
are not deliverable are of little value with the exception of diversionary policies 
that are of political utility but offer no real solution to the problem at hand. 
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Figure 2.2: Strategic Option Evaluation 
 
Lastly, acceptability is concerned with the expected performance outcome 
and the extent to which these meet the expectation of the stakeholders (the 
strategic elites in this case). In public affairs, the chosen policy option must enjoy 
political support (and public support) to legitimize the course of action, or at the 
very least enough political backing to withstand opposition and criticism. It is in 
the last appraisal criterion where strategic culture might exert a stronger influence 
in the form of bounded rationality as the evaluation of the previous two criteria 
are more based on objective facts and considerations. The bounded rationality in 
this context is formed by the recurrent and patterned social arrangements that 
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appear to subconsciously influence and limit the capacity and opportunity of 
individual agents to make free choices.
130
 For example, if a small state historically 
holds a strategic culture of cooperation, the strategic elites will be less inclined to 
accept cost/benefit analysis based on relative gains.  
By adding government process and the evaluation criteria to the model, 
Johnston‘s oft-criticized non-finding that Ming China had two strategic cultures 
and the parabellum one was the one seemingly at work can be better explained. 
To measure against the three criteria, the symbolic Confucian strategic culture 
only fulfills the first one. Although the Confucian strategic culture enjoyed wide 
public, scholarly, and political support, it was not suitable to address the strategic 
environment Ming China faced. As a maritime power, Ming China of the 15
th
 
century was beset by several continental threats: Mongols to the north, Annam to 
the south, and Korea to the northeast. The emphasis the Ming court placed on 
tribute missions over use of force and the priority on building navy over army 
rendered any course of action inadequate to fend off the continental aggressors. 
Thus it is no surprise that the parabellum strategic culture took precedence over 
the Confucian one. 
 
                                                 
130
 The concept of bounded rationality, developed by the Nobel laureate Herbert Simon, originally 
means decision makers, irrespective of their level of intelligence, are faced with three unavoidable 
constraints when making a decision: 1) information is not always accurate or available; 2) 
cognitive limitations may affect an individual‘s capacity to process and evaluate the available 
information; and lastly 3) there is always time constraint. Therefore, decision makers who intend 
to make rational choices are bound to make ―satisficing‖ rather than ―optimizing‖ choices in 
complex situations. See Herbert A. Simon, Models of Man: Social and Rational (New York: John 
Wiley and Sons, 1957).  
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Methodology 
This dissertation proposes to study the strategic culture of small states 
through a two stage analysis: conceptual and relational content analyses (see 
discussion below), and process tracing in qualitative case studies. Although small 
state is the focus of this dissertation, the very same method can be applied to the 
studies of strategic cultures of any state, large or small. Conceptual and relational 
content analyses allow us to deconstruct communications that are most relevant to 
a country‘s strategic thinking.  Another chief advantage of the ―unstructuredness‖ 
of content analysis data is that ―it preserves the conceptions of the data‘s sources, 
which structured methods largely ignore.‖131 The relationships deduced will then 
to be analyzed in qualitative case studies through the process tracing method. 
 
Case Selections 
Since our goal is to study cooperative security in Southeast Asia through 
the lens of small state strategic culture, the countries to be selected for case study 
must meet a combination of these two criteria: objective smallness and self-
perceived smallness. Given that there is little research on strategic culture of small 
states in the Asia Pacific, this paper selects Singapore, Thailand, and Malaysia for 
case study. In fact, only one book chapter is found on the subject for each 
                                                 
131
 Klaus Krippendorff, Content Analysis: An Introduction to Its Methodology, 2
nd
 edition (Beverly 
Hills, CA: Sage, 2004), 41. 
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country.
132
 The selection of the three countries is justified on the ground that these 
three small states are among the five founding members of ASEAN. The 
hypothesized relationships of small state strategic culture and their effect on the 
receptivity to cooperative security should be most readily manifested in the 
foreign and security policies of these three states. 
Singapore is easy case as it meets both small state criteria.  Not only is it a 
geophysical small state in absolute size, it also perceives itself so and projects 
itself as regional power without global reach.  Thailand will be a hard case as the 
country is well-known for its long history and war in its past.  However, although 
Thailand has just started to gain international profile in the last two decades, it 
does not claim to be a regional power. Rather, its security focus is domestically 
oriented. Malaysia also appears to be a hard case, if not a deviant one because it is 
certainly not small in absolute geophysical size.  While Malaysia sees itself as a 
―small developing country player in the international arena…,‖ it is nonetheless 
one small state with activism and resolve to speak up on issues that other 
developing countries feel constrained to voice.
133
   
 
                                                 
132
 See the chapters for Singapore, Thailand, and Malaysia in Booth and Trood, Strategic Cultures 
in the Asia-Pacific Region. 
133―An Overview of Malaysia‘s foreign Policy,‖ Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Malaysia, accessed 
October 23, 2010, http://www.kln.gov.my/?m_id=2. 
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Text 
The texts to be deconstructed include the annual defense white paper 
published by the three countries under study. Another set of documents to be 
content analyzed are chapters in ARF Regional Security Outlook submitted to the 
ASEAN Regional Forum by each country respectively. These two sets of 
documents are particularly useful for the study of strategic culture because the 
content of the documents has direct bearing on the strategic concerns of each 
state.  Annual defense white papers typically spell out a state‘s security 
environment, defense capabilities, national defense issues at hand, and measures 
to address these defense issues. The chapters in ARF Regional Security Outlook 
contain information on the perceived security threats by each state and their 
proposed solutions to these problems. Moreover, these two sets of documents 
provide us with an opportunity to identity the members of the strategic 
community in each country. Those who have contributed to the making of these 
two sets of documents are believed to be the decision makers of the state‘s foreign 
and security policies. However, with the exception of Singapore, Malaysia and 
Thailand do not publish either set of document consistently. In the case where the 
desired documents are unavailable, foreign policy statements and national security 
policy statements from the prime minister‘s office are used as substitutions. 
Although there is a real danger that official documents may be white-washed 
before they become available for public viewing, these documents nevertheless 
represent the consensus among the members of the strategic community regarding 
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the permissible boundary within which they contemplate, deliberate, and make 
strategic policy choices.  
 
Conceptual Content Analysis 
Because this dissertation makes no presupposition on which factors inform 
a country‘s strategic culture, the search for these inputs, ideational or non-
ideational, is necessarily open-ended. Dictionary-based content analysis is best 
suited for the project. The pre-existing classification scheme allows researchers to 
map the content of any textual data without the need to customize a new scheme. 
This not only shortens the time needed to devise a new classification scheme but 
also strengthens the accuracy and reproducibility of the result. Any dictionary-
supplied classification scheme comes with categories followed by a list of words. 
For example, the category of religion includes words pertaining to religious, 
metaphysical, supernatural or relevant philosophical materials. Classification 
schemes vary by the type of dictionary used.  
To avoid human coding error, this dissertation utilizes a computer-assisted 
approach for content analysis of textual data. In particular, this dissertation finds 
the General Inquirer (GI) software created by Phillip Stone of Harvard University 
most suitable for the project. General Inquirer performs content analyses with 
dictionaries based on the Lasswell and Harvard IV-4 dictionaries. The 182 GI 
categories were developed specifically for social science content analysis research 
applications. Although Krippendorff and others argued that the assumed category 
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schemes in the software impose the reality of the investigator on the text, the 
dictionaries used in this project are considered commonsense category schemes 
for political analysis rather than the operationalization of a formal theory.
134
 
First, each statement will be subject to word count and disambiguation 
routines for high-frequency English homographs. Since the reliability at all levels 
of aggregation is found to be substantially less than the reliabilities for specific 
words or phrase, the recording unit for the preliminary mapping in this project is 
the word
135
. The assumption is that words that appear frequently in the text reflect 
important concerns in the text. A disambiguation routine of homographs follows 
to ensure the correct categorization of words. At this stage, we are only interested 
in quantifying the words and reducing the text into manageable content 
categories, not in examining how they are related. The final result is an ordered 
word-frequency list of disambiguated text. 
In addition, General Inquirer conveniently organizes words into eight 
different institutional categories, representing both ideational and material 
variables (see table 1 below). A high score (weighted) reflects use of the language 
of that institution. The disambiguated frequency counts will provide a good 
starting point to uncover what factor matters the most/least to a country‘s political 
elite‘s strategic culture. 
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 Krippendorff, Content Analysis, 157. 
135
 Robert Weber, Basic Content Analysis (New York: Sage Publishing, 1990), 39. 
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Table 2.1: General Inquirer ―Institution‖ Categories 
Material 
Variables 
Economy 510 words of an economic, commercial, industrial, or business 
orientation, including roles, collectivities, acts, abstract ideas, and 
symbols, including references to money. Includes names of common 
commodities in business. 
Politics 507 words having a clear political character, including political roles, 
collectivities, acts, ideas, ideologies, and symbols 
Military 88 words relating to military matters. 
Legal 192 words relating to legal, judicial, or police matters. 
Ideational 
Variables 
Academy 153 words relating to academic, intellectual or educational matters, 
including the names of major fields of study 
Doctrine 217 words referring to organized systems of belief or knowledge, 
including those of applied knowledge, mystical beliefs, and arts that 
academics study.  
Expressive 205 words associated with the arts, sports, and self-expression 
Religion 103 words pertaining to religious, metaphysical, supernatural or 
relevant philosophical matters. 
Source: General Inquirer http://www.wjh.harvard.edu/~inquirer/homecat.htm 
 
Relational content analysis 
However, frequency count is meaningless without contextual 
interpretation. Especially with ideological and conceptual explanations in mind, 
Billig commented that ―[t]his sort of methodology can count words, but it cannot 
interpret them. Under some circumstances mere counting can lead to misleading 
conclusions.‖136 To go beyond the plain word count, a relational content analysis 
is needed where the relationships between concepts can be defined and classified. 
After all, ―[c]oncepts are ideational kernels that in isolation are devoid of 
meaning.‖137   
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 Michael Billig, Methodology and Scholarship in Understanding Ideological Explanation, in 
Analysing Everyday Explanation: A Casebookof Methods, edited by C. Antaki (London: Sage, 
1988), 206. 
137
 Kathleen Carley, Case Study & Computing: Advanced Qualitative Methods in the Study of 
Human Behavior (New York: Ablex Publishing Corporation, June 1996): 154. 
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Relational content analysis begins with a concordance on the concepts that 
appear most frequently in the word count. A concordance is an alphabetical list of 
the principal words used in the text with their immediate context. The resulting 
concordance list will be presented in the key word in context format, with the aid 
of KWIC Concordance for Windows, a computer software designed for this 
purpose. ―KWIC lists provide structured information that is helpful in 
determining whether the meaning of particular words is dependent on their use in 
center phrases or idiom.‖138 This routine acts as a second filter to disambiguate 
and analyze words in their specific context.   
Based on the resulting concordance, relational analysis can be carried out 
by analyzing the relationship among categories that frequently appear together 
(collocation). Unlike conventional qualitative research on strategic culture which 
tends to plainly describe each factor individually and coequally, the relational 
analysis here is intended to gauge the relative weight of each factor and how they 
influence each other. The assumption here is that the relative weight of each 
factor should reflect its level of importance to the outcome. The difference in 
importance is apparent in the final ranking of factors. To fully extricate the 
embedded relationship among factors, three elements will be closely studied: 
strength, sign, and direction of a relationship.
139
 
                                                 
138
 Weber, Basic Content Analysis, 44. 
139
 ―Writing Guide-Content Analysis,‖ Colorado University, accessed November 6, 2010. 
http://writing.colostate.edu/guides/research/content/index.cfm. 
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Strength of relationship refers to the extent to which two or more concepts 
are interrelated. Linguistic modifiers such as ―must,‖ ―exclusively,‖ ―least,‖ or 
―never‖ signify different levels of interconnectedness between concepts. For 
example, in the sentence ―we must consider the geopolitical location of our 
country in devising the nation‘s grand strategy,‖ the strength of relationship 
between geopolitical location and grand strategy is strong as one cannot formulate 
the latter without considering the former. While a continuous (scale) coding 
scheme may detail intricate relationships between concepts, it is infeasible to 
assign a numerical value of ―strongness‖ to each modifier. For instance, if we 
were to assign a numerical value of ―strongness‖ from 0 to 100 to ―probably‖ and 
―maybe,‖ the numbers should fall somewhere between 25 to 75.  But within this 
range, it is impossible to assign a more specific number to each modifier. Both 
modifiers may possibly share the same numerical value, depending on the 
context. To solve this problem, the strength of relationship is instead 
approximated by the number of collocation between two words. The assumption 
is that words that appear frequently in tandem are more strongly related. 
 After determining the strength of a relationship between concepts, we then 
look into the sign of that relationship. In this process, we try to identify whether 
the concepts are positively or negatively related. We first identify the presence of 
sentence-modifier adverb ―no‖ and its declarative form ―not‖ which are perceived 
to depict a negation of a related statement. In our previous example, ―we must 
consider the geopolitical location of our country in devising the nation‘s grand 
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strategy, the absence of negation indicates geopolitical location and grand strategy 
are positively related. However, the simple negation test may miss relationships 
that are modified by other adverbs or adverbial clauses. For instance, Satha-
Anand finds that in Thai Buddhism, ―belief in the Buddha‘s teaching coexists 
with a reverence for local spirits and Hindu gods.‖ In this sentence, Thai 
Buddhism is associated positively with folk religion and Hinduism. Concepts with 
negative signs are considered unrelated and prevented from entering the next 
stage of relational analysis.  
 Lastly, to fully determine the relationship between concepts, we need to 
ascertain the direction of the relationship. Strength and sign are the two necessary 
procedures to weed out concepts that have no bearing on each other. At this stage, 
the data are further reduced into a more manageable size. We are left with 
concepts that may inform each other in the making of a country‘s strategic 
culture.  The concordance list in the key word in context format produced earlier 
is in essence directional-neutral. It is only helpful in identifying the co-occurrence 
of concepts but not the direction of their relationship, if any. Typical directional 
relationships include, ―X taking place before Y,‖ ―If X then Y,‖ or ―X implies Y.‖  
Directional analysis is exceptionally useful in establishing the impact of one 
factor on another. For example, in Singapore‘s case, ―[i]nvasion from the north… 
is an almost obligatory initiating scenario for Singapore‘s wargamers… based as 
they are on the logic of history and an appreciation of geostrategic realties.‖140  
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Invasion from the north implies war. More importantly, the deep concern for 
invasion from the north derives its sources from historical analogy and 
geostrategic location. 
 
Qualitative Case Studies 
 One caveat is that this research contains no control. There are no case 
studies on non-small states with which to compare small state foreign policy 
behavior.  As the literature is full of case studies on larger states, the absence of 
this control (i.e. case studies on great powers) should not present itself as a 
methodological predicament. As such, this dissertation follows a ―similar case‖ 
approach in which researchers examine a series of cases sharing crucial criteria, 
smallness in this case, and draws conclusions from them. The purpose of the 
qualitative case studies is to ascertain that the factors and their relationships 
identified in the content analysis phase do manifest themselves in the process of 
strategic decision making in each country respectively. The focus here is the 
internalization of strategic culture in government process. Through process 
tracing, the case studies provide a means for us to map which, how, and when 
strategic culture takes effect. According to George and McKeown, process tracing 
is most adept at ―investigat(ing) and explain(ing) the decision process by which 
various initial conditions are translated into outcomes.‖141 More specifically, this 
method ―attempts to uncover what stimuli the actors attend to; the decision 
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 George, Alexander L. and Timothy J. McKeown, "Case Studies and Theories of Organizational 
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process that makes use of these stimuli to arrive at decisions; the actual behavior 
that then occurs; the effect of various institutional arrangements on attention, 
processing, and behavior; and the effect of other variables of interest on attention, 
processing, and behavior.‖142 
The first case study sets out to examine the strategic option evaluation 
process in Malaysia and Singapore‘s participation in the maritime anti-terrorist 
multilateral regime, the latest and arguably more pressing addition to ASEAN 
cooperative security agenda. Simon once observed in 2005 that ―there are no 
ongoing exercises or patrols involving the armed forces of three or more 
Southeast Asian states that either cross national boundaries or operate on the high 
seas or in international air space.‖143 It was not until very recently that there 
appear some joint patrol activities by several littoral states in the Malacca Strait, 
though prior consultation is still required when entering other‘s territorial 
water.
144
 The second case study examines Thailand‘s reaction to Cambodia‘s 
efforts at internationalizing the Preah Vihear conflict along the contested Thai-
Cambodian border. In particular, this case study explores the rationale of 
Thailand‘s insistence barring third-party mediation and international involvement 
at the expense of prolonged militarized conflict and mounting casualties. This 
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dissertation process-traces the strategic decision making process by consulting 
archival documents and secondary sources.   
 
Conclusion 
In sum, this dissertation sets out to complete three tasks.  First, it seeks to 
map strategic culture in small states. This dissertation challenges the conventional 
wisdom that strategic culture is mainly ideationally based. The empirical studies 
have over-privileged ideational factors at the expense of material or situational 
ones.  In small states where historical experience or historically rooted strategic 
preference is found wanting, material constrains and situational considerations 
should take precedence over ideational factors. Second, it proposes a two-stage 
methodological improvement to address which, how, and when strategic culture 
affects foreign policy outcomes in all states, small or large. The proposed 
methodological improvement not only gauges the relative weight of the 
constituent elements of strategic culture through conceptual and relational content 
analysis but also specifies the internalization of such culture in strategic decision 
making through process tracing in qualitative case studies. Last but not least, to 
better understand why there is no concrete cooperative security regime in the 
region. As Southeast Asia has been labeled the ―second front of terrorism,‖ 
external powers such as the U.S. have been increasingly pressing the region for 
enhanced military and security cooperation both bilaterally and multilaterally. 
However, one should understand, after reading this dissertation, that ASEAN is 
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not NATO. ASEAN is devoid of genuine trust internally, a prerequisite for 
security cooperation. Confidence building must precede military cooperation. 
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Chapter 3 
SINGAPORE'S STRATEGIC CULTURE 
 
Singapore in Southeast Asia 
Singapore‘s objective smallness in territorial size and lack of strategic 
depth have engendered a continuous official propaganda campaign since its 
independence to instill the discourses of ―smallness,‖ ―vulnerability,‖ and 
―survival‖ into the psyche of every Singaporean. The challenge to Singapore 
remains the same as the late Sinnathamby Rajaratnam (Singapore‘s first Minister 
of Foreign Affairs) once opined: ―our problem is how to make sure that a small 
island with a teeming population and no natural resources to speak of, can 
maintain, even increase, its living standards and also enjoy peace and security in a 
region marked by mutual jealousies, internal violence, economic disintegration 
and great power conflicts.‖145 This vulnerability, firmly believed by the 
government, will only increase as Singapore becomes more integrated with the 
global economy.
146
 
On this lowland of 710.3 square kilometer there reside of 5.077 million 
permanent residents and foreign workers.
147
 Against the backdrops of its size, 
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lack of natural resources, and a small domestic market, the city-state, via the 
government-led export oriented development model and heavy state investment in 
human capital, has upgraded itself from the bottom of the production chain to a 
distinctive spot in the global division of labor, specializing in higher value-added 
activities along with the vision of transitioning to a knowledge based economy in 
the near future. According to the CIA World Factbook, Singapore achieved a real 
growth rate of 14.70% in 2010, the highest in the region and second in the 
world.
148
 The ―Singapore Story‖, proudly presented by the government, ―is the 
account of how a small island-nation overcame its vulnerabilities and prospered, 
despite overwhelming odds.‖149  
Yet, Singapore‘s economic success does not bring much security. The 
constant fear of being encircled in a ―sea of Malay‖ has been exacerbated by the 
―little red dot‖ comment made by the former president of Indonesia, Habibie, in 
an interview with the Asian Wall Street Journal: ―It's O.K. with me, but there are 
211 million people (in Indonesia). All the green (area) is Indonesia. And that red 
dot is Singapore.‖150 Its geographic proximities and volatile relationships with 
larger neighbors, especially Malaysia and Indonesia, compel the island to tighten 
security across the board. The growing salience of a multitude of unconventional 
security problems further complicates Singapore‘s security environment.  
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Given an already harsh security environment and persistent anxiety over 
new sources of vulnerability such as U.S. strategic retrenchment and new 
transnational threats,
151
 Singapore‘s participation in multilateral cooperative 
security regimes is at best selective. It has traditionally relied on the principle of 
self-reliance and bilateral ties to shore up its defence needs. If any unilateral 
attempt at seeking security risks a security dilemma which may easily attract 
suspicion from the neighborhood, why does Singapore remain lukewarm toward 
cooperative security architecture in the region? Understanding Singapore‘s 
strategic culture, characterized by the push and pull between cooperation and 
conflict, may shed light on how Singapore perceives threats and the policy 
instruments chosen to tackle existing and future security problems facing the 
country. 
 
Approximating Singapore‘s Strategic Culture 
Once again, the study of ―strategic culture‖ explores how the world views 
of the political-military decision makers influence their strategic choices at the 
highest political level‖ and policy options at the operational or tactical level.152 At 
the conflict end is a Hobbesian world of zero-sum competition while the 
cooperation end exemplifies the Kantian positive-sum (at the very least non zero-
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sum) community (see Figure 3.1 below). Yet, the two extremes on the continuum 
can only be seen as ideal types and no state can long reside at either end. State‘s 
strategic culture is characterized by the push and pull between two opposing 
forces, the predisposition to cooperation on one end and the predisposition to 
conflict on the other.  
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.1: Deconstructing Strategic Culture 
 
This dissertation concedes that quantitative measures for any cultural 
variable have limitation. It is at best an approximation of one part of the culture, 
strategic culture in this case. However, the numerical representation may be 
useful for cross-country comparison. 
The computer assisted content analysis software, General Inquirer, 
processed 13 defence and security related documents (see Table 3.1 below) with a 
total of 83,766 words. These are official documents issued by the Singaporean 
government at the ministerial level. Speeches by individual political elites are 
excluded because the speeches may reflect the personal views of the speech giver, 
not that of the state.  
 
Hobbesian 
Zero-Sum 
Conflict 
Kantian 
Positive-Sum 
Cooperation 
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Table 3.1: Singapore Documents to be Content Analyzed 
 
 
The first three white papers published by Singapore‘s Ministry of Defence 
in 1992, 1994 and 2000 are considered traditional defence white papers. All three 
documents contain sections on Singapore‘s defence and security policies, 
evaluation on the current and future security environment, the state‘s relations 
with intra and extra regional powers, and more importantly, information on the 
Singapore Armed Forces including the roles the Armed Forces play in national 
defence, military expenditure and procurement plans, order of battle, current stage 
of revolution in military affairs, and challenges the armed forces are expected to 
encounter. The 2004 whitepaper responds exclusively to the threat of terrorism in 
the post-9/11 context. In particular, the document details the organizational 
changes through the ―networking approach‖ not only in the three services of the 
Armed Forces but also within the entire government apparatus to better prevent, 
protect against, and respond to terrorist attacks. The 2008 booklet succinctly 
 Document Title Word Count 
1 ASEAN Regional Forum Annual Security Outlook, Singapore Chapter 2001 1,318 
2 ASEAN Regional Forum Annual Security Outlook, Singapore Chapter 2002 1,533 
3 ASEAN Regional Forum Annual Security Outlook, Singapore Chapter 2003 2,061 
4 ASEAN Regional Forum Annual Security Outlook, Singapore Chapter 2004 2,347 
5 ASEAN Regional Forum Annual Security Outlook, Singapore Chapter 2005 2,869 
6 ASEAN Regional Forum Annual Security Outlook, Singapore Chapter 2007 2,599 
7 ASEAN Regional Forum Annual Security Outlook, Singapore Chapter 2008 2,705 
8 ASEAN Regional Forum Annual Security Outlook, Singapore Chapter 2009 3,497 
9 Defence White Paper, The Defence of Singapore 1992-1993 15,218 
10 Defence White Paper, The Defence of Singapore 1994 17,839 
11 Defence White Paper, Defence Singapore in the 21
st
 Century, 2000 15,562 
12 Defence White Paper, The Fight Against Terrorism, 2004 13,550 
13 Security Policy, Total Defence, 2008 680 
 Total 84,845 
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summarizes the cornerstone of Singapore‘s security and defence policy: Total 
Defence. This document reiterates how the five pillars of Total Defence 
(psychological, civil, economic, social, and military) may aid the country to 
strategically deter external threats.  
Up till the year 2009, Singapore has regularly submitted three sections in 
its annual security outlook to the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF): outlook on 
regional security, review of existing regional cooperation, and Singapore‘s 
contribution to regional security. The latest submission, published in 2009, differs 
from the previous versions in three ways. First, the conventional outlook on 
regional security has been broadened to include the perceptions of global security. 
Second, for the first time, Singapore officially discusses the ARF‘s role in 
regional security. In particular, ―ARF has moved beyond discussions to more 
substantive cooperation…‖ since its inception in 1994. In other words, the ARF 
has moved beyond its Confidence Building Measures (CBMs) phase and is ready 
to implement the second phase mandated in the ARF inaugural concept paper, 
preventive diplomacy.
153
 Lastly, the government inserts a short section on its 
defence policies in the report, briefing the ARF on the core elements of its 
defence policy and defense spending in the past five years.  
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Predisposition to Conflict vs. Predisposition to Cooperate 
GI identifies 2,488 power-conflict related words and 1,267 power-
cooperation words. To translate, figure 3.2 (see below) shows the graphical 
representation of the push and pull between a stronger tendency toward conflict 
vis-à-vis a weaker inclination to cooperate.  
 
 
Figure 3.2: Approximating Singapore‘s Strategic Culture 
 
In the defence white paper category, GI identifies 1,986 power-conflict 
related words and 746 power-cooperation related words. The tendency to conflict 
is three times stronger than the predisposition to cooperation. One can reasonably 
argue that the higher usage for power-conflict related words can be attributed to 
the fact that defence white papers by nature describe defence and military matters. 
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The allusion to and usage of ―words martial‖ may not be taken directly as a 
country‘s intent. Yet, one should also be reminded that as the types of 
―insecurity‖ multiply, terrorist attacks for instance, political elites‘ mindset to 
handle these ―new‖ threats also expanded. Therefore, the policy options of the 
state are no longer restricted exclusively to military instruments. In fact, a quick 
survey of the defence white papers does provide a strong impression of 
Singapore‘s effort for and commitment to multilateral mechanisms whenever 
transnational security issues arise.   
Nevertheless, the tendency to cooperate may still be not strong enough to 
cancel out the negative effect of the predisposition to conflict in the ARF 
documents. This finding is unexpected since ARF member states, especially 
Singapore, frequently point to the need for regional cooperation to handle all sorts 
of security problems. In this batch of documents, GI identifies 1,841 power-
cooperation related words and 1,940 power-conflict related words. This result is 
surprising given that states adhering to the ASEAN Way principles such as 
consensus decision making/agenda setting, non-interference in others‘ internal 
affairs, or non-use of force to solve inter-state problems, are expected to utilize a 
higher percentage of power-cooperation related words. ARF documents are 
accessible to all member states. 
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The Constituent Elements of Singapore‘s Strategic Culture 
The constituent elements of Singapore‘s strategic culture and their relative 
weight are gauged first by subgrouping the 83,766 words into eight General 
Inquirer institutional categories, four of which are ideational and the other four 
material (see figure 3.3 below). Ideational categories include religion, personal 
expression, doctrine and academia. Non-ideational ones include politics, military, 
legal, and economy. Relational content analysis then identifies key words that 
appear most frequently in each category and qualitatively explore the connection 
these key words have with each others. 
 
 
Figure 3.3: Singapore, Content by Institutional Category 
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Ideational Factors 
DOCTRINE 
The institutional category, DOCTRINE, refers to any organized systems of 
belief or knowledge, including those of applied knowledge, mystical beliefs, and 
arts that academics study. Words such as astronomy, conservatism, medicine, and 
utopian fall under this broad institutional category. GI identifies 1,620 words in 
this category. Notably, the term ―technology‖ and its associated terms appear 
most frequently with a total of 195 in this category. Through disambiguation and 
collocation, technology and the idea of being technologically sophisticated are 
found positively and strongly related to defence (see Figure 3.4 below).  
 
 
 
Figure 3.4: Collocation of ―Technology‖ 
 
How to read the figures: 
- The bold letter represents the base word with the number of appearance in the parenthesis. 
- The arrow denotes the direction of flow. 
- The number in the parentheses indicates the number of co-occurrence with the base word. 
- The plus sign signifies positive correlation with the base word while the negative sign points to 
negative correlation (connected by dotted arrow line). 
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As early as 1992, the Ministry of Defence (MINDEF) justified heavy 
investment in defence technology and the development of a domestic defence 
industry by arguing that technology as a force multiplier is imperative for 
Singapore to overcome the challenges of limited manpower and natural 
resources.
154
 Moreover, the ―new American way of war‖ amply demonstrated in 
the Gulf War, and again, in the ongoing war on terror led Singapore to conclude 
that ―defence technology won the day for the coalition forces despite the fact that 
they faced a numerically stronger foe...‖155 The need for defence necessitates the 
attainment of advanced military technology. Defence is later reinforced by the 
introduction of such technologies into the Singapore Armed Forces (SAF). 
Upon a closer look, other than gaining battlefield advantage, the 
preoccupation with technological sophistication can be attributed to the real 
concern over the decreasing birthrate of an already small population: ―[w]hat is 
lacks in numbers, because of Singapore‘s small population, it more than makes up 
for by exploiting defence technology to yield the force multiplier.‖156 
Accordingly, more emphasis has been given to the indigenous development of 
―smart‖ technologies in the areas of stealth technology, unmanned technology, 
information technology, advanced computer modeling and simulators, protective 
technology, stand-off precision weaponry, and enhanced lift and endurance 
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capabilities.
157
 In particular, information technology is of critical importance to 
Singapore‘s counter-terrorist capability as the Internal Security Department 
employs IT forensic techniques to discover useful intelligence leads. 
Information technology is also an important domain of SAF modernization for the 
third generation force (see discussion below). The establishment of the Defence 
Science and Technology Agency (DSTA), a statutory board set up under the 
MINDEF, represents a major thrust of the government to better coordinate the 
implementation of defence technology plans, defence material procurement, and 
defence infrastructure development on the principle of self-reliance. 
 
RELIG 
The institutional category, RELIG, contains words pertaining to religious, 
metaphysical, supernatural or relevant philosophical matters. Words such as 
church, providence, orthodox, and spiritual are subsumed under this category. Of 
the 84,845 words analyzed, GI filters out 69 words belonging to this category. 
Although the word ―religion‖ and its related words such as ―religious‖ and 
―religions‖ appear 27 times, relational content analysis cannot discern any 
meaningful connection these words have with other vocabularies. Religion is 
mentioned on a few occasions when domestic cohesion is concerned. To 
Singapore, domestic cohesion is largely based on racial and religious harmony. 
The government‘s efforts at Social Defence, one arm of Singapore‘s Total 
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Defence strategy, focuses primary on educating its citizens on how sensitivity to 
the culture, tradition, and religion of one another will be conducive to 
strengthening ties across different ethnic groups in Singapore.
158
  
Alternatively, it is possible that religion is purposely underplayed in 
defence and security policies to avoid unnecessarily stirring up racial and 
religious discord. The comment of former Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew in 1986 
regarding the Malay Singaporean‘s strong allergic reaction to the visit of the 
Israeli President, Herzog, is still apropos: ―… in certain circumstances, the Malay 
Singaporean reacts with the emphasis on Malay/Muslim rather than 
Singaporean.‖159 Racial tension and associated religious conflict are also apparent 
in the armed forces. The response of then Brigadier-General Lee Hsien Loong, 
now the Prime Minister of Singapore, to the underemployment of Malay-
Singaporeans in higher ranking SAF positions is quoted repeatedly by the media 
as a reminder of the precarious racial and religious balance that characterized 
Singapore‘s internal stability: ―…we do not want to put any of our soldiers in a 
difficult position where his emotions for the nation may be in conflict with his 
religion…‖160 These two popular, yet provocative, remarks are in stark contrast to 
Rajaratnam‘s famous speech to the United Nations when the country was 
accorded UN membership in 1965: ―We think of ourselves not as exclusively a 
                                                 
158
 Total Defence 2008, 7. 
159
The Strait Times, December 15, 1986. 
160
 The Strait Times, February 23, 1987. 
   82 
Chinese, an Indian, or a Malay society but as a little United Nations in the 
making.‖161  
Notably in the 2004 Defence White Paper in which terrorism is the 
underlying theme, the government is careful about its wordings when it comes to 
religion. Terrorism, asserted by the government, ―is an ideology based upon a 
gross misreading of Islamic religious… It debases concepts like Jihad.‖162 Given 
that Al Qaeda and other extremist terrorist groups have wrongfully rationalized 
their action in the name of Islam, former Prime Minister Goh Chok Tong in the 
immediate aftermath of 9/11 urged all Muslims in Singapore not to ―allow the 
extremists and militants to set the Islamic agenda.‖163 In many occasions, only 
specific terrorist groups that might be of security concern to Singapore and their 
―evil deeds‖ are noted in official documents. For example, MINDEF warned that 
―Singapore is a target of JI activity because of its place as part of the Daulah 
Islamiyah Nusantara - a conception rooted in history and myth of a pan-Islamic 
superstate comprising much of South-east Asia
164. Similarly, Singapore‘s 
discussion of terrorism in various ARF Annual Security Outlooks places emphasis 
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on what has been done to tackle the problem instead of mentioning any specific 
religion even in passing. 
 
EXPRSV 
The institutional category, EXPRSV is associated with arts, sports, and 
self-expression. Words such as aesthetics, creative, imagination, and spectator fall 
under this category. GI identifies 210 words in this category. However, through 
careful collocation and disambiguation, no meaningful connections between any 
pair of vocabularies are deduced. It is understandable that security and defence 
related documents would have little discussion of arts and sports. Forms of 
entertainment and leisure activities are mentioned sporadically when the daily life 
of soldiers, the National Servicemen (NSmen), is showcased. For example, 
clubhouses and resorts were built to promote esprit de corps among NSmen 
wherein soldiers may ―enjoy a wide range of sports, social and recreational 
facilities as well as educational and leisure courses and activities.‖165 
Reference to self-expression or individualism is absent. On the contrary, 
collective will, a sense of emotional attachment to the country, and the beliefs that 
Singapore is worth defending and more importantly, defendable, are accentuated 
throughout to muster loyalty and patriotism toward the country.
166
 It is strongly 
pointed out by the 2000 Defence White Paper that when it comes to defence, 
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everyone has a part to play, not just the armed forces. In other words, the 
continued survival and security of the nation rest not only on money, material and 
machines available, but also the ―heartware‖ of every Singaporean to the defence 
of the state.
167
  
 
ACADEM 
 The institutional category, ACADEM, groups together words relating to 
academic, intellectual or educational matters, including the names of major fields 
of study. Out of 84,845 words processed, GI isolates 527 words under this 
category. Through disambiguation and collocation, relational content analysis 
discovers linkages between ―research‖ (and its associated form, ―researcher(s)‖) 
and three other vocabularies (see Figure 3.5 below). First of all, research is always 
associated with development. The pair of words mostly references the 
Singaporean government‘s endeavor at establishing as well as strengthening 
domestic Research and Development (R&D) capability in defence technology. 
The twin discourse of ―survival‖ and ―vulnerability‖ propel the government to 
focus on defence technologies that will give Singapore a critical edge when 
countering both military and non-military threats. In fact, Singapore consistently 
invests about 4% of defence spending in R&D.
168
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Figure 3.5: Collocation of ―Research‖ 
 
Yet, the ―smallness‖ in resources (money, material, and manpower) 
unavoidably constrains the government‘s ability prioritize military procurement 
over other national developmental needs. As a result, the Singapore government 
pegs its defence budget at 6% of the GDP, based not on threat perceptions or the 
economic wellbeing of the state, but to reflect ―the point of view that defence is 
investment and not expense, that it is insurance and not consumption.‖169 SAF has 
opted for ―the spiral development approach, which is characterized by a flexible 
outlook on defence procurement. With no fixed end point, each procurement 
process feeds into the next and is continuously refined to achieve the most 
optimal material defence capability.‖170 According to Teo Chee Hean, the 
Minister ―for‖ Defence, there are three general rules of thumb regarding SAF 
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capital expenditure.
171
 First, any acquisition of a new weapon system is strictly on 
a need-basis. Second, to obtain the most cost-effective result, the life cycle of 
existing systems is extended through routine maintenance and upgrades with 
modern technologies. Third, where possible, second hand systems are purchased, 
altered, and upgraded to fit domestic needs.  
 
Non-Ideational Factors 
POLIT 
 The institutional category, POLIT, refers to words having a clear political 
character, including political roles, collectivities, acts, ideas, ideologies, and 
symbols. Words such as Asia, federal, propaganda, and suffrage are examples of 
this category. In the 13 documents processed, GI identifies 8,170 repeated POLIT 
words out of a total of 85,845 words. Several clusters of words stand out and 
connect through a web of positive and negative linkages (see figure 3.6 below). 
First, feeding into ―defence‖ is a group of words representing one pillar of 
Singapore‘s defence and security policy, Total Defence.172 The introduction of 
this umbrella defense concept in 1984, based on the Swiss and Swedish models, 
can be attributed to two situational drivers: 1) the inability to maintain a regular 
force in light of Singapore‘s small population and declining birthrate; and 2) the 
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changing nature of threats and warfare, especially transnational and non-
conventional.  
 
 
Figure 3.6: Collocation of ―Defence‖ 
 
In a nutshell, this comprehensive security strategy, covering five aspects 
of defence, is designed to provide an integrated, synergistic, and seamless 
response to external threats, military or otherwise. The Singapore Armed Forces 
is the military arm of Total Defence. The primary role of the military is to deter 
aggression. However, it will fight and win swiftly and decisively over an 
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aggressor should deterrence fail. The Singapore Civil Defence Force (SCDF) and 
trained volunteers are tasked with disaster relief, whether natural or man-made.  
During peacetime, SCDF is also responsible for raising public awareness of new 
forms of threats to national security and the appropriate responses civilians can 
take should the threats materialize. Other than staying competitive economically, 
Economic Defence places emphasis on policies and measures that will help the 
domestic economy withstand external shocks during crisis times. Social Defence 
stresses maintaining internal stability through community building in a multi-
racial and religious society. Social cohesion can be further strengthened if citizens 
are in the habit of helping each other regardless of their race, language, religion, 
age or nationality. Lastly, Psychological Defence aims not only at nurturing 
patriotism and loyalty in Singaporeans but more importantly, the resolve and 
mental preparedness to overcome challenges as individuals and as a society in 
time of difficulties. Overall, Singaporeans need to believe that Singapore is 
defendable and the country is worth defending. Everyone has a part to play when 
it comes to defending the country. 
 Although in theory the five components should weigh equally and 
reinforce one another, the defence white papers mostly focus on how to 
strengthen the military part of Total Defence. The size of the military budget and 
the apparent resilience in the face of recessions lead one observer to claim that 
―Military Defence appears to be the centerpiece of Total Defence while other 
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components function as auxiliary ones.‖173 In fact, it is the official MINDEF 
position not to cut back defence expenditure during economic downturns because 
threats do not decrease or disappear when economic growth is slow. The constant 
investment approach in defence and the pegged ceiling of 6% GDP for defence 
spending also imply that no sharp increase is permissible. On the whole, the 
interactive and synergistic effect of Total Defence has yet to be seen. 
In light of relatively high spending on Defence, the increasing salience of 
terrorism and the fear factor it creates has propelled the government to further 
shore up the Civil Defence component through organizational transformation. The 
previous emphasis on disaster relief has been broadened to include measures that 
will better prevent, protect against, and respond to terrorist attacks. Specifically, 
the 2004 Defence White Paper: The Fight Against Terror outlines the 
replacement of the hierarchical organization structure with a lateral network 
approach.
174
 Traditionally, various ministries share jurisdiction and responsibility 
over security related issues. Yet, the resources, capabilities, and expertise needed 
to deal with transnational terrorism mandate the convergence of the previously 
separated and independent government agencies. To cultivate a culture of 
collaboration, a new National Security Coordination Secretariat (NSCS) has been 
set up within the Prime Minister‘s office in 2004 to better organize the various 
agencies around policy coordination, operational coordination, and capability 
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development coordination.
175
 Several key measures fall under the purview of this 
new security architecture: intelligence sharing, border control, protection of 
critical infrastructure and key installations, land transport security, aviation 
security, maritime security, and response capabilities to both conventional and 
non-conventional threats. Overall, the high level of interest in future 
contingencies and the preoccupation, if not obsession, with risk assessment and 
horizon scanning have led to the development of a culture of preparedness and 
long range planning.
176
  
Whereas Total Defence epitomizes Singapore‘s internally oriented 
defence approach, the next cluster of words represents Singapore‘s externally 
oriented approach to defence through bilateral and multilateral cooperation. 
Bilateral defence ties are deepened through joint exercises and training programs, 
exchange visits, professional seminars and cross-attendance of military courses.
177
 
In effect, the SAF has engaged in regular joint exercises with almost every 
military in the Asia-Pacific region. The least expected is a series of joint counter-
terrorism training exercises with the People‘s Liberation Army of China starting 
in late 2009.
178
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In comparison to the multitude of bilateral ties, Singapore laments the 
relative underdevelopment of multilateral dialogue and cooperation among 
defence establishments in the region, especially in the area of practical 
cooperation.
179
 While understanding any multilateral defence cooperation is more 
difficult to come by, the government has focused on strengthening existing ones 
such as the Five Power Defence Arrangements (FPDA), the Western Pacific 
Naval Symposium, the Shangri-La Dialogue, the ASEAN Defence Ministers‘ 
Meeting (ADMM), and the ASEAN Regional Forum. Interestingly, in its 
discussion on FPDA, to date the longest standing multilateral defence 
arrangement in the region, MINDEF acknowledges the indivisibility of the 
defence of Malaysia and Singapore.
180
 Support for multilateral arrangements 
notwithstanding, Singapore has not raised the issue of creating a region wide 
security pact, or even a security commitment. Rather, its participation in 
multilateral cooperation is functionally based, mostly restricted to Humanitarian 
Aid and Disaster Relief (HARD). 
The ASEAN Regional Forum is seen by Singapore as a vehicle for 
confidence building measures (CBMs) through dialogues and less of a channel for 
actual comprehensive security cooperation. Absent from the Forum‘s agenda are 
the many bilateral disputes between the ASEAN states. In fact, Singapore rarely 
alludes to issues such as disputed borders and overlapping Exclusive Economic 
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Zones (EEZs), racial and religious tensions, or latent competition for resources 
and influence. Instead, the ARF is a regional platform for discussions of issues of 
―common concern which cannot be tackled on a bilateral basis…‖181 As a matter 
of fact, ARF‘s limitation in conflict management and conflict resolution is duly 
noted by Jayakumar, former Minister of Foreign Affairs: ―ARF helps to cushion 
tensions and manage difficulties. It might not be able to solve disputes or prevent 
the outbreak of conflict, but can minimize their impact.‖182  One wonders how 
Singapore can conclude that the ARF has gone beyond CBMS and is ready to 
move into Preventive Diplomacy, the second phase mandated by the ARF 
Concept Paper of 1994.
183
 
The ARF‘s limitation in conflict management and conflict resolution has 
led Singapore to discuss its security concerns more within ASEAN. Ever since its 
2001 Annual Security Outlook, Singapore has consistently identified China as one 
source of uncertainty. Singapore finds discomfort in the ups and downs of China‘s 
relations with the U.S. and Japan. Singapore deems this triangular relationship 
among the three major powers fundamental to regional stability. Next, although 
the relationship between the two sides of the Taiwan Strait has much improved, 
the possibility of confrontation cannot be permanently excluded. Lastly, China‘s 
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position on the competing claims over the Spratly Islands is of concern both to 
Singapore and other claimants.   
Other than China, terrorism is often discussed within ASEAN in the 
context of regional security. Singapore believes its peace and prosperity is 
inextricably linked to regional stability. After all, given the lack of strategic depth, 
any internal unrest on the island would be affected and exacerbated by external 
threats. In Singapore‘s opinion, the ever-present threat of terrorism has served as 
―a galvanizing factor providing further impetus to regional co-operation.‖184 
Counter-terrorism is one area where ASEAN member states are more actively and 
collaboratively involved. Most notably, ASEAN Leaders signed the ASEAN 
Convention on Counter-Terrorism (ACCT) at the 12
th
 ASEAN Summit in Cebu, 
the Philippines, in 2007. The Convention signifies the ―first region-wide, legally 
binding anti-terrorism pact‖ with mandatory compliance to all relevant UN 
Conventions and Protocols regarding Counter-Terrorism.
185
 According to the 
ASEAN Secretariat, the Convention is still awaiting ratification from at least six 
ASEAN Member States before it can be elevated to the status of a regional treaty. 
To date only four countries has done so with Cambodia being the latest addition 
to ratify the Convention in June 2010 following Singapore, Thailand, and the 
Philippines.
186
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Of the various forms of terrorist attack, Singapore has identified maritime 
security as the most pressing issue facing the country. Unimpeded sea lines of 
communication (SLOC) is the lifeline of Singapore‘s export oriented economy. 
To more effectively police Singapore‘s territorial waters, the government has 
reorganized its costal command in early 2009 and established a new Maritime 
Security Task Force (MSTF) uniting four existing agencies: the Maritime Port 
Authority; the Police Coast Guard; the Immigration and Checkpoints Authority, 
and Customs.
187
 Singapore has also bolstered maritime domain awareness by 
setting up an Information Fusion Center (IFC) at the Changi Command and 
Control Center.
188
  
In addition to force restructuring, Singapore is eager to push forward 
practical cooperation in joint patrols in the Malacca Strait, one of the world‘s 
maritime chokepoints. A regional consensus over cooperation in maritime 
security has emerged around three principles: a) the primary responsibility for the 
security of regional waterways lies with the littoral states; b) the international 
community, including the user states and bodies like the International Maritime 
Organization (IMO), have an important role to play; and c) new cooperative 
measures should be developed in line with international law.
189
 Pursuant to these 
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principles, the Malacca Strait Patrol was launched in July 2004, followed by the 
―Eye in the Sky‖ maritime air patrol in September 2005. The Standard Operating 
Procedures governing both joint patrols were signed by the Chiefs of Defence 
Force of Singapore, Malaysia, and Indonesia in April 2006. An Information 
Sharing Center has also been instituted in Singapore under the Regional 
Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships 
in Asia (ReCAAP), the first ever inter-government agreement to enhance 
maritime security in regional water. 
Overall, bilateral cooperation coupled with multilateral dialogues under 
ASEAN and ARF are positively reinforcing each other to bring about an extra 
layer of defence for the region at large and Singapore in particular. The 
diplomatic effort at securing these intricate ties is indicative of Singapore‘s 
commitment to pursue good relations with friendly nations, another major pillar 
of Singapore security policy. Yet, Singapore‘s activism in extending dialogues 
with friendly nations and participation in functional cooperation cannot be 
casually taken as Singapore being accommodating. The perennial emphasis on 
military capability building with technology as force multiplier reflects a realist 
worldview shared by the government elites that has not changed since 
Singapore‘s independence. Eternal vigilance and combat readiness underwrite the 
survival of small states. This is most evident in a speech given by Prime Minister 
Lee Hsien Loong just days after his appointment:  
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―One thing which isn‘t going to change is our approach to external 
relations… We seek to be friends with all countries and especially 
with our immediate neighbors and the major powers…, but that 
doesn‘t mean we can always accommodate the views or the 
positions of other countries. When our vital interests are at stake, 
we must quietly stand our grand.‖190  
 
MILIT 
Closely related to POLIT is the institutional category of MILIT, a group of 
words relating to military matters. For instance, words such as armor, force, 
stronghold, and weapon are part of this category. Of the 13 documents processed, 
GI singles out 1,932 words with clear military character. Since there are only 88 
base vocabularies in this category, the number of MILIT words discovered by GI 
may not adequately reflect the weight of this constituent element in Singapore‘s 
strategic culture.  
Relational content analysis identifies a cluster of words centering on the 
Singapore Armed Forces (SAF) through a web of reinforcing linkages (see figure 
3.7 below). The SAF is the military component of the Ministry of Defence 
(MINDEF), as well as the military arm of Singapore‘s Total Defence strategy. It 
comprises the Army, the Republic of Singapore Air Force (RSAF) and the 
Republic of Singapore Navy (RSN). The SAF is headed by the Chief of Defence 
Force with the assistance of the Joint Staff and the Chief of each service. On top 
of the three services, a joint Special Operational Task Force was launched in July 
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2009. Singapore has maintained a conscript force of 50,000 regulars (40,000 in 
the Army, 8,000 in the RSAF, and 4,000 RSN) and 250,000 reservists (National 
Servicemen). A para-military force of 12,000 Police and some 100,000 People‘s 
Defence Force (reserves) are also present.
191
 While the defence budget is pegged 
at 6% of Singapore‘s Gross Domestic Product, Singapore has found it sufficient 
to spend between 4.5% to 5% on defence over the past five years.
192
  
 
 
Figure 3.7: Collocation of ―SAF‖ 
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In light of a fluid security environment, the government firmly believes 
that to credibly defend the country, the principle of self-reliance must be 
paramount. “Unlike some other countries, Singapore does not roll over and play 
dead when threatened with a gun. It can and will fight back, effectively, 
ruthlessly.‖193 To face threats of all types, the SAF has never ceased to improve 
its operational readiness through constant training. In addition, the latest thrusts at 
enhancing combat readiness include the adoption of integrated warfare doctrine 
and the transformation of the entire armed forces into the 3
rd
 generation SAF.  
In terms of threat perception, Singapore has generally seen the regional 
security environment to be favorable. The government has identified several 
conventional threats to the region but recognizes that none constitutes an 
existential threat to its continued survival and independence. Diplomatic 
endeavors can help lessen security concerns over the intricate dynamics among 
China, the U.S. and Japan, potential military conflict over the Taiwan Strait, the 
North Korean nuclear threat, military rule in Myanmar, resource competition in 
an increasingly interdependent world, and several territorial disputes in the region. 
Interestingly, although Singapore has expressed concerns elsewhere about the 
recent military build-up in the region, this issue is not raised in either ARF or 
ASEAN. 
194
 Relationships with neighbors, especially Malaysia and Indonesia, 
                                                 
193
 The Straits Times, 28 March 1991, cited in The Fight Against Terror, 21. 
194
 Benedict Ang Kheng Leong, ―Understanding the Security Environment in Southeast Asia : A 
Key to Analysing the Arms Build-up,‖ Pointer: Journal of the Singapore Armed Forces 26, no. 2 
(2000), accessed January 3, 2011, 
http://www.mindef.gov.sg/safti/pointer/back/journals/2000/Vol26_2/6.htm 
   99 
also escape perusal. Nonetheless, the existence of these conventional threats led 
Singapore to justify force modernization and equipment acquisition for 
―regionally based defence needs.‖195   
The more pressing challenges to regional security at large and Singapore 
in particular, however, lie with transnational and non-conventional threats, 
terrorism to be exact. In Singapore‘s evaluation, the current trend of transnational 
terrorism is ―strategic‖ with demonstrated global reach, sophisticated methods, 
and catastrophic outcomes.
196
 Given the uncertain and unpredictable nature of 
terrorist attacks, the government unusually warned its citizens about the 
impossibility of attaining ―absolute security‖ even with Total Defence in place.197 
Minister of Home Affairs, Wong Kan Seng, made the remark when addressing the 
parliament that ―… no one can guarantee that a terrorist attack will not happen 
here. Our approach must be to make it extremely difficult for terrorists to carry 
out their evil deeds while at the same time, be well prepared and ready to deal 
with the repercussions if such an attack does happen.‖198 Seen in this light, 
combat readiness is of critical importance for a country with no strategic depth 
and reaction time if it were ever to come under attack. 
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Overall, operational readiness has three main components: immediate 
response, rapid mobilization, organizing and training just as in war.
199
 Other than 
those deployed overseas, SAF regulars in the three services are on standby round 
the clock, fully armed, well equipped, and ready to go into action at short notice. 
The ―networked‖ organization structure of the three services enables not only the 
speedy sharing of information but also the rapid mobilization of manpower, 
weapons, and logistics support. The reservists can also be mobilized through 
silent mobilization (discreet in-person activation) or open mobilization (using 
mass media channels).
200
 Lastly, the SAF and on occasion the reserve force train 
in wartime scenarios. Full troop exercises are conducted up to division level. 
Oversea training and joint exercises with friendly foreign forces make up for 
limited training facilities in Singapore as well as the lack of actual battle 
experience. 
Again, because of the lack of strategic depth and reaction time, Singapore 
depends greatly on airborne early warning systems for threat alert.
201
 To better 
shore up its air defence, Singapore purchased four Gulfstream 550-Airborne Early 
Warning (G550-AEW) aircraft in early 2009 to replace the aging E2-C aircraft 
acquired from the U.S. in the 1980‘s.202 The addition of the new platforms 
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signifies the Republic of Singapore Air Force‘s (RSAF)‘s transformation into a 
3
rd
 Generation, ―networked‖ Air Force. The G550-AEW is capable of flying at a 
higher operating attitude of 41,000 feet with longer endurance of nine hours. 
Equipped with a state-of-the-art mission suite that includes an Active 
Electronically Scanned Array (AESA) radar, the G550-AEW is able to detect a 
longer range beyond 200 nautical miles. With the help of these ―sharper eyes,‖ 
improved capability in surveillance will strengthen the RSAF‘s situational 
awareness and give them greater response time to deal with any aerial threat.  
Force modernization is not limited to the Air Force only. The Singapore 
Armed Forces are currently undertaking a wholesale, ―information-led Revolution 
in Military Affairs (RMA).‖ It seeks to transform itself into the so called 3rd 
Generation (3G) Force with a new doctrinal emphasis on ―integrated warfare.‖ 
The campaign has three operational focuses: 1) The three services should be 
interconnected operationally and be able to fight cooperatively through integrated 
command and control across the whole SAF; 2) Holistic improvement is sought 
across a wide range of areas including administration, training, human resource 
management, planning and logistics; and 3) The 3G Force should be equipped 
with an asymmetric edge over its potential adversaries through the acquisition of 
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technologically advanced systems in areas of precision strike, advanced networks, 
sensing capabilities, and unmanned weaponry.
203
  
More specifically, ―integrated warfare‖ is made possible by the 
introduction and implementation of the concept ―Integrated Knowledge-based 
Command and Control (IKC2). IKC2 is conceptualized as network-enabled, 
knowledge-based warfighting that is predicated on the OODA loop. 
‗―Observing‖, ―Orienting‖, Deciding‖ and ―Acting‖ are essential components of 
any war-fighting cycle from the way information is assimilated, decisions made 
and action.‖204 Integrated warfare will give the SAF an upper hand in 
battlespace/situational awareness and battlespace management even when facing a 
stronger foe.
205
 Overall, the latest thrust at RMA in cultural change alongside 
organizational innovation signifies SAF‘s departure from the deterrence-based 
―poisonous shrimp‖ or ―porcupine‖ posture to a more forward and expeditionary 
approach to contingencies with a calibrated and adaptive 3G Force that is more 
like a ―nimble turn-knob.‖206  
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ECON 
The next institutional category ECON contains words of an economic, 
commercial, industrial, or business orientation, including roles, collectivities, acts, 
abstract ideas, symbols, references to money, and names of common commodities 
in business. Words such as credit, investment, poverty, and tax are examples of 
this group. Although GI identifies 5,308 words related to ECON, it should be 
noted that there are 510 base vocabularies in this particular category. In other 
words, the weight of this constituent element may appear greater than what it 
should really be. Nonetheless, relational content analysis uncovers a nexus of 
interplay between words surrounding the most frequently referred term in this 
category, ―economy,‖ with a total of 177 times (see figure 3.8 below).  
The Asian Financial crisis and the late global recession have vividly 
demonstrated that as an open economy with a small domestic market, Singapore 
is highly vulnerable to regional and global developments. While the 1997 regional 
crisis negatively affected Singapore in the currency, banking, and corporate 
sectors, the 2008 global recession hit the country doubly in the forms of reduced 
demand for electronics exports and a diminished supply of foreign direct 
investment.
207
 As globalization hastens the pace of interdependence, the 
government is conscious about the fact that the city-state‘s security and economic 
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well-being ―will become even more susceptible to any instability in our external 
environment when we become more integrated with the global economy in the 
21
st
 Century.‖208  
 
 
 
 Figure 3.8: Collocation of ―Economy‖ 
 
In response to ongoing and more importantly, future economic adversities, 
the government has incorporated macro and micro directives to fortify the island‘s 
economic security in the name of Economic Defence, one of the five pillars of 
Singapore‘s Total Defence (TD).209 Economic Defence places weight on the 
intelligent and efficient use of scarce resources such as land, manpower, natural 
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resources, capital investment, and technological skills. The ultimate goal of 
Economic Defence is to first ensure the economy can withstand prolonged 
external shocks, and second, ensures that the competing demands of the military 
and the economy can be accommodated in time of war. Operationally, a symbiotic 
relationship has been developed between the public and private sectors. While the 
government invests in the ―fundamentals‖ such as education, research 
capabilities, and the infrastructure and connectivity of a global city, the private 
sector is to leverage public investment to better bring about a ―productivity-
driven‖ growth.210 Economic Defence thus shares with other pillars of TD the 
mentality of staying relevant, competitive, and vigilant through internal upgrade, 
innovation, and development to lessen external dependence of any sort. Yet, what 
has not been mentioned is how Singapore can find the balance between this realist 
self-reliance frame of mind with the cooperation, accommodation, and concession 
in international trading regimes that are necessary for a trading state to thrive.
211
  
 
LEGAL 
The last non-ideational institutional category, LEGAL, refers to word 
relating to legal, judicial, or police matters. Words such as amnesty, enforcement, 
sanction, and treatise falls within this group. Although GI identifies 359 words 
with LEGAL character, no meaningful connection between words can be 
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discerned. This lack of meaningful relationship is an unfortunate, but 
understandable, product of the ASEAN Way.  The group of norms governing 
interactions among ASEAN member states includes mostly prominently, 
minimum formality, consultative and consensus-based decision making, non-
interference, and non-use of force to resolve interstate conflict in the region. 
Accordingly, explicit legally binding provisions are missing from most 
agreements made through ARF or ASEAN. By preferences of the member states, 
ARF and ASEAN affairs are generally managed on a consultative basis through 
the personal connections in Track I and Track II venues. The rigid application of 
the non-interference principle makes voluntary compliance the basis of any 
regional agreement. It also effectively precludes punitive measures from being 
attached. Even when the ARF has made significant strides in maritime security 
cooperation, the ASEAN Convention on Counter-Terrorism (ACCT) signed at the 
12
th
 ASEAN Summit in Cebu, the Philippines, in 2007, remains the only ―region-
wide, legally binding anti-terrorism pact with mandatory compliance to all 
relevant UN Conventions and Protocols regarding Counter-Terrorism.  
Although Singapore has been active in supporting confidence building 
measures (CBMs) through Track I and Track II workshops and dialogues, the 
city-state‘s commitment towards greater legalism within ASEAN is at best 
ambiguous. Although legalization of relationships may enhance predictability as 
―rules unambiguously define the conduct they require, authorize, or proscribe,‖ it 
nonetheless entails greater obligation with the state‘s behavior subject to 
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scrutiny.
212
 The need for cooperative security even in functional realms such as 
Humanitarian Aid and Disaster Relief (HARD) necessarily collides with the 
principles of non-interference and minimum formality. Yet, the entry into force of 
the ASEAN Charter is somewhat promising as it has become a legally binding 
agreement among the 10 ASEAN Member States. It will soon be registered with 
the Secretariat of the United Nations, pursuant to Article 102, Paragraph 1 of the 
Charter of the United Nations.
213
 Singapore was the first ASEAN country to ratify 
the Charter following its signing at the 13
th
 ASEAN Summit in November 
2007.
214
 
 
Conclusion 
 In Singapore‘s case, conceptual content analyses uncover a strategic 
culture leaning toward the Hobbesian end with a higher predisposition to conflict. 
On the whole, non-ideational factors (POLIT, MILIT, ECON, and LEGAL) 
weigh more heavily than ideational ones (DOCTRINE, RELIG, EXPRSV, 
ACADEM) in constituting Singapore‘s strategic culture. In particular, political 
and military concerns trump others to be the most significant factors driving 
Singapore‘s security and defence policies.  
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Relational content analyses identify two prominent situational 
considerations undergirding the making of Singapore‘s security and defence 
policies: a lack of strategic depth and reaction time, and smallness in resources 
(money, manpower, and material). In addition, concerns over the negative 
spillover effect of security issues originating in the neighborhood convince 
Singapore to maintain sophisticated armed forces owing to ―regionally-based 
defence need.‖ The adoption of the ―integrated warfare‖ doctrine and the latest 
information-led RMA signifies the maturation of 3
rd
 generation Singapore Armed 
Forces with forward and expeditionary defence capabilities.  
Moreover, a focus on self-reliance with minimum dependence on external 
partners reflects the realist perception of a Hobbeisan world where zero-sum 
conflict is inevitable. Yet, cooperation and accommodation are not excluded 
either. The security and defence related documents analyzed in this chapter show 
that Singapore is quite willing to carry out ―functional‖ cooperative security such 
as those in humanitarian aid and disaster relief. The signing of the Standard 
Operating Procedures governing both the Malacca Strait Patrol and the Eye in the 
Sky Maritime Air Patrol also indicates that Singapore embraces ―functional‖ 
cooperative security as a new platform for regional interaction.  
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Chapter 4 
THAILAND'S STRATEGIC CULTURE 
 
Thailand in Southeast Asia 
 Geographically, Thailand is not a small country. It is in the heart of 
mainland Southeast Asia, covering a land base of 513,115 sq km as well as a 
maritime economic zone of 212,220 sq km
215. It borders the Lao People‘s 
Democratic Republic (Lao PDR) and the Union of Myanmar (formerly Burma) to 
the north, Laos and the Kingdom of Cambodia to the east, Malaysia to the south, 
and Myanmar again to the west. In population, Thailand ranks 20th in the world 
with approximately 67 million people living in Thai territory. Since the 
establishment of a unified Thai Kingdom (commonly known as Siam) in the mid-
14
th
 century, Thailand has achieved racial and religious harmony relative to its 
neighbors through compulsory education and state sanctioned propaganda. Strong 
assimilation policies based on the three pillars of nationalism (Nation, Monarchy, 
and Religion) and official promotion of everything ―Thai-ness‖ have only recently 
given way to the idea of respect for local diversity
216
.  In addition, unlike its 
neighbors, adept diplomatic maneuver has kept Thailand from becoming a colony 
in the midst of western imperialism.   
                                                 
215
 Office of Prime Minister, ―Thailand at A Glance,‖ Thailand in 2000‟s (Bangkok: Government 
of Thailand, 2000), 8. Thailand‘s maritime economic zone covers 72,200 sq. km in the Andaman 
Sea and 140,000 sq. km in the Gulf of Thailand, totaling 212,200 sq. km. 25,000 sq. km of which 
are claimed by Thailand as well as neighboring countries. 
216
 Michael Kelly Connors. ―Goodbye to the Security State: Thailand and Ideological Change,‖ 
Journal of Contemporary Asia 33, no. 3 (2003): 444.  
   110 
 Why then, does Thailand often perceive itself as a small state? Throughout 
its modern history, Thailand has never ascended to the status of political 
powerhouse or economic center of the region. Modern Thai political history has 
been characterized by a weak developmental state that is vulnerable to internal 
and external shocks. Internally, Thailand suffers from a myriad of social problems 
that are directly related to under- and unequal development. As of 2006, about 
9.6% of the population falls under the World Bank designated poverty line of 
US$1.25 per day.
217
 The pace of urbanization has not been impressive either. 
Over 60% of Thailand‘s population still lives in rural areas in 2009.218 Other than 
poverty, infectious diseases prove to be another major threat to Thai citizens. 
Political instability and the frequent alternation of power by military coups further 
weaken the state‘s capacity in handling developmental issues. As Thailand is still 
recovering from the debilitating effects of the 1997 Asian Financial crisis, the 
recent global recession is taking another toll on its export oriented economy.  
Externally, Thailand‘s porous border control has made the country the 
origin, transit as well as destination for human trafficking, drug smuggling (such 
as methamphetamine and ketamine), and illegal small arms trade. In addition, 
escalating communal and sectarian violence continues to claim lives in the 
Muslim-dominated Deep South with a loss of 3,000 lives and counting since 
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2004.
219
 Frequent Thai accusations of militants using Malaysian territory to plan 
and train for attacks often worsen the already precarious Thai-Malaysian 
relations.
220
 At the eastern front, the Thai insistence on solving the Preah Vihear 
Temple dispute bilaterally without seeking any mediation by ASEAN or other 
regional bodies necessarily clashes with Cambodia‘s intent to internationalize the 
conflict.
221
  
Evidently, the Thai government has only limited success in unilaterally 
tackling any of the above mentioned problems. State capacity building, military or 
otherwise, depends greatly on external aid such as the Japanese block grants, US 
military assistance in counter-terrorism operations, and conflict resolution through 
interested third parties. Yet, Thailand has traditionally based its strategic policies 
(economic, national security, and defence) on the principles of self-reliance and 
self-sufficiency. Bilateral ties with selected countries are preferred to multilateral 
ones that necessarily entail more strings attached. Especially in the last two 
decades, a visible shift has taken place in the policy making arena. 
Acknowledging Thailand‘s past as more accommodating, if not compliant, former 
president Chatchai argued in 1999 that the time is ripe for Thailand to take a more 
independent orientation:     
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―Even though Thailand is a small country which conducts 
policy that bends with the wind sometimes…changes in the world 
have opened the opportunity for us to change…I well realise that 
we can not set the direction of the wind, but in the present era we 
are able to stipulate our desired end objectives and use the wind to 
our advantage in walking towards those ends.‖222 
 
 Given an already harsh security environment, both internal and external, 
why does Thailand, a self-perceived small country with developmental lags and 
weak state capacity, insist on solving its national security problems through 
bilateral means? The latest Thai-Cambodia exchange best illustrates this puzzle, 
especially when Thailand is a founding nation of ASEAN and a supporter for 
turning ASEAN into a vehicle for conflict resolution for the region. Identifying 
Thailand‘s strategic culture characterized by the push and pull between 
cooperation and conflict may enlighten our understanding of Thailand‘s threat 
perception and the policy instruments chosen to address existing and future 
security problems facing this small country. 
 
Approximating Thailand‘s Strategic Culture 
 The concept of strategic culture suggests a cultural construct with 
operational dimensions.
223
  Strategic decision makers‘ world views on war and 
peace reside on a philosophical continuum with the Hobbesian zero-sum world 
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and Kantian positive-sum community at the poles. At the Hobbesian end, political 
entities exist in a state of nature where the law of jungle reigns supreme. More 
specifically, war is merely the continuation of politics by other means.
224
 Seen in 
this light, conflict is not only the means for states to survive but always at the 
same time an end itself. In this zero-sum world, peace is therefore ―the 
continuation of struggle only by other means.‖225 The Kantian community at the 
other end portrays a society where cooperation is considered the best possible 
working mechanism for all interested participants to reap maximum benefit. The 
calculus for relative gains is replaced by the quest for absolute gains. In this 
positive-sum world, states may co-exist peacefully with each pursuing self-
interest in a cooperative manner. Accordingly, peace is not only the end result but 
also a state of mind within which cooperation can be carried out. Yet, no state can 
long reside at either end of the continuum. Strategic culture is thus characterized 
by the push and pull between two opposing forces, the tendency for conflict at 
one end and the tendency for cooperation on the other. This push and pull 
necessarily affect the operational dimensions of strategic culture, namely, the 
perception and assessment of threat, the utility of force, the choice of ranked 
policy instruments, and last but not least, the expected outcomes.   
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Documents to be Content Analyzed 
The computer assisted content analysis software, General Inquirer, 
processed 19 defence and security related documents (see table 4.1 below) with a 
total of 78,361 words. These are official documents issued by the Thai 
government at the ministerial level. Speeches by individual political elites are 
excluded from data analysis because the speeches may reflect the personal views 
of the speech giver, not that of the state. Exceptions are made for documents 15 to 
19, policy statements delivered to the national assembly by successive prime 
ministers. These statements represent the general direction of each administration 
on national security, not that of a particular prime minister.  
The three white papers published by the Thai Ministry of Defence in 1992, 
1994, and 2008 are considered traditional white papers. All three documents 
include sections on Thailand‘s defence and security policies, evaluation of the 
current and future security environment, the identification of major threats to 
national security, the state‘s relations with intra and extra regional powers, and 
information on the Royal Thai Armed Forces including order of battle, military 
expenditure, force modernization plans, equipment procurement plans, and the 
roles the Armed Forces play in national defence and development. The overall 
theme of the three defence white papers reflects a strong concern over 
uncertainties in the post-Cold War era, especially when small states in the region 
can no longer enjoy the umbrella protection made available by either superpower. 
The 2000 edition is a functional equivalent of a defence white paper published by 
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the Thai Ministry of Foreign Affairs. This particular chapter provides information 
on the force structure and objectives of the military as well as the missions the 
Armed Forces. Specifically, this chapter provides a detailed description of the UN 
peacekeeping missions in which the military has recently participated. 
 
Table 4.1: Thailand Documents to be Content Analyzed 
 Document Title Word Count 
1 ASEAN Regional Forum Annual Security Outlook, Thailand Chapter 2001 5,480 
2 ASEAN Regional Forum Annual Security Outlook, Thailand Chapter 2002 2,174 
3 ASEAN Regional Forum Annual Security Outlook, Thailand Chapter 2003 2,620 
4 ASEAN Regional Forum Annual Security Outlook, Thailand Chapter 2004 3,386 
5 ASEAN Regional Forum Annual Security Outlook, Thailand Chapter 2005 3,409 
6 ASEAN Regional Forum Annual Security Outlook, Thailand Chapter 2007 4,379 
7 ASEAN Regional Forum Annual Security Outlook, Thailand Chapter 2008 3,264 
8 ASEAN Regional Forum Annual Security Outlook, Thailand Chapter 2009 3,656 
9  Defence White Paper, The Defence of Thailand 1994 15,133 
10 Defence White Paper, The Defence of Thailand 1996 13,811 
11 Defence White Paper, Thailand in 2000‘s, Defence Chapter  3,331 
12 Defence White Paper, The Defence of Thailand 2008 12,700 
13 National Security Policy 1998-2001 1,324 
14 National Security Policy 2003-2006 1,211 
15 Policy Statement of the Council of Ministers of Prime Minister Chuan 
Leekpai Delivered to the National Assembly, Policy on National Security, 
November 20, 1997 
 
265 
16 Policy Statement of the Council of Ministers of Prime Minister Surayud 
Chulanont Delivered to the National Assembly,  Policy on National 
Security, November 3, 2006 
 
578 
17 Policy Statement of the Council of Ministers of Prime Minister Samak 
Sundaravej Delivered to the National Assembly, Policy on National 
Security, February 18, 2008 
 
888 
18 Policy Statement of the Council of Ministers of Prime Minister Somchai 
Wongsawat Delivered to the National Assembly, Policy on National 
Security, October 7, 2008 
 
366 
19 Policy Statement of the Council of Ministers of Prime Minister Abshisit 
Vejjajiva Delivered to the National Assembly, Policy on National security, 
December 30, 2008 
 
387 
 Total 78,361 
 
 
 
To date, Thailand has routinely submitted four sections in its annual 
security outlook to the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF): perception of the global 
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and regional security environments with the identification of major threats, 
Thailand‘s contribution to regional stability, the roles of various forums and 
conventions in regional security, and Thailand‘s defence and security policies. 
Broadly, Thailand is less concerned with threats to global security such as 
globalization. The bulk of Thailand‘s regional security outlook focuses more on 
problems emanating from border security: territorial disputes, illegal drug trade, 
human trafficking, small arms smuggling, infectious diseases, terrorism, and 
nuclearization by its neighbors. Thailand is also confronted with ―everyday 
security challenges‖ both in Thailand and in the neighboring countries. These 
challenges, such as the government‘s domestic legitimacy and social unrest, are 
primarily domestic and may weaken state capacity in the long run. More 
importantly, ―everyday security challenges‖ have the potential to spill over and 
affect countries nearby. In its earlier submissions, Thailand briefed the Forum on 
the domestic reforms the government had been undertaking. However, this 
particular section was dropped entirely after its 2003 submission. Non-traditional 
security issues such as energy security, environment degradation, and maritime 
security were only added to the discussion after 2004.    
 The third batch of the documents, Policy Statement of the Council of 
Ministers, consists of the inaugural speeches of successive Thai prime ministers. 
The statements address the National Assembly on the administration‘s directions 
and objectives in several policy areas, including but not limited to urgent policies 
to be implemented, national security policy, social policy, economic policy, and 
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policy on good governance. Though it is possible that the prime ministers may 
have a greater influence on the wording, scope, and extent of the content, these 
statements provide a consensus shared by the cabinet. Only the sections pertaining 
to national security and/or defence are content analyzed. Two editions of National 
Security Policy are also included in this category. Formulated by the National 
Security Council of Thailand, these documents are considered the master plans for 
national security. The Council is composed of several ministers who are in charge 
of coordinating the maintenance of national security. 
 
Predisposition to Conflict vs. Predisposition to Cooperate 
 General Inquirer detects a total of 3,149 power-conflict related words and 
1,097 power-cooperation words. To better illustrate, figure 4.1 (see below) shows 
the visual representation of the push and pull between a stronger inclination 
toward conflict vis-à-vis a weaker tendency to cooperate.  
   118 
 
Figure 4.1: Approximating Thailand‘s Strategic Culture 
 
In the defence white paper category, GI identifies 2,849 power-conflict 
related words and 725 power-cooperation related words. The tendency to conflict 
is more than three times stronger than the predisposition to cooperate. The 
identification of more power-conflict related words is expected as these 
documents by nature describe defence and military matters. Yet, the graph shows 
that the predisposition to cooperation, though weaker, is not non-existent. Even in 
defence white papers where ―things martial‖ should predominate, Thailand still 
keeps cooperative policy instruments at its disposal. Given the severity of illegal 
activities at Thailand‘s border, Bangkok is especially keen on establishing 
cooperation with neighboring countries in the areas of extradition and mutual 
legal assistance in transnational criminal matters.  
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Notably in the ARF Annual Security Outlook category, the tendency to 
cooperate is only slightly higher than the predisposition to conflict. This finding is 
puzzling for two reasons. First, ARF was established to foster constructive 
dialogue and consultation on political security issues of common interest and 
concern.
226
 Other than the discussion of security threats to regional (and global) 
stability, member states customarily outline the contribution each can contribute 
to regional peace. Second, as a founding nation of ARF, Thailand should have 
been an avid promoter for transparency, confidence building, and preventive 
diplomacy. However, there are numerous occasions where Thailand displays 
minor disappointment in the non-institutionalized nature of ARF in handling 
security issues affecting the region. Thailand even calls for a new mandate by 
which the ASEAN Secretary-General can bring to the Forum‘s attention to any 
emerging or existing security issues that may adversely affect the peace and 
security of the region.
227
  
In the last category, the tendency to cooperate is slightly higher than the 
predisposition to conflict. This finding is understandable because this particular 
batch of security policies is more internally oriented. Unlike the defence white 
papers, both the National Security Policy and the Policy Statement by the Council 
of Ministers are more concerned with threats to internal stability. Cooperation in 
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this context means how the government may work together with the private sector 
and civil society organizations to tackle security threats that are domestic in 
nature. In terms of democratization, such cooperation signifies the growing 
strength of Thailand‘s private sector and more importantly, the gradual 
solidification of Thailand‘s civil society. However, the predisposition to conflict 
is not insignificant. The military is assigned the all-encompassing roles of 
upholding the unity of the nation as well as solving national development 
problems. By extension, the political influence of the military apparatus remains 
pervasive, if not unchallenged.   
 
The Constituent Elements of Thailand‘s Strategic Culture 
 The constituent elements of Thailand‘s strategic culture and their relative 
weight are gauged first by subgrouping the 78,361 words into eight General 
Inquirer institutional categories, four of which are ideational and the rest material 
(see figure 4.2 below). The ideational cluster consists of religion, personal 
expression, doctrine, and academia. The non-ideational group includes politics, 
military, legal, and economy. Relational content analysis identifies key words that 
frequently appear in tandem in each category. The connections these key words 
have with each other are then visually represented and qualitatively investigated. 
 
   121 
 
Figure 4.2: Thailand, Content by Institutional Category 
 
Ideational Factors 
DOCTRINE 
 The institutional category, Doctrine, denotes any organized system of 
belief or knowledge, including those of applied knowledge, mystical beliefs, and 
arts as an academic subject. Words such as civilization, liberalism, medicine, and 
typography fall under this particular institutional category. GI identifies 2,035 
words in this category. Through disambiguation and collocation, relational 
content analysis discovers a web of linkages surrounding the word ―technology‖ 
(see figure 4.3 below). 
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Figure 4.3: Collocation of ―Technology‖ 
 
The development of science and technology is one central aspect of the 
Royal Thai Armed Forces‘ modernization plan. The changed security 
environment in the post Cold-War era has led the Thai Ministry of Defence to 
conduct a wholesale review of its military capability. The 1996 review concluded 
that ―Thailand, like other small countries, had developed its Armed Forces with 
the assistance of the super powers. Consequently, it found itself with a surplus of 
manpower equipped with obsolete and out of date weapons.‖228 Accordingly, a 
significant portion of the defence budget was used ―for the upkeep of personnel 
and only a limited amount left for the development and procurement of weapons 
and equipment.‖ To better shore up its defence needs, the Royal Thai Armed 
Forces (RTARF) sees the acquisition of ―modern weapons with high destructive 
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power‖ such as high-explosive munitions essential for the military to become a 
convincing deterrent to national security threats.
229
 Other emphases have been 
given to the incorporation of information technology in surveillance, observation, 
and warning by acquiring high technology electronic equipment for 
reconnaissance and intelligence gathering.
230
  
 Another impetus for the tech-savvy force modernization plan is the 
regional trend in weapons procurement.
231
 Thailand is cognizant that neighboring 
countries have been accumulating high technology offensive weapons, such as 
aircraft, ships and submarines. Many have also increased the mobility of their 
land forces and improved the capability of defensive weapons by acquiring 
surveillance equipment and anti-aircraft missiles. For example, the Chinese navy 
has embarked on a modernization plan to transform itself into a blue water navy 
with improved power projection capabilities. Malaysia, as a claimant to the 
Spratly Islands, has emphasized the procurement of modern high capability ships 
and aircraft. The Thai 2008 defence white paper specifically points to the 
imperative need for the armed forces to develop its forces and technology at a 
comparable level to regional countries.
232
 Thailand began purchasing Chinese 
weapons in the 1980s for economic reasons, but in the past five years has sourced 
from various countries including Russia, Israel, and the United States. New 
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acquisition plans include the purchase of early warning aircraft such as the Su-
30MKM combat jets, submarines, anti-submarine helicopters, air-to-air missiles, 
and improved surveillance and reconnaissance systems.
233
 The series of 
procurement plans begs the question of whether Thailand is actively participating 
in a regional arms race.  
  
ACADEM 
The institutional category, ACADEM, refers to words relating to academic, 
intellectual or educational matters, including the names of major fields of study. 
Terms such as grammar, letter, knowledge, and pupils fall under this group. GI 
identifies 442 words in this particular category. A cluster of words, education, 
research, and science, are found to be the major components of Thailand‘s plans 
for national power development (see figure 4.4 below). The Thai definition of 
national power is closely linked to its conceptualization of security. Five 
dimensions of security provide the basis of Thailand‘s overall wellbeing: political 
security, economic security, social and psychological security, military security, 
and science and technology security.
234
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Figure 4.4: Collocation of ―Development‖ 
 
At the heart of the Thai government‘s attempts to further secure each 
dimension of national power is a strong sense of developmental nationalism. In a 
nutshell, developmental nationalism stresses state-led construction of ―political 
economies of development by promoting productivity and relative equality...‖235 
Developmental projects aimed at visible forms of state modernization in the long 
run become synonymous with nation-building or state capacity building, all of 
which in turn confers legitimacy on political leaders.   
 To better confront threats and protect national interests, the National 
Security Policy 2003-2006 promotes the development and use of science and 
technology to enhance all aspects of national power. In particular, the 
development of manpower in science and technology is imperative to achieve this 
objective. A new education policy was implemented by the Somchai 
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administration in 2008 to raise the overall quality of the education system, 
including the development of teachers, curricula, instructional media and 
information technology.
236
 Interestingly, other than defending the country, 
restoring internal security, and maintaining law and order, the military is also 
responsible to ―support the state in developing the nation… research and 
developing its defence industry and technology, space technology, information 
technology and communication…‖237 By participating in the developmental 
programs, the military is projecting itself as Thailand‘s legitimate nation-builder. 
As the key national security institution, the military cannot be easily challenged or 
supplanted by other political actors.   
 
RELIG 
 The institutional category, RELIG, refers to words of religious, 
metaphysical, supernatural or relevant philosophical nature. Words such as 
communion, faith, oasis, and zen are examples of this category. Of the 78,361 
words processed, GI filters out 40 words belonging to this category. Relational 
content analysis finds a cluster of words meaningfully connected to the word 
―religion‖ (see figure 4.5 below).  
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Figure 4.5: Collocation of ―Religion‖ 
 
Thailand has long enjoyed religious harmony with Buddhism, essentially 
unchallenged as the de facto state religion. Since Thai citizens are entitled to the 
constitutional right to freedom of faith, other religions are also present albeit with 
fewer followers: Islam, Christianity, Hinduism, and Sikhism (from the largest to 
the smallest groups by the number of followers). To promote the co-existence of 
all religions, the Buddhist King ―is the royal patron of each faith, which allows 
the faithful of different religions to live together peacefully.‖238 Moreover, 
Thailand generally has not politicized religion. When addressing the public on the 
eve of her 75
th
 birthday at Dusitdalai Pavilion, Queen Sirikit said that religion 
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should not be mixed with politics and there is no need to constitutionally declare 
Buddhism the state religion.
239
 
In the 19 documents analyzed, Buddhism, along with the institution of 
Monarchy and the Thai culture are seen as the essence of ―Thai-ness,‖ a 
philosophy to which all Thai people subscribe. The protection and maintenance of 
these three institutions are enshrined in Thailand‘s national objectives.240  The 
military places the greatest importance on the protection of the Monarchy and the 
Throne because this institution is at the center of the heart and minds of all Thai 
people.
241
  
Yet, the concept of ―Thai-ness‖ is fundamentally ethno-centric. While 
there is no agreed definition of what ―Thai-ness‖ entails, Thongchai suggests that 
the discourse of modern national identity can be deconstructed both positively and 
negatively.
242
 Positively, the notion of ―Thai-ness‖ can be defined in several 
ways: the monarchy and Buddhism as the most important elements of the nation, 
treasuring national independence, and assimilation to civilized Thai culture. 
Negatively, the meaning of ―Thai-ness‖ is delineated by carving out an outside 
and somewhat discriminating domain to represent an ―un-Thai Other.‖  
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Observers point to the state endorsement of ―Thai-ness‖ and the related 
assimilation policies as the root cause of Thailand‘s Southern Insurgency.243 The 
Malay-Muslim communities in the southern provinces of Pattani, Yala, and 
Narathiwat are conveniently targeted as the ―others‖ in the Thai society. The 
insurgency is seen as the ultimate rejection of the state sanctioned assimilation 
policies as well as a way for the minorities to ―un-Thai‖ themselves. Successive 
defence white papers have routinely identified the ―southern border problem‖ as a 
serious threat to internal security. Swamped by other national security problems, 
however, Bangkok was unable to formulate a concerted strategy to deal with the 
conflict until the Thaksin administration came into being. Yet the policy choice 
was to confront the insurgents with open force rather than to seek negotiation and 
peaceful resolution. According to a RAND report, 24,000 security-force personnel 
were deployed to the south during Thaksin‘s tenure, along with several 
specialized squads, 5,000 paramilitary rangers, 76,941 village defense volunteers, 
and a 1,400-strong teacher-protection battalion.
244
  
Bearing in mind the limited success of Thaksin‘s heavy handed policy, 
succeeding administrations have tried to shift their approach away from a 
confrontation-based strategy. The 2008 defence white paper contains a brief 
discussion of the new ―people-oriented‖ policy guideline to the problem: 
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―In order to solve this problem effectively and peacefully, the 
Government with the full support of the Armed Forces has applied 
His Majesty the King's concept of "Understanding, Reaching and 
Development" as the main policy guideline… In addition, the 
Armed Forces also have a big role in promoting local development 
in various fields to enhance the local community strength, for 
example education, economic, social, and sports etc.‖245 
 
EXPRSV 
 The next institutional category, EXPRSV, groups together words related to 
arts, sports, and self-expression. Words such as composer, poetic, symbolism, and 
verses are subsumed under this category. Although GI identifies 244 words in this 
category, no meaningful connections between any pair of vocabularies can be 
construed after the dual process of collocation and disambiguation. This finding is 
expected as defence and security policies have little to do with arts, sports, and 
self-expression. While references to individualism are non-existent, the two 
editions of the National Security Policy point to the importance of a cohesive Thai 
society as the basis for social-psychological security. To accomplish this end, the 
government proposes social reform to enhance equality and fairness in society, 
bureaucratic reform to improve transparency and eliminate unfair use of power, 
and education reform to provide life-long learning opportunities for Thai citizens. 
Lastly, national unity is best achieved by commitment (to the nation), sacrifice, 
patience, and knowing others.
246
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Non-Ideational Factors 
POLIT 
The first non-ideational category, POLIT, refers to words demonstrating a 
clear political character, including political roles, collectivities, acts, ideas, 
ideologies, and symbols. Words such as border, imperial, opposition, and reform 
are part of this group. GI identifies 10,677 words out of a total of 78,361 words 
processed. Relational content analysis identifies two constellations of 
vocabularies surrounding the base terms ―security,‖ and ―cooperation‖ 
respectively (see figures 4.6 and 4.7 below).  
Figure 4.6 clearly depicts Thailand‘s multifaceted threat perception, 
ranging from internal security to new forms of transnational threats. First, 
Thailand pays more attention to regional security than to its global counterpart. 
An updated list of threats to global security are identified in Thailand‘s 2009 ARF 
Annual Security Outlook, including financial downturn, rising oil prices, potential 
pandemic, nuclear proliferation, terrorism, and extremism.
247
 Although Thailand 
may easily be affected by any of the threats to global security, these problems are 
beyond Thailand‘s capability to address by itself. Instead, Bangkok chooses to 
focus more on the threats to regional security that may have an immediate effect 
on Thailand‘s national security. 
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Figure 4.6: Collocation of ―Security‖ 
 
Starting with traditional threats, Thailand acknowledges the existence of 
territorial disputes in the region but has neglected to discuss the possibility of 
managing or solving the issues. Priority is placed on preventing and addressing 
non-traditional security challenges because the probability of traditional threats, 
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major power intervention for example, has significantly decreased.
248
 Among the 
eight priority areas of transnational crimes and terrorism identified by ASEAN, 
Thailand attaches greater importance to addressing human trafficking, drug 
smuggling, and terrorism.
249
 
Thailand‘s geographical location makes it not only the origin but also a 
convenient transit point and destination for human trafficking. According to the 
United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), it is estimated that 
between 200,000 and 450,000 people are trafficked annually within the Greater 
Mekong Sub Region.
250
 Human trafficking poses imminent danger to Thailand‘s 
national security because the crime is not only cross border in nature but also 
occurs within the Thai territory. Bangkok has been tackling this problem from 
three levels.
251
 Domestically, the Thai Parliament passed the Prevention and 
Suppression of Human Trafficking Act in 2008. In addition to the conventional 
focus on trafficking of women and children, this Act includes males as possible 
victims of this crime. The Act also extends enforcement of and protection by the 
law to legal and illegal non-Thai victims as well as prescribes harsh punishment 
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for offenders. The Thai government is also working with international non-
governmental organizations (NGOs) to help protect and rehabilitate victims. For 
examples, the Chiang Mai Model (CMM) proposed by the Bangkok chapter of the 
Asia Foundation is a comprehensive approach designed to protect rights of 
victims, provide them with the services they need, and secure the conviction of 
traffickers. Since the launch of the Chiang Mai Model in Thailand, more than 350 
police, prosecutors, social workers, and other counter-trafficking practitioners 
have received training in the multi-disciplinary counter-trafficking approach.
252
 
 Regionally, Thailand has concluded the Memorandum of Understanding 
on Cooperation in the Employment of Workers with Cambodia in 2003, Laos in 
2005, and Myanmar in 2006. Thailand is also the initiator and participant of the 
Coordinated Mekong Ministerial Initiative against Trafficking (COMMIT). Since 
this particular initiative is endorsed by concerned governments, the projects 
underway enjoy strong national ownership and a high level of political 
commitment with ministerial level approval and assistance.
253
 Internationally, 
Thailand has partnered with the UN Global Initiative to Fight Trafficking in 
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Persons and Slavery (UNGIFT) in distributing small grants to local facilities open 
to migrant women.
254
 
 Illicit drug trafficking is also of grave danger to Thailand‘s internal 
security. Dr. Boonruang, the deputy director-general of Thailand‘s Department of 
Medical Services openly acknowledged at a national conference on narcotics in 
Bangkok that ―Thailand has the world‘s most severe problem with 
methamphetamine abuse.‖ 255 According to official records, up to 100,000 new 
drug abuse cases have been reported to the Department. About 65% of new drug 
users are young adults, and more alarmingly, teenagers aged 15-19 years account 
for 32% of the total new cases of drug users.
256
 Although countries of the ―Golden 
Triangle‖ are committed to eliminate opium poppy cultivation, ―the region has 
witnessed the surge in production, trafficking and abuses of synthetic drugs, such 
as methamphetamine, methamphetamine hydrochloride (ICE) and ketamine.‖257 
The Thai government has been addressing this problem on three fronts.
258
 
Locally, sustainable alternative development projects were launched to help 
replace opium cultivation with cash crops and livestock. Other than the relevant 
civil agencies, the Royal Thai Armed Forces are also a principal actor in 
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developmental projects in the border area. For example, the Programme for 
Border Self-defence Villages encompasses, among other things, the installation of 
communication systems, promotion of agriculture and social welfare, provision of 
medical services, religious studies, and cultural promotion.
259
  
At the regional level, anti-narcotics collaboration with neighboring 
countries have been conducted bilaterally through Joint Border Committees. 
Thailand is also a participant in several regional initiatives such as the Pentalateral 
Cooperation on Drug Control (with China, India, Laos, and Myanmar) and ARF 
seminars on Narcotics Control. At the global level, Thailand continues to work 
with the UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) and the Commission on 
Narcotics Drug to promote sustainability in alternative development in the border 
areas.
260
 
 Thailand‘s discussion of terrorism is often linked to the Southern 
Insurgency. In this context, the Thai internal counter-insurgency (CI) strategy 
focuses more on the ―root causes‖ by promoting greater respect for local diversity 
(cultural, linguistic, and religious) and modernization.
261
 Although the Abhisit 
government has announced, for the first time, plans to lift the emergency decree 
in several less affected districts, the military continues to oppose the move
262
. In 
addition, the government‘s plan to scale down the presence of some 30,000 troops 
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remains unimplemented. Despite military resistance, the promulgation of the 
Southern Border Provinces Administrative Center will promote greater 
participation by local people, civilian-led operations independent of the military 
controlled Internal Security Operations Command, and report directly to the 
prime minister.
263
 
With regard to international terrorism, Thailand has given greater attention 
to the improvement of legal frameworks. First, the 2007 Penal Code stipulates as 
criminal offences the making, forgery, distribution, and sale and possession of 
illegal travel documents. Second, the newly approved Computer Crime Act 
provides Thai officials with legal authority to search and seize electronic 
evidence, seek court orders to shut down web sites, and arrest cyber criminals. 
Third, the Anti-money Laundering Act of 1999 has been amended to empower the 
Anti- Money Laundering Office to be able to take swift actions in freezing funds 
and financial assets belonging to suspects of terrorism.
264
 At the regional level, 
Thailand has signed treaties on Mutual Assistance and Criminal matters and 
Extradition treaties with many of the regional countries.
265
 Moreover, The 
Extradition Act has been passed with full adherence to the UN Model.  Thailand 
also prides itself as one of the first ASEAN Member States to ratify the ASEAN 
Convention on Counter-Terrorism.
266
 At the international level, Thailand has thus 
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far ratified and acceded to nine of the thirteen UN Anti-Terrorism Conventions 
and Protocols.
267
 
Closely related to terrorism is Thailand‘s increasing concern with 
maritime security, especially when ―its scope has widened to include different 
kinds of non-traditional security threats, such as terrorism, drug trafficking, 
people smuggling, etc., not to mention the existing problems of sea piracy and 
armed robbery.‖268 To better coordinate information sharing, the Thailand 
Maritime Enforcement Coordinating Center (THAI-MECC), established in 1998 
under direct political purview of the National Security Council, connects the 
operations of five major authorities: the Royal Thai Navy, the marine police, the 
marine department, the customs department and the fisheries department. Thus 
far, the naval patrols have proven effective in deterring human trafficking and 
drug trafficking through sea routes.
269
 In the region, mutual maritime interests 
have been protected through bilateral joint patrols with Malaysia, Vietnam, and 
India. Thailand has also recently joined the Malacca Straits Patrol (MSP) with 
Singapore, Malaysia, and Indonesia mainly through the Eye In the Sky (EIS) 
aerial patrol initiatives. Moreover, Thailand is one of the contracting parties to the 
Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery 
Against Ships in Asia, the first government-to-government agreement designed to 
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enhance regional maritime security. In addition to cooperating with regional 
actors, Thailand has partnered with the US in the Personal identification Secure 
Comparison and Evaluation Systems (PISCES), Container Security Initiative 
(SCI) as well with Australia in the Advanced Passenger Information System 
(APIS) to better track movement of passengers and cargos both to and from 
Thailand.
270
 With regard to port security, Thailand has voluntarily implemented 
the International Ship and Port Facility Security (ISPS) code along with the 
installation of the Automatic Identification System on certain new ships to 
comply with the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS) Agreement. Yet, no matter which 
state or organization Thailand partners with, Bangkok reiterates that ―cooperation 
in promoting maritime security should be based on the relevant principles of 
international law and have due regard to the interests of both littoral States and 
User States.‖271  
Lastly, although Thailand‘s ARF submissions routinely discuss economic 
security, environmental security, and energy security, the discussions are short 
and without much substance. This finding is expected as Thailand is currently 
preoccupied with internal security issues and everyday security challenges. 
Environmental security and energy security are not as urgent as other areas of 
security. Minimal discussion on economic security is also understandable because 
ARF is not a forum for matters related to trade and economics.   
                                                 
270
 Suriya Pornsuriya, ―Thailand‘s Perspective,‖ in Maritime Counbter-Terrorism: A Pan-Asian 
Perspective, ed. Swati Parasha (Delhi, India: Dorling Kindersley Pvt. Ltd., 2008), 93. 
271
 ―Thailand Chapter,‖ ARF Annual Security Outlook 2008, 91.  
   140 
 Other than ―security,‖ relational content analysis also finds a cluster of 
words surrounding the base term, ―cooperation,‖ which appears 402 times in the 
19 documents processed (see figure 4.7 below). One enduring feature of 
Thailand‘s defence and security policy is ―enhancing security cooperation with 
neighboring states, and the regional and international community.‖272 Key areas 
of cooperation include counter-terrorism, intelligence sharing, joint military 
training and exercises, developmental programs for regional community building, 
and mutual legal assistance to deal with transnational crimes. Although claiming 
itself as an avid supporter of multilateral forums, Thailand appears to prefer 
bilateral cooperation to multilateral whenever possible.  
The most common forms of bilateral cooperation include the 
establishment of an ad hoc Joint Working Committee under the purview of a 
relevant ministry and the signing of a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU).
273
 
For example, Thailand has enhanced anti-narcotics collaboration with its 
neighbors through Joint Border Committees to better patrol the border areas 
against illegal drug trade. This model provides the template for the interested 
parties to discuss the issue at hand without jumping through bureaucratic hoops. 
The utility of this model is evidenced in the new arrangements of the Cambodia-
Thai General Border Committee and Joint Border Committee on Demarcation for 
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Land Boundary (JBC) on April 7-8, 2011, in Bogor to negotiate recent border 
conflicts.
274
  
 
 
Figure 4.7: Collocation of ―Cooperation‖ 
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Regional security cooperation is often conducted through regional forums 
such as ASEAN, ASEAN Regional Forum, the Greater Mekong Sub-region 
Cooperation, East Asia Summit, the Conference on Interaction and Confidence 
Building Measures in Asia, to name just a few. The multitude of overlapping 
forums is unavoidable as great diversity (or lack of commonalities) exists within 
the Asia-Pacific region. Accordingly, ―no single overarching security architecture 
is envisaged to oversee the entire region in the near future.‖275 Yet, many of the 
overlapping forums are necessarily redundant as similar issues such as terrorism 
and transnational crimes are discussed repeatedly. In fact, four types of security 
cooperation combine and at the same time compete with each other: multilateral 
defence cooperation between extra-regional powers and individual Southeast 
Asian states (Five Power Defence Arrangements for example), ASEAN-centered 
non-binding multilateral efforts, US-led theatre security arrangements, and rising 
Chinese influence, if not domination, in East Asia security issues.
276
 Although 
each forum makes its own unique contribution to regional security, Thailand 
openly suggests the consolidation of security cooperation through ―a more 
coordinated and sophisticated network of dialogue, intelligence, capacity 
building, and other cooperation activities.‖277 
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Interesting, the National Security Policy 2003-2006 stipulates that 
Thailand needs to maintain relationships with all major power but at the same 
time should avoid commitments that could undermine its national interests. 
Moreover, collaboration for mutual benefit must be carried out on an equal 
basis.
278
 Together, this signifies Thailand‘s reluctance to be the junior partner in 
any of the bilateral or multilateral arrangements. This reflects the shift to a more 
independent posture in foreign policy decision making. 
Two areas of international cooperation in which Thailand has been 
particularly active are the peacekeeping missions and humanitarian assistance 
under the auspices of United Nations. The government sees its participation in 
UN mandated activities as a way to gain Thailand honor and prestige. It is also a 
way to show that Thailand is a responsible member of the international 
community. In fact, Thailand has just sent a number of troops, known as the Thai-
Darfur Task Force 980, to join the African Union-United Nations Hybrid 
Operation in Darfur at the end of 2010.
279
 In addition, Thailand insists that all 
forms of cooperation should be conducted under the framework of the United 
Nations. For example, ―counter-terrorism cooperation within the ARF should 
complement the global efforts led by the UN. In this regard, the ARF might 
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consider how it could support its participants to fully implement relevant UN 
resolutions.‖280         
 
MILIT 
 Closely related to POLIT is the institutional category of MILIT, a group of 
words relating to military matters. Words such as coup, fort, intervention, and 
troop fall under this category. Of the 19 documents processed, GI identifies 1,815 
words reflecting military matters. Since there are only 88 base words in this 
category, the number of MILIT words discovered by GI may undervalue the true 
weight of this constituent element in Thailand‘s strategic culture. 
 Relational content analysis reveals a cluster of words centering on the 
Royal Thai Armed Forces (see figure 4.8 below). The Armed Forces is the key 
national security institution in Thailand. It comprises the Royal Thai Army 
(RTA), Royal Thai Navy (RTN) and Royal Thai Air Force (RTAF). According to 
the latest Military Balance, the entire Armed Forces has a strength of 
approximately 305,590 officers and enlisted personnel on active duty, including 
190,000 in the army, 46,000 in the air force, and 69,860 in the navy.
281
 The actual 
number of the reserve force is unknown but estimated to be at least 160,000 
persons.  
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In order to face a multitude of security challenges, the Armed Forces is to 
transform itself from a conventional military force into a ―multipurpose‖ one282. 
In effect, the military is tasked with several roles and responsibilities other than 
defence.
283
 First, the RTARF is responsible for protecting national sovereignty, 
national territory, the Monarchy, democracy under the Monarchy, and the national 
interest in the context of national security. Second, the RTARF supports the state 
in developing the nation, maintaining internal security, restoring law and order, 
providing humanitarian assistance and disaster relief operations, researching and 
developing its defence industry and technology, space technology, information 
technology and communication, and military operations other than war 
(MOOTW). Third, the RTARF has a role in maintaining regional and 
international peace and stability under the United Nations framework.  
Due to the diminishing likelihood of conventional armed conflicts in the 
region, the role of the Thai armed forces has been re-adjusted to focus on tasks 
other than defence and the preparation for an actual armed conflict. Today, the 
armed forces allocates most of its personnel in assisting in the implementation of 
developmental projects, preservation of the environment and natural resources, 
and other civic action programs.
284
 Since mid-2008, the militarized Thai-
Cambodian confrontation over the temple of Preah Vihear, however, has however 
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reoriented the military‘s focus back to border defence (see chapter 7 for 
discussion). Overall, these roles and responsibilities, as prescribed by the 
Constitution, elevate the status of the Armed Forces from the military arm of 
national defence to a principal political actor. The linkage between the institution 
of the Monarchy, state religion and the military further accentuate the importance 
of the Armed Forces.   
Like many of the armed forces in the region, the Thai military is also 
undergoing force modernization. In particular, the military must develop its force 
capability and technology at a level comparable to regional countries.
285
 Yet, the 
self perceived need not to lag behind others is itself an indication of a high level 
of intramural suspicions.
286
  Key areas of the modernization plans include forces 
restructuring, military education and personnel training, weapons upgrades, and 
research and development (R&D) capability. The overall modernization theme is 
―change from quantity to quality.‖287 To do so, the Armed Forces will be reduced 
in size to the ratio of 1 active personnel to 1 reservist.
288
 To offset the reduction in 
size, the 2006-2010 Defence Forces Modernization Plan sets out a phased 
procurement plan for modern hardware and equipment. Several priority items 
have been identified: upgrades and purchases of new fighter jets, command and 
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control (C4I) systems, UAVs, multi-role helicopters, an air defence early warning 
system, off-shore patrol vessels, training simulators, and search and rescue 
aircraft.
289
 The new procurement plan seems to favor the Air Force because 
surveillance and reconnaissance cannot be accomplished without an agile air 
defence system. Moreover, flexible, long range, and high precision air power is 
necessary for a quick and decisive victory.
290
 Lastly, the reduction in size 
mandates integration and joint operations among the three services. In effect, joint 
operations through efficient networking among command and control, sensors and 
engagement are considered force multipliers in the military‘s modernization 
plan.
291
 
In addition to foreign sources, the development of an indigenous defence 
industry with enhanced research and development capabilities is seen as a way for 
the military to achieve self sufficiency and self-reliance. The defense industry in 
Thailand today is relatively small and supports mainly the army. There are 
currently 48 defense-related industries under the Ministry of Defense. Of the 48, 
21 are operated by the Royal Thai Army, seven by the Royal Thai Navy, 12 by 
the Royal Thai Air Force, 1 by the Royal Thai Armed Forces Headquarters, and 
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seven by the Office of the Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Defense.
292
 Overall, 
the industry is still in its nascent form and has not reached its desired potential. 
 
 
Figure 4.8: Collocation of ―Royal Thai Armed Forces‖ 
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Yet, like any other armed forces, the military must compete with other 
national development objectives for resources. Graph 4.3 shows that the Thai 
defence budget has been on the rise since 2001. The estimated defence budget for 
2010 is roughly 5.1 billion USD, accounting for 8% of the total national 
expenditure or 1.7% of Thailand‘s GDP. Out of 5.1 billion USD, 22% is spent on 
acquisition of new equipment, 40% on support and logistics, 14% on repair and 
maintenance, 14% on upgrading equipment, and the remaining 10% on education 
and training.
293
 The Ministry of Defence believes that Thailand‘s modest defence 
budget, compared to other countries, is ―not large and not threatening.‖294 The 
Ministry went further to suggest that for the armed forces to fulfill the roles and 
responsibilities assigned to it, the national budget allocated to defence should be 
increased to at least 2% of GDP, or roughly 6 billion USD. Nonetheless, 
observers claim that neither the Ministry of Defence nor the Armed Forces can 
engage in effective resource management.
295
 In particular, each service may 
autonomously draw up its own separate budget, and has authority to manage that 
budget and personnel. The lack of centralized budget planning inevitably leads to 
overlapping duties and units, higher budgets for personnel, and inefficient use of 
resources. However, none of the defence related documents discussed this 
problem.  
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The substantial increase in military budget in the last three years (see 
figure 4.9 below) may be attributed to the weak central government‘s need to 
cajole support from the military in the post-Thaksin era. In particular, the 
military's budget jumped 24% to US$4.6 billion by July 2007 after the 2006 coup 
and the installation of a military government.
296
 In November 2007, then defense 
minister Boonrawd Somtas further requested $9.3 billion for new weapons over 
the next 10 years. Although the Abhisit government cut the defence budget for 
2010 by US$547 million in May 2010 due to shortfalls in revenue collection, the 
government endorsed most of the military‘s procurement plans. 
 
 
Figure 4.9: Thailand‘s Defense Budget 1996-2010  
         (Source: Asian Defence Journal) 
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The ostensible purpose of the force modernization is to strengthen the 
armed forces‘ ability to better defend the nation. At the policy level, national 
defence is to be realized through a total defence strategy. This is a defence system 
aimed at ―deterrence, protection and responding to enemy operations by the 
planned integration of all available forces, including main forces, local forces and 
citizens, with continuous political, economic, social-psychological and military 
support, to deal with conflicts at every level.‖297 At the operational level, three 
distinct military strategic doctrines have been formulated to better meet national 
defence objectives: Security Cooperation, United Defence, and Active Defence. 
Security cooperation is to be carried out with major powers that have some 
bearing on regional security.
298
 Interestingly, while Thailand has maintained a 
long strategic partnership with the US to help modernize its military and facilitate 
economic development, the RTARF is also building closer ties with China‘s 
People‘s Liberation Army through medium and high level exchanges, joint 
research, and possible military technology transfer. However, security 
cooperation is by no means alliance. There is no discussion on alliance making in 
any of the defence white papers. In Thailand‘s perspective, ASEAN is not a 
security pact and military cooperation is limited to joint exercises and logistics 
support cooperation outside of ASEAN.
299
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United Defence is based on the popular acceptance of the military 
apparatus by all sectors of the society. It is thus important for the military to raise 
public awareness of the roles and responsibilities assigned to the armed forces. 
Again, the most important of which is the military‘s role in upholding the 
institution of the Monarchy and by extension, encouraging the population to 
support the King. Lastly, Active defence denotes operational readiness through 
joint operations, and the utilization of intelligence, early warning, and the 
surveillance system. The doctrine of Active Defence also entails the preparation 
for fighting a two-front war. In particular, the Ministry of Defence holds that the 
Armed Forces should be able to conduct combat operations in one area while at 
the same time maintain defensive position in another area.‖300 This doctrine can 
be applied to the scenario where the armed forces have to fight the insurgents on 
the southern border and a border confrontation with Cambodia to the east.  
 
ECON 
 The next institutional category ECON contains words of an economic, 
commercial, industrial, or business orientation. Words such as auditor, equity, 
refund, and welfare are examples of this group. GI identifies 6,396 words related 
to ECON. Relational content analysis uncovers a cluster of words surrounding the 
most frequently refereed term in this category, ―economy,‖ with a total of 303 
times (see figure 4.10). Other than being affected by the global financial 
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downturn, Thailand is cognizant that future competition between states for 
economic opportunities and resources will be a new basis of conflict. Economic 
disputes and threats will have a greater effect on national security because the 
traditional split along ―political blocs‖ during the Cold War era is now shifting 
into ―economic blocs.‖301 For Thailand, economic problems cannot be separated 
from political and social problems. In this regard, Bangkok‘s top priorities are 
poverty alleviation and more equitable distribution of income through government 
initiated developmental programs. 
 
 
Figure 4.10: Collocation of ―Economy‖ 
 
LEGAL 
 The last non-ideational institutional category, LEGAL, denotes words 
relating to legal, judicial, or police matters. Words such as divorce, negligence, 
probation and summons fall within this group. GI identifies 660 words with 
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LEGAL character. Relational content analysis discerns a cluster of words 
surrounding ―transnational crimes‖ (see figure 4.11 below). Other than amending 
domestic laws, Thailand attaches greater importance to improving legal 
compatibility between affected states to ensure that extradition and mutual legal 
assistance in criminal matters are available, timely, and effective.
302
 To promote 
legal compatibility, Thailand hosted two workshops, in January and June 2005, on 
‗International Legal Cooperation against Terrorism under the framework of the 
Legal Issues Working Group of the Bali Regional Ministerial Meeting on 
Counter-Terrorism. Thus far, Thailand has concluded bilateral extradition treaties 
on Mutual Assistance and Criminal Matters with a total of 14 countries, including 
the US, UK, Canada, China, Belgium, Philippines, Indonesia, Laos, Cambodia, 
Malaysia, South Korea, Bangladesh, Fiji, and Australia.  
Regionally, Thailand is also a party to the ASEAN Mutual Legal 
Assistance Treaty. This particular Treaty is aimed at improving the effectiveness 
of the law enforcement authorities of the Parties to the MLA Treaty in the 
prevention, investigation and prosecution of offences through cooperation and 
mutual legal assistance in criminal matters. However, Thailand‘s enthusiasm for 
more legal obligations in other issues areas such as environmental security and 
human rights is ambivalent. 
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Figure 4.11: Collocation of ―Transnational Crimes‖ 
 
Conclusion 
 In Thailand‘s case, conceptual content analysis reveals a strategic culture 
leaning toward the Hobbesian end with a higher predisposition to conflict. 
Although Thailand does not preclude cooperation as a valid policy instrument, 
Bangkok is quite selective on how and with whom cooperative security should be 
carried out. Overall, non-ideational factors weigh more heavily than ideational 
ones in constituting Thailand‘s strategic culture. 
 Relational content analyses uncover three situational considerations 
underlining the making of Thailand‘s defence and security policies: internally 
focused threat perception, developmental nationalism, and resilience of the 
military apparatus. First, Thailand‘s threat perception is internally oriented. 
Security problems emanating from border security such as the Southern 
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Insurgency, drug smuggling, and human trafficking are high on Bangkok‘s 
agenda. Although many of the security issues are transnational in nature, Thailand 
is more focused on addressing related problems within its border. Thailand‘s 
approach in solving these security challenges through collaborative means, 
however, does not apply to the separatist movement in the south. This reflects one 
unchanging feature of international relations in Southeast Asia, as the late 
Michael Leifer once opined, that national sovereignty is still cherished jealously 
among the regional states.
303
 The selective application of cooperative means also 
serves as a caveat to the constructivist optimism about the positive spillover effect 
of the dialogues and forums for the creation of any regional cooperative security 
architecture. Realists argue that ―constructive agendas do not resonate with the 
elites of the region, who are welded to… classic realism, with its emphasis on the 
preservation of state sovereignty.‖304  
 The state developmentalist approach inevitably rationalizes the continuous 
military control of politics by elevating the military apparatus to the status of 
nation builder. Moreover, the self assigned roles of the military in protecting the 
institution of Monarchy, religion and culture further solidify the Armed Forces‘ 
influence in the political realm. The more recent defence and security documents 
also show some effect by the military to regain support from the population
305
. 
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The bottom line is civilian control as the military is only constitutionally 
responsible for restoring internal order. The Armed Forces also need to inform the 
public about its operations in a timely and complete manner. There will also be 
opportunities for the public to participate in the Armed Forces‘ activities such as 
formation of MoD Strategy, determining the MoD‘s military to civilian ratio, or 
joining the think tanks. Friendly gestures notwithstanding, given the entrenched 
nature of military control of internal affairs, it is difficult to imagine the Armed 
Forces withdrawing from the political scene. Thailand‘s defence and strategic 
policies, as well as its strategic culture, will continue find the imprint of the 
military.   
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Chapter 5 
MALAYSIA'S STRATEGIC CULTURE 
 
Malaysia in Southeast Asia 
 Malaysia has always perceived itself as a small country both in absolute 
and relative terms. Malaysia encompasses two landmasses separated by part of the 
South China Sea. West Malaysia, more commonly known as Peninsular Malaysia, 
consists of 11 states and the federal territories of Kuala Lumpur and Putrajava. 
East Malaysia includes the states of Sabah and Sarawak as well as the federal 
territory of Labuan. East and West Malaysia together comprise a land base of 
329,758 square kilometers (slightly larger than New Mexico). Thailand borders 
West Malaysia to the North and Singapore to the South. Sabah and Sarawak are 
bounded by Indonesia. Sarawak also shares a border with Brunei. According to 
the Maritime Institute of Malaysia, the total sea area of the country is almost 
twice its landmass, and the size of its exclusive economic zone (EEZ) alone is 
approximately 453,186 square kilometers.
306
 However, Malaysia‘s EEZ claim is 
much contested since Kuala Lumpur only issued a map showing the outer limits 
of the ―Malaysian Territorial Waters‖ without promulgating the geographical 
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coordinates for its territorial sea baselines, from which territorial sea is measured, 
according to the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea.
307
 
Other than a smaller land base in comparison to its neighbors such as 
Thailand and Indonesia, the population is also modest with approximately 28.6 
million people in 64 racial groups.
308
 Yet, under the veil of national unity and 
respect for diversity is a strong sense of inter-racial tension between the major 
ethnicities in Malaysia: Malay (50.4% of the total population), Chinese (23.7%), 
Indigenous (11%), Indian (7.1%) and others (7.8%).
309
 The nationally sanctioned 
New Economic Policy (NEP) of 1970, an affirmative action programme favoring 
the Bumiputra for the purposes of poverty reduction and wealth redistribution, 
further intensifies the animosity between the Bumiputra (sons of the soil or 
indigenous people) and the non-Bumiputra (mainly Chinese and Indian). 
Although the country is recovering from the latest global recession, a 
weak microeconomic structure has long impaired Malaysia‘s ability to withstand 
external economic shocks as seen during the 1985 commodity shock and the 1997 
Asian Financial Crisis. In addition to poor corporate governance, weakness in the 
financial sector, fervent political aversion against external control (especially IMF 
conditionality), the excess spending propelled by NEP from 1970 to 2000 have 
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further contributed to the country‘s vulnerability to external adversities.310 
Moreover, the state‘s disproportionate dependence on oil revenue also subjects 
the country to budget fragility and fluctuation in commodity prices.
311
 In 2008 
alone, oil revenue accounted for 44% of the government‘s revenue.  
Other than objective smallness in territorial base, population, and 
economic performance, Malaysia has always presented itself as a small 
developing country vis-à-vis others in the international context. In particular, it is 
not uncommon to find Malaysian leaders portraying the world as unjust and 
inequitable. For example, in a state dinner with the German Chancellor in 2003, 
Dr. Mahathir, then prime minister, openly addressed the lack of influence of small 
states on the issue of western intervention in Iraq: 
―… we the small countries now live in fear, not just of terrorists 
but also from unilateral actions by powerful countries. We can 
expect no protection from international organizations like the 
United Nations (UN) since powerful countries like the United 
States and Britain can attack Iraq without the sanction of the 
UN.‖312   
 
In many official publications, politicians point to the need for Malaysia ―to 
speak up on issues that other developing countries feel constrained to voice for 
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fear of retribution by the major, particularly western, powers.‖313 Solidarity with 
fellow developing countries, especially the Islamic world, has been a recurrent 
theme in Malaysia‘s foreign and security policies. Kuala Lumpur has been 
playing an active role in setting the agenda for the Non-Aligned Movement and 
the Organization of Islamic Conference. 
Despite the fact that many developing countries, Malaysia included, may 
lack the capacity to solve developmental and security problems on their own, 
Kuala Lumpur is less in favor of foreign assistance (or directives), and instead 
advocates tenaciously for ―indigenous solutions.‖314 If anything, Malaysia‘s Third 
World Spokesmanship necessarily creates points of difference, if not frictions, 
between Malaysia and several western powers. Its stance on ―indigenous 
solutions‖ may also limit the scope and extent of cooperation, if not inadvertently 
preventing cooperative security from taking place. Why is Malaysia, a self-
perceived small developing country, willing to collide with others and forgo the 
possibilities of cooperation that may be conducive to national development, 
military and otherwise? Understanding Malaysia‘s strategic culture may shed 
light on the country‘s threat perception, propensities for cooperation and conflict, 
and the policy instruments chosen to address security issues. 
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Approximating Malaysia‘s Strategic Culture 
Broadly speaking, strategic culture is about the norms and procedures of 
strategic decision making. It reflects a bounded rationality within which the policy 
makers correlate ends to means and objectives to capabilities. Specifically, 
strategic culture focuses on the use of force, military or otherwise, and goes 
beyond political culture in relation to external affairs.
315
 Strategic decision makers 
shift back and forth between Kantian cooperation and Hobbesian conflict as no 
state can rely on one option perpetually. The bounded rationality, either zero-sum 
cost-benefit analysis or positive-sum absolute gains, is thus conditioned by the 
push and pull between the tendency for conflict and predisposition to cooperate. 
 
Documents to be Content Analyzed 
 The computer assisted content analysis software, General Inquirer, 
processed 8 defence and security related documents (see chart 5.1 below) with a 
total of 84,581 words. These are official documents published by the relevant 
agencies in Malaysia. Speeches by individual strategic decision makers are 
excluded from content analysis because the speeches may reflect more the 
personal views of the speech giver and less of a ―consensus‖ between all political 
elites. 
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Table 5.1: Malaysia Documents to be Content Analyzed 
 Document Title Word Count 
1 ASEAN Regional Forum Annual Security Outlook, Malaysia Chapter, 2001  2,161 
2 ASEAN Regional Forum Annual Security Outlook, Malaysia Chapter, 2008 4,408 
3 ASEAN Regional Forum Annual Security Outlook, Malaysia Chapter, 2009 3,498 
4 Defence White Paper, Honor and Sacrifice: The Malaysia Armed Forces 1994 23,616 
5 Defence White Paper, Towards Defence Self-Reliance 1995  10,908 
6 Defence White Paper,  Malaysia Defence Policy, 2010 8,889 
7 Malaysia Foreign Policy, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2010 5,472 
8 Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Strategic Plan 2009-2015 25,629 
 Total 84,581 
   
 
The three white papers published by the Malaysian Ministry of Defence in 
1994, 1995, and 2010 are considered traditional defence white papers. All three 
documents contain information on Malaysia‘s defence and security policies, 
evaluation of the current and future security environment, identification of major 
threats to national security, bilateral and multilateral relations the state is currently 
engaged in, and lastly, information on the Malaysian Armed Forces (MAF) 
including force structure, plans for conventionalization
316
 and modernization, and 
the roles the Armed Forces play in national defence, diplomacy, and development. 
The first two white papers provide a detailed account on the genesis and historical 
development of the MAF. The three white papers give a general impression that 
Malaysia has to be self-reliant for its defence needs. Moreover, Malaysia‘s 
selective bilateral relations with certain countries and selected participation in 
multilateral forums indicate that ―Malaysia has never had permanent allies nor 
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permanent enemies; it has always consistently worked on the basis of its 
permanent interests with all other nations be they big or small.‖317 
 To date, Malaysia has only submitted three editions of Annual Security 
Outlook to the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF). No official explanation has been 
given for the omissions. In the three chapters submitted, Malaysia discussed 
major threats to national, regional, and global security as well as Malaysia‘s role 
in regional and global peace. Only in its latest submission (2009) did Malaysia 
brief the Forum on its defence and security policies. As ASEAN became the 
cornerstone of Malaysia‘s foreign policy, the bulk of Malaysia‘s regional security 
outlook focuses significantly more on the security provisions legitimized by this 
regional organization such as The Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast 
Asia (TAC) and the Treaty on the Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone 
(SEANWFZ).  
 Due to the absence of defence and security documents available, two 
documents published by the Malaysian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Malaysia‟s 
Foreign Policy 2010 and Strategic Plan 2009-2015 are used as functional 
equivalents. The substitution is justified on the grounds that ―the defence policy, 
which complements other domestic policies, is an extension of foreign policy 
which underscores that diplomacy is the first line of defence and the use of force 
as the last resort.‖318 The two documents provide a detailed account of the 
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evolution of Malaysia‘s foreign policy since independence as well as an overview 
of the current foreign policy objectives. The objectives include 1) the protection 
and promotion of Malaysia‘s interests in international relations through proactive 
diplomacy; 2) strengthening bilateral relations; 3) enhancing Malaysia‘s 
participation in multilateral forums; 4) promoting ASEAN as the primary catalyst 
for regional cooperation and stability; 5) public diplomacy; and 6) human capital 
development within the Ministry.
319
 The Strategic Plan outlines the strategies, 
plans of action, and key performance indicators to actualize the objectives 
identified by the Ministry.  
 
Predisposition to Conflict vs. Predisposition to Cooperate 
 General Inquirer discovers a total of 2,281 power-conflict words and 1,125 
power-cooperation words. To better visualize the push and pull between the two 
tendencies, a column graph is made for the three categories of the document as 
well as an average score for all documents combined (see figure 5.1 below). In the 
case of Malaysia, there is a stronger tendency for conflict than for cooperate. 
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Figure 5.1: Approximating Malaysia‘s Strategic Culture 
 
In the defence white paper category, GI identifies 1,758 power-conflict 
words and 513 power-cooperation words. The predisposition to conflict is more 
than three times stronger than the tendency for cooperation. This finding is 
expected as defence white papers by nature utilize more words related to defence, 
security, and the military. For example, the word ―force‖ alone appears 192 times. 
However low, the tendency for cooperation is still visible. Yet, most of the 
defence cooperation initiatives are bilateral in nature. Malaysia is also careful in 
choosing its participation in multilateral security forums. Only ASEAN-led 
multilateral security forums such as ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) and the 
ASEAN Defence Minister Meeting (ADMM) are discussed in the defence white 
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papers. Notably, the only reference to alliance is the Five Power Defence 
Arrangement.  
 In the ARF category, the predisposition for conflict is higher than the 
tendency to cooperate. This finding is unanticipated. Malaysia has always prided 
itself as a founding nation of ASEAN. It has actively participated in ASEAN 
related security forums and promoted confidence building in the region. There 
should be more discussion on how cooperative security has been carried out by 
Malaysia or at least the impetus for future cooperation. Yet, Malaysia is cognizant 
of the fact that ―the diversity of the security environment, national interests, and 
differing policies of countries in the region may have prevented the development 
of a regional framework and/or an organization for regional cooperation.‖320 
When the concept of self-reliance, the fundamental principle of Malaysia‘s 
defence policy, is taken into account, it becomes clear that cooperation is not an 
automatic policy choice even when national security is breached.  
 The higher predisposition to cooperate in the foreign policy section is 
expected because foreign policy documents have less reference to military 
matters. Since proactive diplomacy is enshrined in Malaysia‘s foreign policy as 
the primary instrument in conducting foreign relations, use of the force or the 
threat of using force should be the last resort. Although significantly lower than 
that of the two other categories, the tendency for conflict is still observable.  
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The Constituent Elements of Malaysia‘s Strategic Culture 
The constituent elements of Malaysia‘s Strategic Culture and their relative 
weight are determined first by grouping the 84,581 words into eight General 
Inquirer institutional categories (see figure 5.2 below). The eight categories 
comprise four ideational factors (religion, personal expression, doctrine, and 
academia) and four non-ideational ones (politics, military, economy, and legal). 
After gauging the relative weight of each category, relational content analysis 
follows to qualitatively uncover the meanings of the connection between words 
that frequently appear together in each category.   
 
 
Figure 5.2: Content by Insititutional Category, Malaysia 
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Ideational Factors 
DOCTRINE 
 The institutional category, DOCTRINE, refers to any organized system of 
belief or knowledge, including those of applied knowledge, mystical beliefs, and 
arts as an academic subject. Words such as conservation, liberation, precept, and 
specialization are subsumed under this category. GI identifies 2,100 words in this 
category. Though not directly collocated, further disambiguation and relational 
content analysis discovers a cluster of words that are positively correlated with the 
expression ―force modernization‖ (see figure 5.3 below). 
  
 
Figure 5.3: Collocation of ―Force Modernization‖ 
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Since the early 1990s, the Malaysian Ministry of Defence has embarked 
the dual program to conventionalize and modernize the armed forces. 
―Conventionalization is related to organization and doctrinal changes while 
modernization is synonymous with acquisition of technologically advanced 
weapon systems and equipment.‖321 According to the 1994 defence white paper, 
conventionalization is to be carried out at four different levels.
322
 The first level is 
based on the concept of ―MINDEF Incorporated‖. It aims at integrating the three 
services of the armed forces with the civilian component of the Ministry of 
Defence. The second level is to reorganize the command and control of the armed 
forces by creating the Headquarters manned by personnel from all three services. 
The third level is to adjust the level of inter-service proportions by significantly 
reducing the size of the army while enhancing the combat capability of the air 
force and navy. Lastly, the Ministry attempts to correct the intra-service 
imbalance by enhancing the combat support units (engineering for example) and 
the combat service support units (medical for example) vis-à-vis the combat units. 
With respect to modernization, other than continued sourcing from other 
countries, the 2010 defence white paper indicates a new policy to be implemented 
in the next ten years: achieving ―self-reliance defence capability‖ by developing 
local defence industry as well as defence science and technology capabilities
323
. 
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At present, the local defence industry has been able to meet only limited needs 
especially in the areas of maintenance, repair and overhaul (MRO) activities, low 
level manufacturing of parts and components as well as sub-assemblies
324
. To 
accelerate development, a Defence Industry Blueprint was published in 2004 to 
address issues related to technology transfer through defence cooperation, offset 
programs, counter-trade programs, standardization of specification, and incentives 
to industry, to name just a few. As Malaysia depends on foreign defence 
purchases for industrial and technological spin-offs both in defence and non-
defence sectors, observers claim that ad hoc offsets (mandatory, 50% worth of the 
deal) and uncoordinated counter-trades (up to 50% of the offset for each 
purchase) are not conducive to consistent weapons procurement plans and long 
term development of an indigenous base.
325
 The contraction of the army, as 
instructed by the conventionalization plan, may also reduce local demands for 
small arms, light weapons, and armored vehicles, three major production lines of 
the Malaysia defence industry.
326
 
 In addition to conventionalization and modernization, the 
professionalization of military personnel is also an important aspect of the force 
modernization plan. The most noteworthy initiative in human resource 
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development is the creation of the K-Force University Program in 2002. It is a 
distance learning program in partnership with the University of Tun Abdul Razak 
(UNITAR) to provide opportunities for higher education and self-development to 
military officers.
327
 To date, more than 1000 military personnel throughout 
Malaysia have acquired tertiary education through e-learning. Given the shortage 
of education facilities for military personnel, the National Defence University of 
Malaysia was established in 2006 in the Sungei Besi Camp, Kuala Lumpur to 
provide quality integrated military education and training to cadets who will join 
the armed forces upon graduation. The university will also take overseas students, 
mainly exchange students from military academies of other ASEAN countries, 
starting from July 2011.
328
 
 
ACADEM 
 The institutional category, ACADEM, contains words pertaining to 
academic, intellectual or education matters, including the names of major fields of 
study. Terms such as clinical, historian, museum, and scholar fall under this 
category. GI identifies 404 words in this particular category. With the exception 
of ―education,‖ which has been addressed in the previous section, relational 
content analysis is unable to collocate words sharing meaningful connections. 
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This finding is not surprising as defence and military related documents by nature 
do not address academic or intellectual matters. There is some limited discussion 
on the need for indigenous research and development (R&D) in the field of 
Information and Communication Technology (ICT) and how such technology 
may help the armed forces develop cyber warfare capabilities. Although the 
Ministry of Defence identifies ICT along with joint operation as ―force 
multipliers,‖ the latest defence white paper contains no information on the 
Ministry‘s plan to actualize this goal. 
 
RELIG 
 The institutional category, RELIG, groups together words related to 
religious, metaphysical, supernatural or relevant philosophical matters. Words 
such as divinity, Islam, myth, and salvation are examples of this category. Out of 
85,581 words, GI only uncovers 67 RELIG words. Although the world ―Islam‖ 
appears 29 times, relational content analysis cannot identify any meaningful 
connections between Islam and other words. Whenever Islam is mentioned, it is 
often discussed in the context of Islam Hadhari, or literally, Civilized Islam. 
Envisioned by the former Prime Minister, Abdullah Badawi, it is an approach 
based on Islamic values towards progress and development. According to Badawi, 
all Muslims must demonstrate ten fundamental principles: 1) faith in God and 
piety; 2) a just and trustworthy government; 3) a free and independent people; 4) a 
vigorous pursuit and mastery of knowledge; 5) balanced and comprehensive 
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economic development; 6) a good quality of life for the people; 7) protection of 
the rights of minority groups and women; 8) cultural and moral integrity; 9) 
safeguarding natural resources and the environment; 10) strong defence 
capabilities.
329
 
 Badawi believes that Islamic teaching is fully compatible with modernity 
and democracy. It is a ―different‖ way for the Islamic community to achieve 
parity with the rest of the world. By using Malaysia as a success story, he openly 
encourages other Islamic countries to adopt the same approach to bring about 
progressive Islamic civilization. The concept has been accepted and 
acknowledged by the Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC) member states 
during the 3rd Special Summit of the OIC in Makkah (Mecca, Saudi Arabia) in 
December 2005.
330
 In Badawi‘s words, 
―… [i]t is not an approach to pacify the West. It is neither an 
approach to apologize for the perceived Islamic threat, nor an 
approach to seek approval from the non-Muslims for a more 
friendly and gentle image of Islam. It is an approach that seeks to 
make Muslims understand that progress is enjoined by Islam. It is 
an approach that is compatible with modernity and yet firmly 
rooted in the noble values and injunctions of Islam. It is an 
approach that values substance and not form.‖331  
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Although Islam Hadhari has won Malaysia some applause within the 
international Islamic community, it does not directly address the existing racial 
disharmony that has long been dubbed the ―time bomb‖ of Malaysia. In reality, it 
offers no opportunity for non-Muslims in Malaysia to participate in the 
modernization project. Ironically, the movement further accentuates the difference 
between the Bumiputra (sons of the soil or indigenous people) and the non-
Bumiputra (mainly Chinese and Indian). In addition, Baldawi‘s vision places a 
high premium on the ability of the government, an Islamic government in this 
case, to provide the platforms for Muslims to accomplish the ten fundamental 
principles. This government-centric, if not authoritative top-down, approach 
inadvertently limits the ability of media and civil society organizations to act as 
policy gatekeepers. In fact, the government has identified non-government 
organizations and their demands as disruptive of social harmony and national 
security.
332
 The line between religion and politics is thus muddled even when 
Malaysia is constitutionally declared a secular state. 
 
EXPRSV 
 The last ideational institutional factor, EXPRV, denotes words related to 
arts, sports, and self-expression. Words such as image, marksman, orator, and 
verse are included in this category. Although GI identifies 217 words in this 
category, no meaningful connections between any pair of vocabularies can be 
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discerned. This finding is not surprising as defence and security policies have 
little to do with arts and sports. While references to self-expression are absent 
from all the documents analyzed, allusions to collective will or national identity, 
the basis for social cohesion and communal harmony, are absent from the text as 
well. In spite of the fact that national unity is the most fundamental element of a 
state, both big and small, Malaysia‘s national security policy is unusually silent on 
this issue.  
 
Non-Ideational Factors 
POLIT 
 The first non-ideational institutional category, POLIT, groups together 
words with clear political character, including political roles, collectivities, acts, 
ideas, ideologies, and symbols. Words such as diplomacy, frontier, segregation, 
and unification are examples of this category. With the 11,301 POLIT words 
identified by GI, POLIT ranks the highest in terms of relative weight in 
comparison to seven other categories. Relational content analysis uncovers three 
clusters of words surrounding the base terms ―defence,‖ ―security,‖ and 
―cooperation‖ respectively (see figures 5.4, 5.5, and 5.6 below).  
Figure 5.4 below depicts Malaysia‘s defence policy. The first sub-branch 
delineates Malaysia‘s national interests, which can be divided into three levels: 
strategic, regional, and global.
333
 Strategic interests comprise the protection of 
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land territories, territorial waters, airspace, EEZ, and sea lines of 
communication.
334
 Malaysia sees the existence of a peaceful and stable region 
most conducive to the development of the nation. It is also alarmed by the 
possible negative spillover effect the security issues from the bordering countries 
may bring to its national security. The global level interest is however stated in 
passing with globalization identified as the main source of concern. Overall, the 
number of co-occurrences indicates that protecting Malaysia‘s strategic interests 
is the most important task of the government. 
The second sub-branch illustrates the guiding principles for safeguarding 
the above mentioned national interests. Above everything, Malaysia must rely on 
itself for its defence needs. The Malaysian Armed Forces (MAF) must possess the 
capability to act independently without foreign assistance in matters concerning 
internal security. Taking into account the current phase of force modernization, 
foreign assistance is sought only if Malaysia‘s territorial integrity and security 
interests are compromised by high level external threats.
335
 Total defence requires 
other sectors of the society to contribute to national defence both in peacetime and 
wartime. There are five facets to this concept: security readiness, economic 
resilience, social cohesiveness, psychological resilience, and civil preparedness. 
Next, the Five Power Defence Arrangement (FDPA) is the only mutual defence 
alliance that Malaysia is currently committed to. FDPA is of great value for two 
                                                 
334
 Malaysia Defence Policy 2010, 11. 
335
 Ibid, 22. 
   178 
reasons. First, the Armed Forces gains invaluable benefits from cross training and 
joint exercises under the Arrangement. Second and more importantly, it is an 
important political and security nexus between Malaysia and Singapore as the 
Arrangement provides ―a tangible military link that binds the Armed Forces of 
both countries.‖336 As a responsible member of the global community, Malaysia 
sees its participation in UN mandated peacekeeping missions the most 
constructive way to contribute to world peace. Moreover, ―Malaysia‘s firm 
commitment to the UN Charter has made it to adopt a defensive defence 
posture.‖337 Lastly, Malaysia places emphasis on conflict prevention. Bilateral 
defence diplomacy and multilateral security forums provide Malaysia the venues 
to discuss potential sources of tension with other concerned states. 
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Figure 5.4: Collocation of ―Defence‖ 
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 The last sub-branch of this cluster touches on the doctrinal guidance on 
use of force. Deterrence is the keystone of Malaysia‘s defensive defense posture. 
It aims at discouraging potential adversaries from using force of any kind against 
Malaysia. Deterrence requires Malaysia to demonstrate capabilities such as state 
of preparedness and willingness to use force at all times. The concept of forward 
defense features an armed force that has the capacity to act beyond the boundaries 
of Malaysia through strategic rapid reaction to gain tactical advantage.
338
 The 
government stresses that forward defense must not be mistaken as Malaysia‘s 
intent to develop power projection capability far beyond its national borders. Yet, 
there is no elaboration on the permissible distance from the national borders by 
which the MAF may operate without either contradicting the policy or alarming 
other states. 
Figure 5.5 below depicts Malaysia‘s multifaceted threat perception, 
ranging from economic security to new forms of non-traditional threats. Other 
than the conventional focus of national security, Malaysia attaches great 
importance to regional security. In particular, ASEAN forms the core priority of 
Malaysia‘s current security and foreign policies as its neighbors are considered 
―the closest allies,‖ albeit without formal alliance commitment.339 Moreover, any 
internal security problems, particularly the separatist movements, emanating from 
the bordering states such as Myanmar, Thailand, the Philippines, and Cambodia, 
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may have immediate negative ramifications on regional stability in general and 
Malaysia‘s national security in particular. In light of the heightened sensitivity 
attached to ―everyday security problems,‖ Malaysia reiterates the three guiding 
principles when dealing with political and sovereignty issues: 1) non-interference 
in the internal affairs of its neighboring countries; 2) no support for any struggle 
by groups that would affect the sovereignty and territorial integrity of any 
country; and 3) not granting political asylum to any members or leaders of such 
separatist groups.
340
 
In the greater Asia Pacific region, Malaysia is especially concerned with 
territorial disputes in the South China Sea. As Malaysia‘s economic and energy 
security depend greatly on fishery resources and hydrocarbons, the protection of 
its EEZ and continental shelf becomes one of the priorities of national defence. 
Yet, the overlapping territorial claims in the area necessarily complicate the 
prospect of peaceful resolution of the disputes. Malaysia is somewhat optimistic 
about stability in the South China Sea. Kuala Lumpur treats the South China Sea 
issue as a constellation of many bilateral disputes that can be resolved through 
bilateral mechanisms such as joint exploration or third party arbitration. Bilateral 
disputes, stated by Malaysia, ―do not in any way act as impediments to ASEAN 
cooperation.‖341 Yet, it is known that Malaysia has maintained an uninterrupted 
military presence on the Ardasier Reef, Mariveles Reef, and the Swallow Reef to 
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reinforce and defend its claims. Interestingly, the documents portray China, an 
extra-regional claimant to the dispute with growing military presence in the 
region, not only as an opportunity but also ―a staunch friend of ASEAN.‖342  
Malaysia‘s long coastline and the physical separation of the two 
landmasses by part of the South China Sea prompt the government to invest in 
maritime security. Other than guarding its maritime strategic interests, Malaysia, 
as its neighbors, is equally confronted with the problems of piracy, maritime 
crimes, and terrorism. To better coordinate law enforcement on the sea, the 
Maritime Enforcement Agency of Malaysia (MMEA) was established in 2005. 
Under the Maritime Enforcement Agency Act 2004, MMEA is authorized to 
enforce Malaysia‘s maritime acts and laws such as the Continental Shelf Act 
(1966), the Exclusive Economic Zone Act 1984, Fisheries Act 1985, 
Environmental Quality Act 1974, and the Merchant Shipping Ordinance 1952 
(amended 2005). Two surveillance systems are also operational, namely, the Sean 
Surveillance System (SWASLA) manned by MMEA and the Automatic 
identification System (AIS) run by the Marine Department.
343
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Figure 5.5: Collocation of ―Security‖ 
 
 With regard to safety and security in the Malacca Straits, Malaysia 
believes that ―the focus should be on how cooperation between littoral states and 
user states could continue to be further enhanced without impacting on the 
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sovereignty and territorial integrity of the former.‖344 Apparently, the value the 
littoral states place on sovereignty outweighs the potential security benefit joint 
patrols may bring about. This is evident in Malaysia‘s refusal to include security 
cooperation in the 2007 Cooperative Mechanism and its reluctance in allowing 
ships in the Malacca Straits Patrols (MSP) the right of hot pursuit beyond five 
nautical miles into the neighbor‘s territorial water.345 The MSP, according to 
Simon, is in actuality ―more coordinated than joint, with each country responsible 
for patrolling its own sector and each ship under national command.‖346   
Figure 5.6 below illustrates Malaysia‘s patterns of cooperation. In theory, 
Malaysia places equal value on bilateral and multilateral cooperation. In practice, 
however, bilateral engagement appears to be the preferred policy instrument in 
conducting Malaysia‘s security policy. For example, Malaysia has pursued 
bilateral cooperation through the establishment of Joint Commissions. According 
to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, a Joint Commission is a channel used by two 
countries to discuss all issues of mutual interests
347
. Substantive bilateral 
cooperation is carried out only after the two countries signed the Economic, 
Scientific, Technical and Cultural Cooperation Agreement (ESTCA). The 
Ministry takes the lead when it hosts a Joint Commission Meeting (JCM) and 
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other relevant agencies may participate in it. In Southeast Asia, Malaysia has 
established separate Joint Commissions with Brunei, Indonesia, the Philippines, 
Thailand, Laos, and Vietnam
348
. Even within ASEAN, the cornerstone of 
Malaysia‘s security and foreign policies, cooperation is limited to functional 
terms on a sub-regional basis such as the ASEAN Mekong Development Co-
operation and the Indonesia-Malaysia-Thailand Growth Triangle (IMTGT).
349
  
Region-wide cooperation is concentrated in trade and investment as seen in the 
implementation of the ASEAN investment area.  
In the area of security cooperation, Malaysia sees the ASEAN Regional 
Forum (ARF) the main venue for member states and dialogue partners to 
―discuss‖ security matters. Yet, Malaysia is not enthusiastic about turning the 
ARF or ASEAN into concrete cooperative security architecture. ―As the ARF 
originally was not perceived nor structured as a mechanism to solve crises in the 
region, its process should evolve at a pace comfortable to all ARF participants and 
on the basis of consensus.‖350 Moreover, the ASEAN Defence Ministers Meeting 
(ADMM) is only good for transparency and confidence building, not for defense 
cooperation or alliance making.
351
 In effect, Malaysia has long concluded that 
(new) military alliances will perpetuate the climate of mistrust and rivalry among 
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countries in the region.
352
 Any defensive weapon systems acquired by the alliance 
members inadvertently carry offensive capabilities that may destabilize the 
strategic balance in the region.  
Instead of multilateral defence cooperation, Malaysia has been conducting 
defence diplomacy at a bilateral level through the Malaysian Defence Cooperation 
Program (MDCP). Mutual understanding can be gained by having military 
officers from other countries train at the facilities in Malaysia. Other than the 
exchange of personnel, Malaysia has conducted bilateral defence cooperation with 
most ASEAN members and several non-Asian states. Kuala Lumpur believes that 
these relationships may provide opportunities for professional training, technical 
assistance, technology transfer, and sources for defense equipment procurement. 
Malaysia purposely seeks defense technologies and equipment from varied 
sources so as not to over rely on any one supplier. Two obvious problems 
attached to the multiple sources of armed procurement are the question of 
interoperability and the added difficulty in maintenance.    
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Figure 5.6: Collocation of ―Cooperation‖ 
 
Of the non-ASEAN states, Malaysia considers relationships with 
Australia, New Zealand, US, several European countries, Russia, China, India, 
and Pakistan important as defense cooperation can bring about positive 
externalities to other areas of cooperation. It is striking that Malaysia is not shy to 
publicly articulate the view that cooperative relations with some countries like 
South Africa, Sweden, Ukraine and Spain are more for the acquisition of military 
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equipment and not for the development of a friendly relationship.
353
 Moreover, 
Malaysia should also be able to manage ―the risk of entrapment and over-
dependence on certain powers already present or emerging in the region.‖354   
In the context of international cooperation, Malaysia welcomes 
multilateral efforts, peacekeeping missions in particular, under the auspices of the 
United Nations. As a ―small developing country player‖ in the international arena, 
Malaysia sees the need to uphold the UN charter as a defence of last resort 
because only the UN can provide legitimacy to international order.
355
 But 
Malaysia‘s support for the organization is not unconditional. Malaysia 
periodically criticizes the ―undemocratic aspects‖ of the United Nations, 
especially the Security Council and the veto power enjoyed by the ―permanent‖ 
members. This view is best illustrated by the famous speech delivered by the 
former Prime Minister, Dr. Mahathir, at the 48
th
 United Nations General 
Assembly in New York on October 1, 1993: 
―… We can accept some weightage for them, but for each of them 
alone, to be more powerful than the whole membership of the 
United Nations is not acceptable; not before, not now and not for 
the future. There can be for the time being some permanent 
members. But the veto must go…‖356 
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MILIT 
 Closely related to POLIT is the institutional category denoting military 
matters, MILIT. Words such as ambush, commander, fleet and troop are examples 
of this category. Of the 8 documents processed, GI identifies 1,582 words in this 
category. Relational content analysis isolates a cluster of words centering on the 
Malaysian Armed Forces (see figure 5.7 below). According to the latest Military 
Balance, the entire Armed Forces consists of approximately 109,000 officers and 
enlisted personnel, including 80,000 in the army, 15,000 in the air force, and 
14,000 in the navy.
357
 The reserve is estimated to be 51,600 persons, including 
50,000 in the army, 600 in the air force, and 1000 in the navy.  
 To better shore up its defense needs, Malaysia has embarked on a dual 
program of conventionalization and modernization named the Versatile Malaysian 
Armed Forces of the 21
st
 Century (VMAF21). Eliciting strong suspicion from its 
neighbors, the Ministry of Defence reiterates that Malaysia does not have any 
specific threats in mind when purchasing such big ticket items as multiple rocket 
launchers, submarines, and fighter jets. The modernization effort is mainly due to 
the fact that MAF needs to catch up and stay abreast with modern defense 
technology, especially in the area of Information and Communication Technology 
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(ICT)
358
. Since the late 1990s, Malaysia has spent over $5 billion on arms and 
become one of the largest arms buyers in Southeast Asia.
359
 
 
 
Figure 5.7: Collocation of ―Malaysian Armed Forces‖ 
 
One of the priorities in the modernization program is to establish effective 
air space control, ―the prerequisite for the successful execution of operations by 
land, sea, and air.‖360 As a result, the procurement plan seems to favor the air 
force at the expense of other two services. Malaysia has purchased 18 Su-
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30MKM Flankers from Russia at a cost of $900 million in 2003.
361
 In an 
interview with the Kuala Lumpur Security Review, the Chief of the Air Force in 
2008 previewed the procurement plan for the near future, including airborne early 
warning and control aircraft (AEW&C), a medium range air defense system, six 
squadrons of Multi Role Combat Aircraft (MRCA), as well as software upgrades 
for six new SU30MKMs.
362
  
 In addition to national defence, the MAF is tasked with maintaining 
internal security, development, and participation in defence diplomacy mainly 
through joint exercises and UN peacekeeping missions. The MAF prides itself as 
a professional military. As a result, Malaysia is one of the countries in the region 
―where the military has not intervened in politics and where civilian authorities 
have continued in power since independence.‖363 According to Ra‘ees, several 
factors have contributed to the ―non-interventionist attitude‖ and subservience to 
civilian leadership: 1) constitutional constraints, 2) the evolution of the armed 
forces, 3) shared social background between political and military elites; 4) Malay 
domination in the MAF; and lastly, 5) the convergence of interests between 
civilian and military leaders.
364
 The MAF is to assist the civil authorities in 
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combating internal threats, restore and maintain public order, and in disaster relief 
missions. The key word is ―to assist,‖ not to take over. 
 Before the communist threat was fully eradicated in Malaysia, the military 
had devised the KESBAN (Security and Development) program to neutralize the 
threat by bringing socio-economic development to affected areas, especially those 
along the borders. Apart from KESBAN, small units of MAF personnel were 
engaged in minor relief and assistance missions to the more isolated and secluded 
settlements under the Jiwa Murni‘ program. Lastly, MAF was also active under 
the Tentera Bersama Rakyat‘ program to provide services such as education and 
basic infrastructure construction by utilizing military resources. However, as the 
military gradually conventionalized and modernized, its role in national 
development has been returned to its primary responsibility, namely, defending 
the sovereignty and strategic interests of Malaysia against external threats. In 
other words, the military now contributes to national development by offering 
security. 
 Lastly, the Armed Forces contribute towards world peace and stability 
through UN peacekeeping operations. To date, Malaysia has participated in 14 
missions, 4 of which are ongoing.
365
 The Multilateral Political Affairs Division in 
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is tasked with formulating Malaysia‘s position 
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regarding issues related to international peace and security, peacekeeping 
operations, and peace-building questions in the United Nations.
366
 
 
ECON 
 The next institutional category, ECON, refers to words of an economic, 
commercial, industrial, or business orientation. Words such as antitrust, 
budgetary, fund, and manpower fall within this category. GI identifies 6,334 
ECON words, the second highest ranking category in terms of relative weight. 
Relational content analysis uncovers a cluster of words surrounding the most 
frequently referenced term in this group, ―economy‖ (and its associated terms 
such as ―economic‖ and ―economically‖) with a total of 258 times.  
 Figure 5.8 below shows that Malaysia‘s economy has been negatively 
affected by successive financial crises and recessions. The major economic 
concerns in the medium term include slower global economic growth, on-going 
structural adjustment, and fast paced technological advances.
367
 To better prepare 
for a more integrated global economy, Malaysia is advocating collective regional 
responses and economic resilience vis-à-vis foreign (extra-regional) assistance. 
Malaysia‘s approach to globalization in general and future financial crises in 
particular, according to Dr. Mahathir, has always been guided by the principle 
that the pace of globalization in Malaysia at least must be on Malaysia‘s terms, 
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367
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based on local circumstances, interests, and priorities.
368
 Malaysia‘s experience 
during the Asian Financial crisis has boosted its confidence as a small developing 
country in dealing with external shocks without the assistance and directives from 
foreign entities. The pride of being a successful story is best captured in the 
remark by Badawi, the former Prime Minister of Malaysia: 
―… But in the final analysis, it was our ability to act rationally, 
independently and not merely follow conventional orthodoxy that 
saw us introducing successfully the bold solutions, which are now 
being acknowledged by the IMF, then one of our biggest critics, as 
a case study.‖369 
 
Trade and offshore resources are two major sectors of Malaysia‘s 
economy. In effect, in the period of Jan-Feb 2011 alone crude petroleum and 
refined petroleum products account for 10.9% of Malaysia‘s total export at the 
value of RM 11.7 billion (approximately US$ 3.88 billion).
370
 The protection of 
its economic interests and offshore resources has always ranked high in Kuala 
Lumpur‘s agenda. However, even in the context of globalization, Malaysia‘s 
economic policy has historically reflected a strong nationalistic character. Starting 
from the ―Buy British Last‖ (BBL) policy in 1981, Malaysia has gradually shifted 
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its focus to trading with countries in the vicinity. The ―Look East Policy‖ of the 
same year aimed at bringing Japanese models of business and Japanese Foreign 
direct investment (FDI) into Malaysia. The more recent involvement in the South-
South Cooperation sought to promote solidarity with fellow developing countries 
and the Muslim world. The latest invention of ―Prosper Thy Neighbor‖ policy 
proposes enhanced economic relations and cooperation with neighboring 
countries. All in all, these economic policies while not severing ties with 
Malaysia‘s major developed nation trading partners, at the same time allows 
Kuala Lumpur to be the champion of the less developed world.
371
 
In 2010, Singapore (13.4% of Malaysia‘s total exports), the People‘s 
Republic of China (12.6%), Japan (10.4%), the United States (9.5%), and 
Thailand (5.3%). remained the top five destinations for Malaysia‘s export. A 
burgeoning India has risen to be a new market for Malaysia‘s products, 
accounting for 3.3% of the total export last year. The European Union as a whole 
has been a stable market. In December 2010, exports to EU were valued at 
approximately US$2 billion.
372
 Paradoxically, although Malaysia is sometimes at 
odds with the ―developed‖ world, when it comes to trade and investment ―there is 
no contradiction between Malaysia‘s justifiable criticisms of the West on certain 
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issues and our continued acceptance of western countries as a market for our 
products and as a source for investment in our country.‖373  
 
 
Figure 5.8: Collocation of ―Economy‖ 
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LEGAL 
 The last non-institutional category, LEGAL, features a group of words 
relating to legal, judicial, or police matters. Words such as court, indictment, 
probation and robbery are examples of this category. GI identifies 673 words with 
clear LEGAL character. Relational content analysis uncovers a cluster of words 
surrounding ―crime‖ (see figure 5.9 below). Organized crime, transnational 
crimes, and terrorist attacks are identified by the Malaysian government as threats 
of increasing significance to national security. Organized crime, especially human 
trafficking and illicit drug trade, are transnational in nature and require 
cooperation from other affected countries in the region.   
 
 
Figure 5.9: Collocation of ―Crime‖ 
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However, Malaysia appears to be less affected by the problem of 
trafficking in persons. There is no immediate policy response to this problem 
other than participation in the Asia Regional Trafficking in Persons (ARTIP) 
project to help train judges and prosecutors on the legal concepts, trial issues, and 
practical concerns often implicated in cases of human trafficking.
374
 In the case of 
illicit drug trade, other than participating in the UN organized drug control 
initiatives and the establishment of the ASEAN Training Centre for Treatment 
and Rehabilitation in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia has also signed five bilateral drug 
control agreements with the United States (1989), United Kingdom (1989), 
Venezuela (1990), Russia (1999), and Hong Kong SAR (2003). There is no 
explanation on why these countries were chosen for bilateral drug control 
cooperation but not those countries deeply affected by the same problem in the 
region. Lastly, Malaysia‘s counter-terrorism effort emphasizes capacity building 
and mutual legal assistance. It has offered training sessions through the Southeast 
Asia Regional Centre for Counter-Terrorism (SEARCCT). It also took the 
initiative to prepare the text of the proposed the Mutual Legal Assistance in 
Criminal Matters Treaty for like-minded ASEAN Member Countries, which was 
signed by eight ASEAN countries in Kuala Lumpur on November 29, 2004. 
However, there is no discussion on bilateral cooperation on this issue. 
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Conclusion 
 In Malaysia‘s case, conceptual content analysis delineates a strategic 
culture leaning toward the Hobbesian end of the spectrum with a much stronger 
disposition to conflict than to cooperate. Overall, non-ideational factors (POLIT, 
MILIT, ECON, and LEGAL) weigh more heavily relative to the ideational ones 
(DOCTRINE, RELIG, EXPRSV, AND ACADEM) in constituting Malaysia‘s 
strategic culture. Specifically, political, military, and economic concerns trump 
other factors to be the most significant drivers of Malaysia‘s security, defence, 
and foreign policies.  
 Relational content analysis identifies two situational considerations and 
one psychological consideration that shape Malaysia‘s policy responses to 
security problems. First, Malaysia‘s geophysical location (two separated land 
masses, long coast line, and overlapping territorial claims) and the need to protect 
its geo-economic interests determine much of its defence needs. The goal is to 
prevent any conflict or disruption of peace from taking place on Malaysian soil. It 
thus calls for conflict prevention, the application of a denial strategy, and the 
development of a credible air force equipped with added surveillance and early 
warning capabilities.    
 Second, the scope and extent of any cooperation, bilateral or multilateral, 
are necessarily limited by Malaysia‘s insistence on upholding the principles of 
sovereignty and territorial integrity as well as non-interference in the internal 
affairs of its neighbors. Cooperation is carried out in functional terms only, if not 
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ad hoc in nature. This trend, in the long run, stifles the positive spillover effect 
genuine cooperation may bring about between countries. 
 Lastly, Malaysia‘s world view is best characterized by the dichotomies of 
big vs. small, North vs. South, West vs. East, core vs. periphery, and the 
developed vs. the less developed. Embedded in these dichotomies, as suggested 
by Wallerstein‘s World Systems theory, are the intrinsic struggles for control 
between the two parties. While acknowledging itself a small country in the East 
with a peripheral developmental status, Malaysia sees the need to make its 
presence felt whenever possible. Its economic success relative to other small 
states has empowered Kuala Lumpur to champion the issues of the Islamic 
community, third world developmental problems, the imposition of the Western 
notions of human rights on non-western societies, and the Israeli-Palestine 
conflict, to name just a few. It effectively creates an impression that Malaysia will 
not blindly accommodate foreign demands. By doing so, Malaysia wants to 
demonstrate that ―a small developing country player‖ can also exercise some 
influence in setting the international agenda through sophisticated and well-
articulated views.   
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Chapter 6 
OPERATIONALIZED MARITIME SECURITY REGIMES IN SOUTHEAST 
ASIA: A TALE OF TWO COUNTRIES 
 
Maritime Security in Southeast Asia 
 Located between the Indonesian island of Sumatra and peninsular 
Malaysia, the Strait of Malacca, among other waterways in Southeast Asia, is the 
seaborne trade nexus linking major Asian economies to the rest of the world, and 
vice versa. With a length of 805 kilometers, the Strait is the shortest sea route 
between the Persian Gulf and the East, connecting the Indian Ocean to the South 
China Sea and the Pacific Ocean. It is also the lifeline of global economy. The 
growth of international trade brings about commensurate increase in the traffic 
passing though the channel. According to the Maritime Institute of Malaysia, the 
number of merchant vessels exceeding 300 gross register tonnage (GRT) passing 
through the Straits increased by 37 per cent between 2000 and 2008. Liquefied 
natural and petroleum (LNG/LPG) tankers registered 26 percent growth from 
2,962 to 3,726 while container and general cargo vessels rose 41 percent over the 
same period of time.
375
 Japan's International Transport Institute estimates that 
traffic in the strait will increase further to approximately 141,000 vessels in 
2020.
376
 In fact, it is one of the world‘s oil transit chokepoints with an estimated 
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13.6 million barrels per day flow in 2009.
377
 Together, with over 50,000 larger 
ships passing through the Strait annually and carrying a quarter of the world‘s 
maritime trade onboard, safety and security of navigation in the regional 
waterways are pivotal to the well-being of local and global economies.
378
 
 Yet, the regional waterways are clearly not the safest places to traverse. 
Existing security issues such as people smuggling, human trafficking, small arms 
trafficking, illicit drug trade, and piracy are further compounded by the possibility 
of terrorist attacks. In fact, there has been a 60% increase in the total number of 
actual or attempted incidents of piracy and armed robbery against ships reported 
in Asia in 2010 compared to 2009: a total of 164 incidents, most of which took 
place in the Arabian Sea, South China Sea, and the coasts of Bangladesh, 
Indonesia, Malaysia, and Vietnam.
379
 In particular, tankers have been the most 
common target of maritime predation in the Asian waters.
380
 It is estimated that 
piracy and armed robberies against ships in Southeast Asia alone are costing the 
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region about U.S. $500 million and the world U.S. $25 billion a year.
381
 The 
enormous resources (military, technical, and monetary) required for solving these 
security problems are beyond the capacity of any one of the coastal states. ―The 
reality is we need more resources to ensure the level of security of the straits and 
the only way to do it is to get the international community [involved]…‖ said 
Najib, the Malaysian prime minister.
382
 Even when individual states are 
committed to strengthen maritime security, Singapore‘s deputy prime minister 
once expressed that ―individual state action is not enough. The oceans are 
indivisible and maritime security threats do not respect boundaries.‖383  
 
Cooperative Security in the Maritime Domain 
Despite years of practices in confidence measures building (CMB), 
dialogues, and an urgent need for collaborative actions, security regionalism in 
Southeast Asia is still a ―weak reed.‖384 In most cases, cooperation remains at the 
policy level and takes the forms of joint declarations or memorandums of 
understanding (MOU) without being operationalized. Specifically, effective 
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multilateral security cooperation is hampered by low interoperability between the 
armed forces in the region (and outside the region), lingering intramural distrust 
rooted in historical enmity, as well as the lack of motivation and/or capacity to 
commit to joint maritime security arrangements.
385
 These security deficiencies 
notwithstanding, the strategic value of the regional waterways to the global 
economy has propelled regional and extra-regional stake-holders to propose 
numerous multilateral mechanisms to cope with a host of maritime transnational 
crimes.  
 This first half of this chapter surveys four recent successful and failed 
attempts by regional and extra-regional powers to actualize maritime security 
cooperation at the operational level: Regional Cooperation Agreement on 
Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships in Asia (ReCAPP) initiated 
by Japan in 2001, Regional Maritime Security Initiative (RMSI) proposed by the 
United States in 2003, the Malacca Strait Patrol (MSP) launched by Singapore, 
Malaysia, and Indonesia in 2004, and lastly, Cooperative Mechanisms 
administered by the three littoral states in consultation with the International 
Maritime Organization (IMO) in 2007. The second half of the chapter focuses on 
how strategic culture, as an intervening variable, might have affected the 
enthusiasm of Singapore and Malaysia to welcome and adopt these measures. 
Each government‘s decisions on endorsing or rejecting the initiatives are analyzed 
from three criteria of strategic evaluation: suitability, feasibility, and acceptability. 
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Operationalized security cooperation ―is a specific type and degree of cooperation 
in which policies addressing common threats can be carried out by midlevel 
officials of the states involved without immediate or direct supervision from 
strategic-level authorities.‖386 In other words, cooperation at the policy level is 
translated into workable plans of action at the operational level. A standard 
operating procedure, or at the very least norms regarding operation, must exist to 
instruct participants how certain activities are performed in reaction to a given 
situation. 
 
Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery 
Against Ships in Asia  
 
 The Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed 
Robbery Against Ships in Asia (ReCAAP) is a much watered down version of 
Japan‘s Ocean Peace Keeping (OPK) concept first introduced in 1999. While 
OPK proposed ―coordinated activities among the regional maritime forces [under 
one international command] in order to maintain order in the utilization of the 
oceans, to prevent the occurrence of armed conflicts and to assure the stable and 
sustainable development of the oceans,‖387 ReCAAP only aims for joint exercises, 
information sharing, and capacity building. Limited in scope notwithstanding, it is 
the first multilateral government-to-government agreement to promote and 
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enhance cooperation against piracy and armed robbery against ships in Asia. The 
Agreement was finalized on November 11, 2004 and entered into force on 
September 4, 2006 with 17 signatories as of today.
388
 
 Central to the Agreement was the establishment of an Information Sharing 
Center (ISC) in Singapore on November 20, 2006. The Center was later 
recognized as an international organization on January 30, 2007. ISC as a 
coordinating hub has three broad functions.
389
 First, it serves as a platform for 
information exchange linking the ReCAAP Focal Points (the designated 
government contact agency for ISC in each signatory state). An Information 
Network System (IFN) has been built at the cost of approximately US$ 660,000 to 
facilitate communication and information exchange among the Focal Points as 
well as to the ISC to improve incident response speed and quality.
390
 Second, it 
facilitates capacity building by regularly holding seminars and workshops for 
interested government agencies on combating piracy and armed robbery against 
ships in regional waters. Third, upon agreement among the contracting parties, the 
ISC may extend cooperation with organizations and like-mined parties on joint 
exercises, information sharing, capacity building, or other appropriate forms of 
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cooperation. Moreover, as a research institute, it contributes to anti-piracy efforts 
by conducting analysis on incidents according to the level of violence involved 
and economic loss incurred. The monthly and annual reports provide up-to-date 
statistics of the piracy and armed robbery incidents in Asia. They also identify 
patterns of trends, and publish the outcomes of investigations reported by the 
Focal Points as well as highlight case studies and good practices undertaken by 
ship masters and their crews.
391
 In reality, in order to find the least common 
denominator that would satisfy all signatories, the final version of ReCAAP 
excluded virtually any operational activity (especially those involving the armed 
forces) and largely confined the ISC‘s role to a platform for information 
gathering, voluntary exchange of information, and analysis at the end of a six-year 
protracted negotiation.
392
  
Noticeably absent from the contracting parties are Malaysia and Indonesia. 
The idea of foreign naval or constabulary forces patrolling territorial waters has 
never been popular in Southeast Asia. Both countries fervently protested against 
the location of the ISC in Singapore and the possibility that the Center may 
publish politicized report unfavorable to other states.
393
 Jakarta was especially 
displeased by fact that the location of ISC is a product of voting strongly pushed 
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by Japan and Singapore, rather than consensual decision making.
394
 Indonesia was 
also unable to designate a ―focal point‖ due to a jurisdictional fight among several 
concerned agencies such the navy and the Indonesian Marine Police.
395
 In 
addition, Jakarta did not perceive much benefit from joining as the country has 
been preoccupied with land-based security concerns and piracy is low on its 
agenda.
396
 Malaysia viewed the Center as an unnecessary and intentional 
competitor to the Piracy Reporting Center previously established in Kuala 
Lumpur and run by the London-based International Maritime Organization 
(IMO).
397
 The fervent objection indeed reflects a long term intramural rivalry 
among the littoral states themselves. The absence of collaboration from Indonesia 
and Malaysia is a worrisome sign as the effectiveness of the ISC may be 
compromised. According to Ho, since the majority of the piracy incidents 
reported took place in waterways that are either partially or wholly within the 
territorial and archipelagic waters of the two littoral states, information from these 
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two countries would greatly contribute to a more accurate analysis on the situation 
in the regional waters.
398
   
 
Regional Maritime Security Initiative  
 The concept of the Regional Maritime Security Initiative (RMSI) was first 
previewed by Admiral Thomas Fargo of US PACOM at the 2003 Shangri-la 
dialogue. A more definitive ―plan of action‖ was later introduced by him in a 
Congressional testimony in March 2004. Broadly, RMSI is PACOM‘s effort to 
operationalize the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) and the Malacca Straits 
Initiative.
399
 The end goal of RMSI is to bring together a ―partnership of willing 
with varying capabilities and capacities to timely identify, monitor, and intercept 
transnational maritime threats under existing international and domestic laws… It 
is not a treaty or an alliance.‖400  
RMSI at operational level consists of five elements.
401
 First, the initiative 
aims at increasing situational awareness and information sharing, or ―cueing.‖ 
This is done by ―leveraging technology to build and share a clear picture of the 
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maritime environment to match that which we have of international airspace.‖ 
Second, responsive decision making architectures are to be developed to achieve 
―speed of command‖. Third, maritime interdiction ―will take the form of law 
enforcement or customs vessels, but military forces may be needed for more 
organized threats, especially on the high sea.‖ Fourth, RMSI encourages the 
establishment of national coast guards and the integration of coast guard 
operations with naval forces to eliminate seams at sea. Lastly, since RMSI will be 
a ―law enforcement‖ effort, enhanced interagency cooperation is required for 
immediate and synchronized responses. 
However, RMSI was not well received by the ASEAN states especially 
after the media ―misreported‖ the US intention to patrol the regional water by 
―putting Special Operational Forces on high speed vessels… to conduct effective 
interdiction‖402 and possibly setting up bases for that purpose. While Singapore 
and Australia were ready to participate and Thailand expressed conditional 
support for the initiative
403
, Indonesia and Malaysia strongly objected on the 
ground that ―naval patrols by an extra-regional power are viewed as contrary to 
the innocent transit passage granted to ships using the Straits of Malacca since 
they were designated as international waterways under the United Nations 
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Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS).‖404 On top of infringement on 
sovereignty, "[t]he involvement of foreign troops will make us look weak. We 
don't want that," said the Indonesian Vice-Admiral Argawa.
405
 Accepting the US 
offer will further inflame the anti-American sentiment already visible in the 
region and subsequently reduce support for the two governments.  
The coastal states were especially wary about the US and its allies 
magnifying and politicizing a ―perceived‖ threat of terrorist attack to justify their 
strategic objectives in the region. Thus far, there has been no conclusive evidence 
to suggest that piracy or armed robbery against ships in the regional waters is 
conducted or sponsored by any of the terrorist groups active in the region. In 
addition RMSI was seen as a device to project a US forward military presence as 
well as to counter growing Chinese influence in the region.
406
 ASEAN states have 
long expressed deep concerns over not being able to opt out of the strategic 
competition between these two extra regional-powers, and even worse, one day 
being forced to choose sides.
407
 Despite Secretary of Defence Donald Rumsfeld‘s 
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diplomatic effort to quickly reassure the littoral states that ―[t]here is no intention, 
implication, or anything in anybody‘s words that should imply or state bases or 
additional forces in the Straits of Malacca,‖408 the initiative was shelved by 
PACOM due to strong regional skepticism, and the concept withered away with 
no follow-up communication on the issue. 
 
The Malacca Strait Patrol 
 The Malacca Strait Patrol (MSP) evolved from the initial Trilateral 
Coordinated Patrols (code-named MALSINDO) between Singapore, Malaysia, 
and Indonesia, and was later reinforced by the establishment of the Intelligence 
Exchange Group (IEK) as well as the addition of Thai participation in the Eyes in 
the Sky (EiS) aerial surveillance. MALSINDO, formally launched on July 20, 
2004 and later renamed the Malacca Strait Sea Patrol (MSSP), is a major 
improvement from three existing bilateral exercises that started in 1992: the 
MALINDO joint patrol between Malaysia and Indonesia, the INDOSIN joint 
naval exercise between Singapore and Indonesia, and the MARAPURA naval 
collaboration between Malaysia and Singapore. However, owing to the lack of 
training in joint exercises and perhaps sincerity, these bilateral joint patrols were 
so ineffective that one Indonesian naval officer lamented that ―bilateral 
coordination of these patrols amounted to little more than exchanges of schedules, 
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to which in many cases partners did not adhere.‖409 Mindful of the fact that the 
quad-annual bilateral exercises were meager deterrents to pirates in the region, the 
consolidated MALSINDO is designed to be a 24-hour, year-round operation 
enforced by a consortium of seventeen naval ships from the three countries to 
tackle piracy, illegal transnational crimes, and possible terrorist attacks in the 
Malacca Strait.
410
 At the same time, three naval command centers were set up in 
Batam (Indonesia), Changi (Singapore), and Lumut (Malaysia), to increase 
coordination through the use of a hot-line. Merchant ships are also allowed access 
to radio frequencies used by naval vessels for timely information and calls for 
help when under attack.
411
  
 The Eyes in the Sky (EiS) combined maritime air patrol was proposed by 
the then Malaysian Minister of Defence, Najib, during the 2005 Shangri-La 
Dialogue after strong US pressure for tighter security in the straits.
412
 Under 
Phase I of the EiS, the armed forces of the participating countries would provide 
the resources of maritime patrol aircraft (mostly propeller planes with basic radar) 
and a combined mission patrol team onboard each flight. The flight schedule, up 
to two patrols a week along designated sectors, is then coordinated by the EiS 
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operation center in each country, A Monitoring and Action Agency (MAA) was 
also set up in each state to establish a listening watch during all EiS flights and 
coordinate follow-on responses within their own territorial waters. Although not a 
littoral state, Thailand was invited by Indonesia to join the coordinated patrol in 
2008 because of ―rampant marine crimes particularly in the Thai marine territory 
north of the Malacca Strait.‖413 Although Indonesia and Malaysia had earlier 
rejected Singapore‘s proposal of inviting the US to take part in the initiative414, it 
had been agreed that EiS should be an ―open arrangement.‖415 There were 
discussions about extending EiS participation to the international community 
under Phase II, the United States included, as long as foreign participants are 
accompanied by littoral state representatives.
416
 To date, Phase II has not been 
activated.   
 The arrangement also establishes the MSP Intelligence Exchange Group 
(IEG) formed by the three participating states in 2006 to support the sea and air 
patrols. The IEG is responsible for the development and implementation of an 
internet-based information platform called the Malacca Strait Patrols Information 
System, or MSP-IS. Specifically, ―[t]he MSP-IS aggregates shipping databases 
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and relevant real-time maritime information to improve coordination and overall 
awareness of the situation at sea, to enable timely responses to maritime incidents 
in the Malacca Strait.‖417 It is worth noting that a conceptually related bilateral 
surveillance project, SURPIC, was launched under the ambit of INDOSIN joint 
patrol in May 2005 to enable the two navies to better monitor the waterway, 
exchange information, and deploy their patrol vessels to the affected areas.
418
 
While Project SURPIC has migrated to Phase II in December 2009 with enhanced 
software such as the Open and Analyzed Shipping Information System (OASIS) 
for maritime situational awareness and Sense-Making Analysis and Research 
Tool (SMART) for maritime sense-making, there is no plan to extend the project 
to include Malaysia or any other countries either inside or outside of the region
419
. 
Although the MSP is widely lauded as the first indigenous multilateral 
ongoing security cooperation among the three armed forces, criticisms abound in 
every operational aspect of the initiative. First, to avoid the thorny issue of 
sovereignty especially in contested waters, the patrols are deliberately more 
coordinated than joint with each country patrolling its own sectors under national 
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command. Hot pursuit in this case is impossible as a patrol vessel from one 
country will not be allowed to interdict pirates, terrorists or other suspected 
maritime criminals into the territorial waters of another, leaving the offender(s) 
free to flee the scene. It was only after January 2006 that the littoral states finally 
agreed on cross-border hot pursuit up to five nautical miles into the sovereign 
waters of another strictly on the condition that no military action is allowed.
420
 
Similar constraints apply to the EiS operation as the air patrols may not go within 
three miles of other state‘s territorial coastlines when in pursuit of ―suspected‖ 
vessels. Moreover, EiS currently only provides eight sorties a week and only 
during daylight, far from the seventy sorties required for 24/7 coverage. A 
multilateral agreement that does not allow reverse hot pursuit in its own territorial 
water is completely missing the point of ―working together.‖ These limitations led 
observers not only to question the effectiveness of coordinated patrols but also the 
long-term sustainability of the activities.
421
  
Second, the timing of MALSINDO also leads to the question of efficacy. 
Although MALSINDO came into being partly due to a real need to address 
maritime predation that has been increasingly threatening local economies, the 
initiative was also a device to fend off foreign intervention. Kuala Lumpur and 
Jakarta, though much less Singapore, have traditionally opposed any attempt at 
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internationalizing the management of the sea lanes. The decision of the Joint War 
Committee (JWC) of the London-based Lloyds Market Association to designate 
the Strait of Malacca a ―war risk area,‖ put unusually strong pressures on the 
littoral states to tackle the issue immediately. While Malaysia condemned Lloyds‘ 
decision, Kuala Lumpur understood that the littoral states must coalesce "to paint 
the picture to the world that the strait is not really a war-risk zone" before the user 
states and stakeholders get involved.
422
 The long perceived threat of US unilateral 
involvement in the straits actually served as the catalyst for closer cooperation 
among the littorals.
423
 Furthermore, there has been no discussion on reviewing the 
effectiveness of the MSP initiative since the establishment of IEK, let alone plans 
to enhance it. It can be argued that MSP is essentially a Malaysia-Indonesia public 
relations campaign to the world that the littoral states are taking strait security 
seriously as well as keeping things under their control.
424
 
 
Cooperative Mechanism  
 The Cooperative Mechanism is a conceptual spinoff from the International 
Maritime Organization‘s ―Protection of Vital Shipping Lanes Initiative,‖ which 
―aimed to promote a comprehensive approach to addressing the safety, security, 
                                                 
422Michael Schuman, ―How to Defeat Pirates: Success in the Strait,‖ Time, Apr. 22, 2009. 
423
 Ian Storey, ―Securing Southeast Asian Sea Lanes: A Work in Progress,‖ Asian Policy, No. 
6(July 2008): 96. 
424
 J. N. Mak. ―Unilateralism and Regionalism: Working Together and Alone,‖ in Piracy, 
Maritime Terrorism and Securing the Malacca Straits, eds. Graham Gerald Ong-Webb 
(Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asia Studies, 2006), 156. 
   218 
and population control in critical shipping lanes around the world.‖425 Broadly, 
the Cooperative Mechanism is a burden sharing scheme among the coastal states, 
user states, and other stakeholders based on Article 43 of the United Nations 
Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), which stipulates that user states 
and states bordering a strait should by agreement cooperate to maintain and 
enhance navigational safety as well as to prevent, reduce and control pollution 
from ships.
426
 According to the Honolulu-based Pacific Forum, approximately 
some US$300 million is required to maintain aids to navigation in the straits over 
the next decade.
427
 Thus far, no mandatory charges have been levied for transit 
due to violation of freedom of passage in international waters.
428
 The heavy 
burden has led to an outcry from the littoral states that ―international users have 
thus far not matched their extensive usage of the Straits and their keen interests in 
the Straits with proportionate contributions to the costs of maintaining the 
waterway.‖429 Starting from the IMO Jakarta meeting in 2005 and onwards, the 
three littoral states have been engaging all interested players for a workable plan 
                                                 
425
 ―New Milestone in Better Straits Cooperation: Article 43 of UNCLOS Helps Keep Malacca, 
Singapore Straits Safe, Secure, and Clean,‖ The Business Times (Singapore), September 28 2007. 
426
 Users and stakeholders of the Straits include major shipping and trading nations, shipping and 
oil companies as well as maritime organizations.  
427
 Mark. J. Valencia, ―Burden Sharing in the Malacca and Singapore Straits: Sailing in the Right 
Direction,‖ PacNet 16 (March 29, 2007). 
428
 Nihan Unlu. ―Current Legal Developments: Straits of Malacca,‖ The International Journal of 
Marine and Coastal Law 21, no. 4 (2006): 543 and 547.  
429
 Khalid Nazery, ―Maritime Capacity-building Measures in the Straits of Malacca,‖ 
Contemporary Southeast Asia 31, no. 3 (December 2009): 431. 
   219 
to more equitably share the responsibilities of maintaining and enhancing 
navigational safety, and protection of marine environment in the straits. 
 The principles, scope, and organizational structure of the Cooperative 
Mechanism was finalized during the IMO Singapore meeting in 2007.
430
 The 
terms and conditions reaffirm the sovereignty, jurisdiction and territorial integrity 
of the littoral States over the straits. In addition, any plan of action must be 
consistent with all pertinent international laws in general and article 43 of 
UNCLOS in particular. Although the primary responsibility for the safety of 
navigation and environmental protection in the straits lies with the littoral states, 
the interests of user states and other stakeholders are recognized. Operations are 
carried out within the framework of the Tripartite Technical Experts Group on the 
Safety of Navigation in the Straits of Malacca and Singapore (TTEG), and 
participation by all parties should voluntary. 
 The scope of the Cooperative Mechanism focuses on navigational safety 
and environmental protection in the Straits, but not security cooperation due to 
objections from Malaysia and Indonesia.
431
 The Cooperative Forum, the first 
component, serves to facilitate dialogue and exchange of views on issues related 
to the straits. However, participation in the forum is upon ―invitation only‖ by the 
littoral states. On the flip side, because participation is on a voluntary basis, the 
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littoral states may not compel unwilling users to join even with article 43 of 
UNCLOS as the legal basis. Second, a Project Co-ordination Committee (PCC) is 
set up to oversee the implementation of projects in cooperation with sponsoring 
users. The littoral states have identified six projects that are in need of sponsors: 
1) wreck removal; 2) building capacity to respond to hazardous incidents; 3) a 
demonstration project for automatic identification system transponders on small 
ships; 4) setting up a tide, current and management system; 5) replacement and 
maintenance of navigational aids, and lastly 6) replacement of those damaged by 
the 2004 tsunami. The total estimated cost of all six projects amounts to US $50 
million.
432
 Lastly, mindful of the fact that the Japanese maritime industry has 
indicated less funding in the future to maintain competitiveness
433
, a special fund 
for aid to navigation is established to ensure a sustainable means of funding. The 
hosting power of the Fund is shared by the littoral states with a three-year 
rotation. Malaysia is the current host. Contribution to the fund is voluntary. 
 The end result of a three-year long negotiation is a framework that is 
reasonably inclusive in membership with terms and conditions acceptable to all 
those who voluntarily participated. Yet, the prospect of the Cooperative 
Mechanism evolving into a more comprehensive scheme covering navigational 
safety, environmental protection, and security is not hopeful for two reasons. 
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First, the coastal states have different opinions over the role the international 
community should play in the straits. In contract to Singapore‘s open position and 
welcoming hand, Malaysia and Indonesia are more reluctant to allow the 
international community (state or non-state actors) to get involved.
434
 In addition 
to creating precedence for foreign ―interference‖ into domestic affairs, outside 
involvement and the accompanied media coverage may further expose the 
weakness of the littoral states in coping with security problems. Second, 
misgivings over attempts by extra-regional powers and major trading nations to 
control and manage various strategic maritime chokepoints further erode the 
willingness of Kuala Lumpur and Jakarta to include security cooperation. The 
resistance was so strong that in preparation for the second meeting held in Kuala 
Lumpur in 2006, Rear Admiral Stephen Voetsch had to openly assure the two 
countries that ―the US has no desire, plan or intention to conduct patrols in the 
Strait of Malacca,‖ and instead emphasized the need for user nations to contribute 
responsibly to the region‘s maritime security in coordination with the nations that 
hold jurisdiction.
435
 Lastly, the plethora of security forums in the region such as 
the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) and ASEAN Defence Minister‘s Meeting 
(ADMM), albeit not ―action-oriented,‖ have led to the exclusion of security 
cooperation by user states and stakeholders. In fact, the three littoral states share a 
tacit understanding that security matters fall under the purview of the MSP Joint 
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Coordinating Committee, even though the rationale for the IMO-littoral states 
meetings was primarily to address ship security issues in the straits.
436
  
 
Malaysia‘s Perspective 
 The following section examines how Malaysia‘s strategic culture might 
have influenced its evaluation on participating in multilateral maritime security 
regimes. Several recurrent themes on Malaysia‘s behavior can be gauged from the 
above survey. First, sovereignty is always the chief reason for Malaysia to reject a 
proposal on multilateral cooperation if the terms and conditions of the proposal 
are perceivably infringing territorial rights. Second, Malaysia is not only willing 
to clash with extra-regional powers, the United States in particular, but also with 
fellow ASEAN states. Third, political consideration always outweighs the 
perceived benefits from joining the multilateral initiatives. Lastly, Malaysia 
distinguishes maritime safety clearly from maritime security in its maritime 
strategy and is more inclined to cooperate in the realm of maritime safety. Kuala 
Lumpur is more inclined to cooperate in enhancing navigational safety, but not 
maritime security.  
 
Suitability 
Suitability concerns with whether the proposed multilateral security 
cooperation initiatives will enhance Malaysia‘s economic wellbeing and strategic 
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position in the region. In addition to being the major international maritime trade 
route, the costal and marine renewable and non-renewable resources of the 
Malacca Strait are of immense value to Malaysia. The estimated gross economic 
value of the Strait exceeds US$6.8 billion, not counting income from other 
activities such as coastal tourism, fisheries, exploitation of seabed petroleum and 
natural gas, port services, to name just a few.
437
 However, the geophysical feature 
of the strait, namely a narrow archipelagic sea-lane, creates a natural navigational 
bottleneck that is easily blocked or congested due to natural disaster, accidental 
collision, piracy, or terrorist attack. The blockage of the chokepoint, even just 
temporarily, can incur tremendous economic loss to all littoral states, user states, 
shippers and other stakeholders. Although shippers may reroute via Lombok, 
Makassar, or Sunda Straits (smaller vessels only), the immediate extra cost 
associated with longer transit time in the scenario of a five day blockage in the 
Malacca Strait is estimated at USD 54 million
438
. The closing of the Suez Canal 
during the Suez Crisis in 1956 serves as a vivid reminder of how disruption in a 
major maritime trading route may increase freight rates by as much as 500 
percent, if not more
439
. Accordingly, initiatives that improve navigational safety 
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and security would not only ensure smooth transit but also sustain economic 
growth, prosperity and stability along the coastal areas.  
In addition to enhanced navigational safety and security, joining 
multilateral cooperative security arrangements also resonates well with one of 
Malaysia‘s foreign policy objectives as identified in the latest edition of Strategic 
Plan of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs: to advance multilateral relations as a 
means to project Malaysia‘s values and defend its interests at the international 
level
440
. In effect, Malaysia is willing to support all initiatives aimed at 
strengthening… multilateralism.‖441 This is also the goal of the Malaysian 
Maritime Enforcement Agency (MMEA), ―to establish a conductive working 
environment that facilitates cooperation between the international maritime 
communities and Malaysian Maritime Enforcement Agency.‖442 Participating in 
any of the above mentioned multilateral arrangements will feature Malaysia as a 
responsible member of the global community and more importantly, a reliable 
partner in combating maritime predation. Moreover, visible actions in maritime 
law enforcement not only showcase Malaysia‘s resoluteness in upholding 
maritime safety and security, but also demonstrate the ability of the government 
to effectively administer its maritime zone. Foreign stakeholders thus may not use 
the lack of capacity on the part of Malaysia in anti-piracy and anti-terrorist 
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operations as a pretense to intervene. In the words of First Admiral Zulkifli bin 
Abu Bakar, the Northern Regional Commander of the Malaysian navy, ―lack of 
enforcement portrays lack of display of authority and eventually, sovereignty.‖443 
 
Feasibility 
The feasibility assessment questions whether Malaysia can afford to reject 
proposals for multilateral arrangements for maritime safety and security. A 
cost/benefit analysis strictly from an economic standpoint would suggest that 
multilateral security cooperation with pooled resources in information sharing, 
capacity building, and the provision of equipment, technology, funding and 
training is deemed suitable for a developing nation such as Malaysia. The total 
estimated cost for the six navigational safety enhancement projects identified by 
the Project Co-ordination Committee of Cooperative Mechanism alone exceeds 
US$ 50 million. Although the MMEA was operating on a US$ 179 million budget 
in 2010, the funding was designated to cover operation, equipment, and personnel 
costs solely.
444
 Improvement in maritime security and maritime safety is an 
obvious financial drain on Kuala Lumpur. The Malaysian prime minister openly 
said to the press that Malaysia alone ―has spent more than RM200 million to 
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install, maintain, and upgrade various aids for navigation… For a small country 
with limited resources, this was a significant amount.‖445 
 Given the rapid pace of technological change, reliance on indigenous 
development of maritime safety and security technology is insufficient. The lag in 
technological development also hinders interoperability between the armed forces 
of Malaysia and others. Due to budget constraints, successive white papers 
published by Malaysia‘s Ministry of Defense readily admit to the lack of focus 
and funding on research and development (R&D). There has been little discussion 
on the need for indigenous research and development (R&D) in the field of 
Information and Communication Technology (ICT) and how such technology 
may help the armed forces develop better platforms for information exchange. 
Yet, Malaysia‘s participation in various bilateral naval exercises with regional and 
extra-regional powers indicates Kuala Lumpur‘s understanding of the utility of 
technology cooperation in maritime safety and security for enhanced surveillance 
and networked information exchange to keep any disruption of the free flow of 
trade and navigation in the straits to a minimum. In the June 2004 Shangri-la 
Dialogue, then Defence Minister Najib even conceded that Southeast Asia 
―should definitely expand our cooperation with the US‖ with regard to acquisition 
of intelligence and surveillance technology.
446
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Malaysia has thus far downplayed the possibility of terrorists causing 
mayhem in the strait, calling the foreign conflation of piracy with terrorist attack 
over exaggerated. Given the steady decline in the number of maritime predation 
reported by various agencies, ―[t]he notion of a possible nexus between sea 
pirates and potential maritime terrorists advocated by some self-proclaimed 
maritime strategists and government officials.‖447 has not only created a gloomy 
scenario in this region but also the unfair accusation of the littoral states not doing 
enough to secure the straits. Of those reported, most piracy incidents actually 
occurred in Indonesia‘s archipelagic waters where the configuration of the 
coastlines in combination with sporadic enforcement made the area prone to 
maritime crimes. In the view of Kuala Lumpur, it is Indonesia that is the ―weakest 
link‖ in safeguarding maritime security, not Malaysia. 
Unlike Singapore and other concerned extra regional powers, Malaysia 
has clearly securitized Malacca Strait dichotomously by distinguishing maritime 
security from navigational safety. While the former deals with ―those measures 
employed by owners, operators and administrators of vessels, port facilities, 
offshore installations, and other marine organizations or establishments to protect 
against seizure, sabotage, piracy, pilferage, annoyance or surprise,‖ the latter 
focuses on those measures employed by the littoral states, user states and 
stakeholders ―to prevent or minimize the occurrence of mishaps or incidents at sea 
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that may be caused by the substandard ships, unqualified crew or operator 
error.‖448 As seen in the cases of the ReCAAP and Cooperative Mechanism, 
Malaysia has elected only to participate in collaborative effort to enhance 
maritime safety, not maritime security. The effectiveness, efficacy, and long-term 
sustainability of the Malacca Strait Patrol have yet to be tested. Moreover, MSP is 
more geared toward anti-piracy rather than anti-terror in the straits. Experts point 
to an obvious problem that a gap in information chains may exist if piracy and 
terrorism are not tackled together.
449
  Despite Malaysia‘s reluctance to 
acknowledge the possibility of piracy being exploited by terrorist groups to bring 
about larger scale catastrophes, confirmed and unconfirmed leads for terrorist 
attacks in the straits have never ceased to occupy headlines. The latest warning 
from the Singaporean Navy that a terrorist group is planning attacks on oil tankers 
in the Malacca Strait should be a good motivation for Kuala Lumpur to rethink its 
maritime strategy.
450
   
 Lastly, the strategic balance in the region may be altered especially when 
foreign resources have been continuously funneled to other willing recipients in 
the region in the name of maritime security. The most noteworthy donation of late 
is the US grant to Indonesia for two squadrons of F-16A/B Fighting Falcons with 
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upgraded avionic systems as part of its overall program to upgrade the Indonesia 
air force.
451
 In fiscal 2010, the US has also provided US$80 million to Indonesia 
under the Global Train and Equip Program for improved maritime security and 
counter-terror capability, an amount twice as much as provided to Malaysia.
452
 
Under the Strategic Partnership in Defense and Security, Singapore has received 
US assistance not only in first hand intelligence but also resources for capacity 
building in anti-terrorism, anti-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction 
(WMD), joint military exercises and training, direct policy dialogues, and defense 
technology transfer.
453
 Malaysia‘s preference to stay self-reliant when it comes to 
defense and security related matters renders it a difficult partner to work with.  
 
Acceptability 
The suitability assessment indicates that the perceived benefits from 
joining the multilateral initiatives will enhance Malaysia‘s strategic position. 
Participating in multilateral initiatives also complement Malaysia‘s foreign policy 
goals and showcases its image as a responsible and cooperative member of the 
international community. The feasibility evaluation suggests that Malaysia clearly 
stands to lose in the long run if it continuously rejects working collaboratively 
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with all concerned stakeholders. What are the reasons behind Kuala Lumpur‘s 
meager support for, if not total rejection of, proposals for multilateral security 
cooperation, especially those involving the armed forces?  
First, the scope and extent of any cooperation, bilateral or multilateral, are 
necessarily limited by Malaysia‘s insistence on upholding the principles of 
sovereignty and territorial integrity as well as non-interference in the internal 
affairs of its neighbors. The heightened sensitivity over sovereignty is 
understandable as memories of colonization and hard fought independence linger. 
It was the very same excuse of eradicating piracy that was used by the colonial 
powers to conquer and colonize the littoral states.
454
 Any uninvited foreign 
involvement and military presence (naval patrols and training flights included) in 
the names of anti-piracy and counter-terrorism in regional waters are deemed 
gross violations of the sovereign rights of the littoral states. Malaysia's position on 
any outside involvement or interference, whether in security or law enforcement 
in the straits is clear, that is, ―we do not condone such actions," said the Minister 
of Foreign Affairs.
455
 Allowing extra-regional involvement in any of the 
enforcement regimes in the strait will only create unwelcome precedents that may 
further erode control by the coastal states. 
Second, maritime sovereignty remains a touchy subject because both 
Malaysia and Indonesia believe that ―they have failed to achieve complete 
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sovereignty in the Malacca strait.‖456 The strait, along with the Singapore Strait, 
have been declared passages for international navigation even though the 
thoroughfares fall squarely within the internal water of the littoral states. In 
particular, the ―transit passage‖ regime spawned by the 1982 UNCLO disallows 
the states bordering an ―international‖ strait from unilaterally impeding the 
freedom of navigation in the waterway. The Malaysian insistence on the 
application ―innocent passage‖ to all ships traversing the strait was met with a 
strong US objection (backed by other maritime powers). Washington argued that 
since the Malacca Strait is used for international navigation ―the right to transit 
passage cannot be suspended for security reasons even temporarily.‖457 Seeing 
how sovereignty may be encroached by foreign manipulation of international 
laws, the goal for Malaysia is therefore to limit further erosion of sovereignty by 
any other means. Although foreign military vessel and aircraft may exercise the 
rights of freedom of navigation and over-flight solely for the purpose of 
continuous and expeditious transit, they are prohibited from taking military and 
non-military postures (patrol and training) without the consent of the littoral 
states. The battle between the concepts of ―innocent passage‖ and ―transit 
passage‖ is just another example of how the ―strong do what they can, and the 
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weak suffer what they must‖. The lost of complete sovereign control over the 
strait further convinces Malaysia that the world is not fair and just and Malaysia 
must fight for itself. 
Third, not only is Malaysia willing to collide with extra-regional powers 
on the issue of sovereignty, Kuala Lumpur is also unyielding on territorial 
disputes with its neighbors. Despite Malaysia‘s reiteration that unresolved 
territorial disputes will not impair ongoing joint efforts to monitor the shared 
waterways, clashes over sovereignty have been brought up from time to time. 
Although Malaysia often shares Indonesia‘s concerns over how new safety or 
security regime may negatively affect their sovereign control over the straits, the 
two countries do not act together. While the littoral states continue to work 
together and negotiate their ways in all the above mentioned initiatives, border 
skirmishes have never ceased. The Indonesian navy openly accused the Malaysian 
navy and Marine Police of intruding into Indonesian waters at least nine times in 
the early half of 2009 alone.
458
 The latest incident of Indonesia refusing to release 
two Malaysian vessels allegedly fishing illegally in the Indonesian EEZ on April 
7 this year highlights the growing tensions in the disputed resource rich waters 
surrounding Ambalat. The root cause of continuous clashes can be attributed to 
the inability to demarcate an agreed upon EEZ boundary. While Malaysia is not 
an archipelagic state, it nonetheless followed Indonesia in 1969 to delineate its 
border by claiming straight baselines drawn between the outermost limits of 
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Malaysian territory. This unilateral act, said the Prime Minister, was to ensure ―an 
equitable basis for negotiations on maritime resources with Indonesia.‖459   
Malaysia is also displeased by the repeated accusations from foreign 
powers that its government lacks the capacity and a comprehensive strategy to 
deal with transnational maritime threats. The Sipadan kidnapping incident is often 
cited by foreign observers as an example of Malaysia‘s vulnerability and the lack 
of overall preparedness to transnational crimes.
460
 In order to refute the image of a 
weak state that is incapable of protecting the safety of its citizen on Malaysian 
soil, the defence minister quickly deployed troops to all resort islands along 
Sabah‘s east coast and warned that kidnapping from within Malaysian territories 
would be considered a violation of sovereignty.
461
 Malaysia prides itself as the 
leader of the third world, a leader that is not only capable of safeguarding the 
interests of the state but also able to speak up ―on issues that other developing 
countries [and the Islamic world in particular] feel constrained to voice for fear of 
retribution by the major, particularly western powers.‖462 The idea of a small state 
susceptible to foreign intrusion by both state and non-state actors runs counter to 
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the self portrayal of ―Third World Spokesmanship.‖ Malaysia is also careful not 
to openly endorse US-led counter-terrorism discourse that can be perceived by the 
Islamic community in general and domestic constituencies in particular as anti-
Islamic. At most, Malaysia will cooperate with other countries in navigational 
safety in the strait, but ―we do not need outside protection,‖ said the foreign 
minister.
463
 If anything, Malaysia‘s Third World Spokesmanship necessarily 
creates points of difference, if not frictions, between Malaysia and several western 
powers. Its stance on ―indigenous solutions‖ may also limit the scope and extent 
of cooperation, if not inadvertently prevent a cooperative security regime from 
taking place. 
 
Singapore‘s Perspective 
 Several recurrent themes can be identified from Singapore‘s behavior 
from the above survey. First, Singapore devises its maritime security strategy 
based on worst case scenarios that others might find implausible. Second, unlike 
Malaysia, Singapore did not object to any of the proposals based on the fear of 
losing sovereign control of its internal water. Third, Singapore welcomes 
cooperative regimes both in maritime security and navigational safety. Fourth, 
Singapore prefers the involvement of at least one extra-regional power in any of 
the multilateral security or safety regimes. Lastly, Singapore often sides with the 
extra-regional powers on the region‘s security needs and consequently holds 
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opposing views against the two other littoral states on how the straits should be 
best managed.  
 
Suitability 
 The suitability test assesses whether Singapore‘s decision to promote and 
join a ―action-oriented‖ multilateral cooperative security regime in the regional 
waters will boost its overall economic wellbeing and strategic position in the 
region. Singapore occupies a unique position in Southeast Asia as it is the only 
―developed‖ state in the region with the value of external trade substantially 
higher than its GDP. Seaborne trade has been the most important lifeline for the 
economic wellbeing of the island. Despite Singapore‘s progress in the last few 
decades, the challenge to the city-state remains the same as the late Sinnathamby 
Rajaratnam (Singapore‘s first Minister of Foreign Affairs) once opined: ―our 
problem is how to make sure that a small island with a teeming population and no 
natural resources to speak of, can maintain, even increase, its living standards and 
also enjoy peace and security in a region marked by mutual jealousies, internal 
violence, economic disintegration and great power conflicts.‖464 Any security 
measure that will ensure a stable environment for continued growth, whether 
initiated by extra-regional powers or a product of negotiated regional effort, is 
thus greatly welcomed. 
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 In addition, cooperating with regional and extra-regional powers without 
alliance commitment also fits well with Singapore‘s foreign policy and security 
goals. One important mission of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is making friends 
through ―being a responsible and constructive member of the international 
community, including sharing Singapore's developmental experience with other 
countries.‖465 Promoting and joining multilateral regimes that offer absolute gains 
to all participants is certainly a practical way to boost Singapore‘s image as a 
dependable partner. Nevertheless, multilateral security regimes, especially non-
binding ones with voluntary participation, better serves Singapore‘s security 
posture defined by self-reliance and neutrality. Being the only Chinese-majority 
society with developed economic status and cutting edge military forces in a 
Muslim-dominated region, Singapore is a convenient political punching bag if its 
agenda runs counter to that of other ASEAN states. For this reason, Singapore 
prefers to stay within the existing regional security architecture which is best 
characterized by ―a loose overlapping pattern of partnerships formed around 
functional areas of interest, with varying memberships and varying agendas.‖466 
Although Singapore has identified with the United States on the need to improve 
regional security, it has purposely eschewed alliance commitment and opted for 
being a ―major security cooperation partner of the US.‖ It is a term ―that captures 
                                                 
465
 ―Ministry of Foreign Affairs: Mission,‖ Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Singapore, accessed on 
February 20, 2011, http://app.mfa.gov.sg/2006/idx_ abtmfa.asp?web_id=1#vision.  
466
 Teo Chee Hean, ―Security Cooperation in Asia: Managing Alliances and Partnerships,‖ Pointer 
33, no. 2 (2007), accessed March 3, 2011, 
http://www.mindef.gov.sg/imindef/publications/pointer/journals/2007/v33n2/Security_Cooperatio
n_in_Asia__ Managing_Alliances_and_Partnerships.html. 
   237 
the relationship as being more than just friends,‖ emphasized by the defence 
minister, ―but not really treaty allies.‖467 
 
Feasibility 
Since Singapore endorses multilateral cooperative security regimes in the 
Malacca Strait, the feasibility test evaluates whether Singapore can achieve its 
maritime security goals on its own without help from others, especially from 
Malaysia and Indonesia. As a transshipment hub for seaborne trade and oil 
refinement, any disruption in the straits of Malacca and Singapore would 
devastate the island‘s economy and security. In the case of the Malacca strait, a 
multilateral security arrangement is by default a necessity for one obvious reason: 
Singapore does not have jurisdiction over that particular waterway. Effective 
monitoring of the strait automatically involves at the very least Malaysia and 
Indonesia, if not other interested parties. Under UNCLOS, the Singapore navy 
and coast guard, though better trained and equipped, may not unilaterally, 
monitor, patrol, or apprehend vessels suspected of maritime crimes in Malaysian 
and Indonesian waters even if the strait is declared a waterway for international 
navigation.  
Moreover, even with the most expedient mobilization mechanism, 
Singapore is still faced with minimum reaction time due to the lack of strategic 
depth should the city-state suffer a massive security breach. The government has 
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implemented organizational changes through the ―networking approach‖ not only 
in the three services of the Armed Forces but also within the entire government 
apparatus to better prevent, protect against, and respond to terrorist attacks. 
However, these changes are originally intended to enhance the ability of the state 
to respond to a terrorist attack through timely communication. In comparison to 
post-attack management, prevention is deemed the more effective way to 
minimize economic loss and casualties. ―When you're dealing with terrorists, it 
takes a long time. It requires intelligence networks to co-operate with one another, 
to know who they are and then you have just got to arrest them to prevent a bomb 
from going off. You can't work like the police – let the bomb go off first and then 
you catch them and put them on trial ….‖ explained Goh Chok Tong, the former 
Prime Minister.
468
 Given that terrorist groups active in the region may paralyze 
traffic in the strait simply by announcing a pending attack, cooperation with other 
states, extra-regional or regional, in the forms of timely information exchange and 
speedy interdiction is imperative for effective prevention. 
Furthermore, Singapore shares with the US the nightmare of a supertanker 
being hijacked and driven into the Singapore port, being used as a floating dirty 
bomb, or sunk in the Malacca Straits. The worst case scenario mentality has 
convinced Singapore to securitize the two straits by fusing maritime security and 
navigational safety together. While Malaysia and Indonesia refuse to 
acknowledge the nexus between piracy and terrorism, Singapore holds the view 
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that criminal acts of piracy are indistinguishable from potential acts of terrorism 
and therefore the two should be treated the same in security regimes.
469
 
Singapore‘s heightened threat perception and its campaign on ―real and 
imminent‖ terrorist attack have brought much discomfort to the other two littoral 
states. The move to invite multilateral military involvement in the straits suggests 
the other two littoral states lack both vigilance and capacity to deal with 
transnational maritime crimes. Singapore‘s insistence on inviting the United 
States and Japan for joint patrols also fueled suspicion over Singapore‘s hidden 
strategic agenda and the western powers‘ hegemonic goals. In return, Malaysia‘s 
foreign minister sternly warned Singapore not to ―unilaterally invite the United 
States to patrol the Straits,‖470 and reassured all concerned stakeholders that his 
country "should be able to be in a position in which there will be no more 
incidents of piracy in the Straits of Malacca…"471    
 
Acceptability 
The suitability test shows multilateral security regimes do enhance 
Singapore‘s economic well-being and strategic position in the region. The 
feasibility test suggests that Singapore cannot fulfill its maritime security goals in 
the straits without help especially from Malaysian and Indonesia. The city-state in 
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most parts has worked closely with the other two littoral states for strengthened 
maritime safety and security. The three have hammered out the tripartite Malacca 
Strait Sea Patrol in 2004 with the later additions of the Eyes in the Sky aerial 
surveillance and the Intelligence Exchange Group. Although the effectiveness of 
the coordinated patrols has yet to be proven, the whole Malacca Strait Patrol 
package represents the first regional, ongoing multilateral effort that involves the 
three armed forces. Against the backdrop of the existence of an indigenous 
security arrangement, Singapore has persistently called for military assistance 
from extra-regional powers for joint patrols in the straits, other than the usual 
pleas for intelligence, technology, funding, and equipment. Singapore‘s move is 
quite uncommon as it runs counter to the practices of unobtrusive engagement and 
consultative decision making that typify the ASEAN Way. Knowing the two other 
littoral states will most definitely object to Singapore‘s invitation for foreign 
military forces monitoring the regional waters, why has Singapore not given up 
on this idea?  
Singapore has justified its decision to involve extra-regional military 
forces by arguing that the eradication of transnational maritime crimes naturally 
dictates transnational enforcement effort: ―It is not realistic to unilaterally confine 
such patrols only to countries in this part of the world. . . . [W]e can do more if we 
galvanize the resources of extra-regional players.‖472 Other than the added benefit 
of pooled resources, the extra-regional involvement may tip the internal balance 
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within the tripartite circle in favor of the Singapore. While Malaysia and 
Indonesia are more interested in upholding sovereignty and economically 
exploiting ocean resources, Singapore‘s interests in trade and strategic positioning 
overlaps those of maritime powers (or the user states). The survey of the four 
attempts at creating multilateral security regimes in the straits shows how 
Singapore has to compromise on its demands, however unwillingly, for any of the 
initiatives to be pushed through. While Malaysia and Indonesia can sometimes act 
in unison irrespective of their points of difference, Singapore is left outside of the 
circle.  
 In the view of Singapore, the U.S. military presence in the region 
underpinned by various bilateral treaties helps maintain stability in the region. 
Yet, rising Chinese naval power challenges US influence in the region. Amidst 
the strategic competition between the major and rising powers, Singapore is 
careful not to be forced to take sides and at the same time tries to remain relevant. 
As a small state, the best way to do so would be ―to invite them all on a limited 
scale, so that the external powers would balance among themselves,‖473 while 
Singapore remains the key access point for them to the neighborhood.  
Yet, Singapore‘s close identification with extra-regional interests by no 
means suggests the city state would blindly accommodate foreign demands. For 
example, a huge disagreement exists between Singapore and Washington over 
how best to control potential terrorist finances. Although Singapore has a 
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Monetary Authority to help banking and financial institutions recognize terrorist 
transactions, it retains several financial secrecy laws to boost its standing as the 
regional entrepot.
474
 Consequently, foreign currency exchanges are not required to 
be reported, and Singapore does not share financial records with the United 
States. 
 
Conclusion 
 This chapter reveals that underneath the veil of cooperation there exists 
strong intramural rivalry between the three littoral states. The root of conflict 
stems from how each coastal state defines and pursues its maritime security 
strategy. On the one hand, Malaysia is determined to prevent further erosion of its 
sovereignty even at the expense of forestalling cooperative security mechanisms 
that may enhance the economic well being and strategic position of the state. 
Malaysia‘s insistence on distinguishing maritime security from navigational 
safety necessarily limits the extent and scope of cooperation. Suspicions over 
Singapore‘s collusion with extra regional powers to internationalize the 
management of the straits further compound the existing security predicament.   
 On the other hand, Singapore often sides with the extra-regional powers 
on the region‘s security needs and consequently holds opposing views against two 
other littoral states on how the straits should be best managed. Singapore devises 
its maritime security strategy based on worst case scenarios that others might find 
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exaggerated. The heightened threat perception ordains how the straits are 
securitized. Maritime security and navigational safety are fused together because 
it is difficult to make the distinction between piracy and terrorism as the latter 
may launch attacks in the guise of the former. Other than securing extra backing 
against the other two littoral states, Singapore chooses to involve at least one 
extra-regional power in any of the multilateral security or safety regimes based on 
well calculated strategic considerations. The MSP is the only multilateral security 
regime without extra-regional involvement, though it was clearly against 
Singapore‘s wish. 
While observers are optimistic about how genuine cooperative security 
may germinate from the various multilateral security arrangements regarding the 
straits, these are at best abridged multilateralism. Relative gains trump absolute 
gains in all the proceedings. This trend, in the long run, stifles the positive 
spillover effect genuine cooperation may bring about between countries. There is 
no actual effort to bring the plethora of security arrangements and forums, many 
overlapping and non-action oriented, under one umbrella cooperative security 
scheme. Although the principle of sovereignty is sacrosanct, the representatives of 
the three littoral states should make a note that their sovereignty and jurisdiction 
in the straits are not absolute in the face of transnational maritime crimes.  
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Chapter 7 
THAI-CAMBODIA BORDER CONFLICT: OUTSIDER NOT WELCOME 
 
Introduction 
On the top of the serene Dangrek mountain there sits the elegant ancient 
ruin, the temple of Preah Vihear (or Prasat Phra Wiharn in Thai). Built during the 
reigns of two Khmer Kings, Suryavarman I (1002-1050) and Suryavarman II 
(1113-1150), the temple was the kings‘ dedication to the Hindu god, Shiva the 
destroyer. Preah Vihear is considered the most distinguished example of ancient 
Khmer architecture other than the temple complex of Angkor Wat. The modern 
history of the temple is however much contested as both post-independent 
Cambodia and Thailand lay claim to the temple. The 1962 decision by the 
International Court of Justice to award ownership of the temple to Cambodia 
marks the beginning of a five decade long dispute that has escalated into 
militarized conflict in the past two years.  
This chapter traces the latest round of the Thai-Cambodia border conflict 
as the event unfolds since mid-2008. The Thai insistence on solving the conflict 
bilaterally is in stark contrast to the Cambodian effort at internationalizing the 
issue. Bangkok is determined to forestall any outside involvement, if not 
intervention, in the conflict. In particular, Thailand has categorically rejected 
ASEAN assistance in facilitating dialogue with Cambodia. The analysis below 
unveils Thailand‘s reasoning for sticking with the hitherto unsuccessful approach 
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at the expense of prolonged militarized confrontation and mounting casualties. On 
the whole, multilateralism is far from the norm in Thailand‘s strategic calculation. 
Cooperation is difficult to come by when it comes to sovereignty and territorial 
integrity. 
  
The Original Dispute: Temple of Preah Vihear (Cambodia v. Thailand) 
The dispute originated in a boundary settlement treaty between 
Cambodia‘s colonial ruler, France, and Siam, as Thailand was then known, in 
1907.
475
 Prior to the signing of the treaty, a Franco-Siamese Mixed Commission 
was set up in 1904 with French topographic experts to demarcate the border 
between the two countries by the watershed line of the Dangrek mountain range. 
According to the treaty (and the watershed line agreement), the Preah Vihear 
Temple should fall within the Thai side of the mountain and the temple is most 
accessible from the Thai side as well. A map published subsequently by the 
French colonial government under the auspice of the commission however placed 
the temple in Cambodia. For reasons unknown, Thailand had not objected to the 
map at the time of its publication. Yet, from time to time after Cambodia‘s 
independence Bangkok would remind Phnom Penh of Thai sovereignty over the 
temple and the surrounding land of 4.6 square kilometers by stationing troops 
there. To demand Thai withdrawal and clarify the ownership of the temple once 
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and for all, Cambodia filed an application to the International Court of Justice 
(ICJ) on October 6
th
, 1959 for adjudication.         
 During the ICJ proceedings, Thailand objected to the Cambodian 
application on three grounds.
476
 First, the 1907 treaty should take precedence over 
an erroneous map, which was, in Thailand‘s opinion, intentionally produced by 
the French colonial government not only to mislead the other parties but also to 
further its imperialist ambition. Second, Thailand argued that the Court has no 
jurisdiction to entertain the case. Thailand had never, implicitly or explicitly, 
accepted the compulsory jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice. Neither 
Thailand nor Cambodia has ever been a party to the 1928 General Act for the 
Pacific Settlement of International Disputes. This Act enumerated a framework 
for inter-state disputes, including the establishment of a conciliatory commission, 
an arbitration tribunal, and the opportunity to present cases before the ICJ should 
the previous mechanisms fail to solve the dispute. Specifically, by signing the 
Act, states agree to give up some of their sovereignty and submit themselves to 
the jurisdiction of the ICJ. The ruling is ―binding, final, and without appeal‖ 
provided that any of the disputing parties may ask the court for clarification if 
there is a difference in interpretation on the meaning or scope of the court‘s 
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judgment.
477
 Third, post-independence Cambodia did not succeed any treaty 
rights of France and ergo not was a contracting party to the Act.  
 Eloquent objections notwithstanding, the court ruled, by nine votes to 
three, in favor of Cambodia and awarded the temple and its vicinity to Phnom 
Penh in 1962. The majority opinion applied the principle of legitimate expectation 
from qualified acquiescence, qui tacet consentire videtur si loqui debuisset ac 
potuisset [He who keeps silent is held to consent if he must and can speak].
478
 In 
particular, the consenting judges reasoned that ―the Siamese authorities by their 
conduct acknowledged the receipt, and recognized the character, of these maps, 
and what they purported to represent, is shown by the action of the Minister of the 
Interior [of Siam], Prince Damrong, in thanking the French Minister in Bangkok 
for the maps, and in asking him for another fifteen copies of each of them for 
transmission to the Siamese provincial Governors.‖479 In other words, Thailand 
had not once raised issues related to the validity of map and the subsequent usage 
of the map by Thai officials satisfactorily constituted the act of qualified 
acquiescence to Cambodian sovereignty over the temple.  
 Thailand reacted negatively to the 1962 ICJ ruling. The Foreign Minister 
depicted the ruling as a ―miscarriage of justice‖ when speaking to a group of 
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outraged protesters in Bangkok.
480
 Although Thailand tacitly agreed to the 
Cambodian ownership of the temple, Bangkok insisted that the ruling did not 
cover the surrounding lands. The disputed area should only be settled via bilateral 
negotiations at a later time. Yet, attention to the temple quickly faded as both 
countries were engulfed by a host of international and domestic security 
problems, especially the looming cold war complicated by the US involvement in 
Vietnam, and the threat of communism at home. No demarcation talks were held 
since.  
 
The UN World Heritage Designation 
 The dispute over Preah Vihear has remained dormant for the past four 
decades until Cambodia brought the issue back to the spotlight in 2008 by 
expressing its intention to have the temple inscribed a World Heritage site. The 
United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) 
awards the World Heritage designation to sites of outstanding cultural, natural, or 
physical value to the common heritage of mankind as a whole. ―What makes the 
concept of World Heritage exceptional is its universal application. World 
Heritage sites belong to all the peoples of the world, irrespective of the territory 
on which they are located.‖481 The World Heritage is thus about preserving 
civilization, not politics. 
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  At first, the Surayud government of Thailand conditionally endorsed the 
Cambodian application provided that the application only covers the temple 
complex itself, not the disputed surrounding lands. A Joint Communiqué was 
concluded by Foreign Minister Noppadon with his Cambodian counterpart, Sok 
An, in the UNESCO headquarters in Paris on May 22, 2008 to reaffirm Thai 
support for the inscription. Although Bangkok has never formally recognized the 
ICJ ruling, the Thai endorsement of the Cambodian application, albeit 
conditional, does in a way acknowledge Phnom Penh‘s sovereign claim over 
Preah Vihear. According to the nomination rules, only ―state-parties‖ that have 
signed the World Heritage Convention and pledged to protect their natural and 
cultural heritage can submit nomination proposals for properties on their territory 
to be considered for inscription in UNESCO‘s World Heritage List.482 It is thus 
within the sovereign right of Cambodia to nominate the temple a World Heritage 
Site. Yet, the Convention also stipulates that“[t]he inclusion of a property situated 
in a territory, sovereignty or jurisdiction over which is claimed by more than one 
State, shall in no way prejudice the rights of the parties to the dispute.‖483 This 
particular clause becomes the legal basis for Thailand‘s contention about the 
―surrounding lands.‖ Thailand no longer references the 1962 ICJ ruling.  
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Despite the fact that the Joint Communiqué secured various Thai 
prerogatives including the joint development of a management plan and the right 
to ongoing demarcation in the disputed areas, the issue exploded in the face of the 
newly ascended Samak government as the opposition parties, People‘s Alliance 
for Democracy Party (PAD) and Democrat Party, accused the pro-Thaksin 
government for selling out Thai interests in exchange for personal investment 
opportunities in Cambodia.
484
 The UNESCO nomination was politicized to a 
point that the then opposition leader, Abhisit Vejjajiva told his fellow members in 
the parliament that ―Preah Vihear is the knockout punch that could bring down 
Samak.‖485  
The opposition purposely paired the Joint Communiqué to Thaksin‘s 
family selling shares of Shin Corporation, a leading Thai telecommunication 
company, to the Singapore government controlled Temasek Holdings in 2006. 
The PAD organized rally demanded the resignation of Thaksin as well as the 
cancellation of the 73 billion baht transaction associated with the Shin 
Corporation trade soon after news broke. The PAD spokesperson described the 
purchase as ―an attempt [by Singapore] to interfere with the basic services and 
businesses that are sensitive to Thailand's security.‖486 The public quickly made 
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the connection as the Cambodian Defence Minister General Teah Banh openly 
told the press with satisfaction that ―Thaksin Shinawatra is planning large-scale 
investments in Cambodia with Koh Kong Province serving only as his first step in 
his business ventures in the country.‖487 Although Cambodian officials denied any 
linkage between the self-exiled ex-prime minister‘s personal business venture in 
Cambodia and Phnom Penh‘s intention to register Preah Vihear as World 
Heritage site, conflict between the yellow shirt royalists and the red shirt Thaksin 
supports intensified. Capitalizing on the latest development, the Thai opposition 
was able to fan up nationalist sentiment and exploit the discourse of ―Thailand Is 
Not For Sale.‖ The Samak government and its replacement, Somchai (who is 
Thaksin‘s brother-in-law) resigned partly due to the strong pressure from the 
PAD- led Yellow Shirt movement. 
 UNESCO‘s decision to officially inscribe the temple a World Heritage 
Site on July 7, 2008 further escalated the domestic uproar into militarized 
conflicts. In his letter to the UN Security Council, the Cambodian ambassador to 
the United Nations reported 480 Thai soldiers crossed into the Keo Sikha Kiri 
Svara pagoda located in Cambodia‘s territory at about 300 meters from the temple 
of Preah Vihear as of July 17, 2008.
488
 Since then, retaliatory military clashes 
between the two armed forces have never stopped even when ceasefire 
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agreements were in place. Currently, approximately 2,000 soldiers from both 
sides are on guard along the disputed borders.
489
  
Thai public opinion was further divided when Cambodia‘s Prime Minister 
Hun Sen appointed Thaksin as his economic adviser.
490
 At the risk of irritating all 
ASEAN leaders, Hun Sen publicly welcomed Thaksin to take refuge in Cambodia 
during the 2009 ASEAN Summit held in Thailand and called Thaksin a friend 
who had been prosecuted unfairly for political reasons.
491
 Hun Sen also persuaded 
the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) to "convene an urgent meeting so as 
to stop Thailand's aggression."
492
 The two countries were at the brink of severing 
diplomatic relations when Phnom Penh officially refused to extradite the 
―fugitive‖ should Thaksin establish residence in Cambodia. Thailand immediately 
recalled its ambassador from Cambodia as ―the first diplomatic retaliation 
measure‖ against the Thaksin appointment.493 Thai Prime Minister Abhisit also 
instructed all ministries to review all areas of cooperation with Cambodia. 
Aside from the ongoing political bickering, it is worth noting that the two 
sides have been unable, perhaps unwilling, to reach a permanent truce. All 
ceasefires have been forged at commander level but not at the higher levels of the 
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militaries or the government.
494
 The ASEAN brokered ceasefire earlier this year 
remains unimplemented as Thailand insists on Cambodia first pulling its troops 
and citizens out of the contested 4.6 square kilometer temple ground.
495
 The 
Abhisit government asserts that Cambodia has violated the 2000 Memorandum of 
Understanding between Thailand and Cambodia on the Survey and Demarcation 
of Land Boundary (2000 MOU) by unilaterally stationing troops at the temple 
site. The 2000 MOU stipulates that no actions should be undertaken to affect the 
demarcation work on either side, especially movement of troops into disputed 
areas. As a precaution, the Thai government has evacuated about 7,500 villagers 
out of the disputed border areas, while Cambodian authorities have moved several 
thousand people as well.
496
 Neither government has released the tabulated death 
toll nor the number wounded from both sides since the very first skirmish in mid- 
2008. 
 
New ICJ Interpretation and New Legal Battle 
 Given that the dispute originated from the 1962 ICJ ruling, Cambodia 
went to the ICJ asking the court to clarify the status of the disputed overlapping 
area on April 29, 2011, with special reference to the term ―vicinity of the temple.‖ 
According to a statement issued by the Cambodian Foreign Ministry, ―[t]he 
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submission of this request has been prompted by Thailand's repeated armed 
aggression to exert its claims to Cambodian territory, on the basis of its own 
unilateral map that has no legal basis."
497
 In the same application, Cambodia also 
asked the ICJ to instruct Thailand to immediately and unconditionally withdraw 
all Thai forces from those parts of Cambodian territory situated in the area of the 
Temple.
498
  
While seeking legal remedies, Cambodia also asked the UN Security 
Council to create buffer zone in the disputed area with peacekeeping forces on 
site.
499
 Judging from Cambodia‘s appeals to the UN Security Council, ASEAN, 
and now the ICJ, Phnom Penh is trying to internationalize the Preah Vihear 
conflict. This is a stark contrast to Phnom Penh‘s position on other standing 
territorial disputes Cambodia has with its neighbors. For example, Cambodian 
Prime Minister Hun Sen has been urging the parties concerned to strictly abide by 
the code of conduct in the South China Sea, warning against complicating the 
issue by unnecessarily internationalizing the discussion.
500
 
In response, the Thai Foreign Minister held a press conference two days 
later regarding the latest move by Cambodia. In particular, Thailand accused 
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Cambodia of ―harboring an ulterior motive.‖501 In Bangkok‘s view, Phnom Penh 
has been purposely escalating the armed clashes along the border since April 22, 
2011 to lay the groundwork and create an environment which it hopes would be 
conducive for it to go the ICJ. A Thai Foreign Minister Spokesperson reiterated 
the Thai resolve ―to take appropriate action,‖ and charged Cambodia with 
deliberately bypassing the role of ASEAN in facilitating the bilateral process 
already in place. However, to best defend its interest and more importantly, to 
showcase Thailand‘s determination to end the conflict by peaceful means, 
Bangkok has appointed the Thai Ambassador to the Hague and the former 
Director General of the Legal Department of Foreign Ministry, Veerachai Palasai, 
as the head of Thai legal team to act on Thailand‘s behalf in the JCI hearings.502 
Both countries were due in court on May 30
th
, 2011.  
 
Treading on Thin Ice: Domestic, Regional, and International  
 At home, Abhisit‘s long time partner, the PAD, has been exerting pressure 
on the government for a tougher stand on the Preah Vihear issue. The Central 
Administrative Court‘s decision to annul the Joint Communiqué under the Samak 
government only temporarily eased the tension on the street. The resolution was 
ruled unconstitutional because it violated Article 190 of the Constitution which 
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requires prior parliamentary approval for any border change.
503
 In January 2011, 
the PAD called for another round of ―indefinite protest‖ in Bangkok to galvanize 
public opinion against the ―weak‖ response from the government to Cambodia‘s 
arrest of seven Thai nationalists who crossed into Cambodian territory during a 
border protest in December last year. The "Yellow Shirts" vowed to further 
intensify street protests in Bangkok after a high-profile nationalist activist was 
jailed for eight years in Cambodia on charges of illegal entry into Cambodia, 
trespassing on a military area, and spying.
504
 PAD leader, Sondhi, on one 
occasion even urged the Thai military to seize Angkor Wat, the temple complex 
built for the Khmer King Suryavarman II in the early 12
th
 century, in exchange for 
the disputed Preah Vihear.
505
 While the Cambodian premier maintained 
obstinately that those jailed must serve ―at least two-thirds of their jail terms 
before being considered for royal amnesty,‖506 Abhisit in contrast warned PAD 
―not to mix up the issue of Preah Vihear dispute with the detention of the seven 
Thais,‖ and should ―let the concerned officials do their jobs.‖507 
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Whereas the Thai nationalists are adamant about protecting Thai 
sovereignty, villagers living near the Thai-Cambodian border do not share the 
same sentiment at all. Believing the PAD led protests at the border only aggravate 
the military skirmishes, villagers from Ban Phum Srol, a village about 5 
kilometers from the disputed area, staged a rally to oppose further protests at the 
border by PAD or any Yellow Shirts. "You have created the war. You troubled us. 
We don't welcome you," said one village representative.
508
 Public opinion 
elsewhere in Thailand concerning the conflict is surprisingly underreported as 
street protests in Bangkok mustered most media attention. The Preah Vihear issue 
appears to be an elite project centered on the various political parties and the 
military.  
 Regionally, all ASEAN leaders have expressed concerns over the ongoing 
military clashes on the Thai-Cambodian border. Other than the obvious loss of 
lives and properties caused by military confrontation, the ASEAN states are 
especially concerned about the organization‘s credibility to mediate regional 
conflicts and the long term implication this failure may have on other ASEAN 
initiated projects. Indonesia, as the current chair of ASEAN this year, has used its 
position to secure a peace agreement providing for Indonesia to send in a team of 
observers to monitor the border, but not as a peacekeeping force out of respect to 
both countries. In contrast to the cabinet‘s welcoming tone, the Thai military 
firmly declined the Indonesian initiative as the top brass prefers to solve the 
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conflict through bilateral negotiations without any third-country involvement. The 
Army Chief told the press that the two sides ―can reach a settlement through 
negotiations, especially between the soldiers.‖509 Seeking to find a midway 
between the Cabinet and the military, the prime minister quickly declared in his 
weekly briefing segment on TV that ―there is no conflict between the Foreign 
Affairs Ministry and the army over Thailand's refusal to accept Indonesian 
military observers into the disputed area,‖ and added that the involvement of 
foreign observers would only make the border situation worse.
510
 It is widely 
speculated that the military has taken control over Thailand‘s foreign policy 
toward Cambodia and that the prime minister who is preoccupied with the coming 
election would side with the military in exchange for its electoral support.  
 The flat rejection by the Thai military mocks ASEAN‘s ability to sustain 
regional stability and more importantly, integrity, by mediating and reconciling 
intramural conflicts. No matter how willing Indonesia and other ASEAN states 
are to assist facilitating dialogues between the two disputing parties, the so-called 
ASEAN Way (an assortment of regional norms aimed at reinforcing sovereign 
equality through consensual decision making, non-interference, non-legally 
binding commitments, and voluntary enforcement of regional decisions) is 
actually preventing the Association from doing so. In other words, ASEAN 
involvement was practically brought to a halt when the Thai military vetoed the 
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Indonesian plan. No further ASEAN participation is possible unless it is instigated 
on Thailand‘s request, and of course, subject to Cambodian consent. 
 The Thai-Cambodia conflict not only tests ASEAN‘s ability to at the very 
least mediate intramural tensions, it also dampens the prospects for the much 
celebrated ASEAN Community Building projects scheduled to be completed by 
2015.
511
 ―We always say that we‘re heading in the direction of creating an 
ASEAN Community, but our spiritual situation is not going the same way,‖ said 
the executive director of the ASEAN Foundation, Makarim Wibisono.
512
 In 
particular, as ASEAN members, Thailand and Cambodia have broken the long 
cherished Treaty of Amity and Cooperation and the ASEAN Charter, both 
mandating timely consultation, cooperation, and commitment to peaceful means 
of dispute settlement at times of bilateral crisis. It is especially detrimental to the 
collective efforts that have been committed hitherto to the creation and maturation 
of a closely integrated ASEAN Political-Security Community (APSC). The APSC 
blueprint, among other things, ―envisages ASEAN to be a rules-based Community 
of shared values and norms; a cohesive, peaceful, stable and resilient region with 
shared responsibility for comprehensive security.‖513 Observers from Singapore 
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also commented on how ―[a]n ASEAN disunited will be taken less seriously by 
investors.‖514 Given the worsening situation at the Thai-Cambodian border, many 
wonder if the 2015 completion date is still realistic. 
Internationally, many countries have urged the two sides to exercise 
utmost restraint and resume talks at the earliest date. While the UN Secretary 
General, Ban Kil Moon, has called for ceasefire on numerous occasions, the UN 
Security Council is unusually slow in responding to the worsening situation. In 
comparison to the Security Council‘s quick reaction to the latest development on 
the Korean Peninsula or the Gaza Strip, the Council has withheld involvement in 
the Thai-Cambodia conflict. When asked about the UN‘s lukewarm involvement, 
the council president, the Brazilian Ambassador Maria Viotti, told the press that 
the latest Council meeting regarding the temple conflict ―was aimed at supporting 
bilateral and regional mediation efforts rather than involving the Council in the 
conflict resolution.‖ 515 The buck has been passed back to ASEAN as ―[t]he idea 
is to work in synergy with regional efforts.‖516 Although it can be argued that the 
Council has decided to do so out of deference to the regional grouping, some 
council members in effect consider the fighting a bilateral issue, not one 
jeopardizing international security and requiring UN intervention.
517
 Perhaps the 
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severity of the situation does not justify UN involvement other than eliciting ―a 
grave concern‖ from the international community.  
Thailand‘s Strategic Evaluation 
 Cambodia‘s plea to the international community has gained it much 
sympathy. Not only has Phnom Penh appealed for the UN Security Council to 
diffuse an ―imminent state of war‖ with Thailand, it has also painted a vivid 
picture of constant ―Thai aggression.‖ While Cambodia clearly favors 
internationalizing the temple conflict, Thailand is determined to keep the issue at 
a bilateral level. Whereas Thai specialists attribute domestic politics to the 
reasoning behind Bangkok‘s calculation, the following section argues that Thai 
strategic culture, marked by a stronger predisposition to conflict, partly accounts 
for the Thai rationale for intensifying the confrontation. Although Thailand claims 
itself a peace loving nation, it nonetheless subscribes to a Hobbesian world view 
that is made ever more so real by Hun Sen‘s unrelenting provocation.  
 
Suitability 
The suitability test addresses whether the chosen decision will enhance the 
strategic position of Thailand in the region. Thus far, Bangkok has maintained 
that the territorial dispute is a bilateral issue and should be peacefully resolved 
through bilateral and diplomatic means only. It is not necessary to obtain third-
party involvement. In doing so, Thailand is actually in full compliance with the 
Treaty of Amity and Cooperation as well as the ASEAN Charter. Both documents 
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place importance on the peaceful resolution of intramural conflicts through 
dialogue, consultation, and full commitment not to use force. In Thailand‘s view, 
it is Cambodia that is not cooperating. Abhisit openly questioned Cambodia‘s 
rationale for eschewing direct bilateral talks on the issues at hand: "Why do they 
need a different approach? The problem arises due to the movements of troops 
along the border. The talks on the border conflict and other details on the location 
of the observers should be handled as one package.‖518 According to the 
constitution, Thai foreign policy should ―promote friendly relations with other 
countries and adopt the principle of non-discrimination.‖519 Bilateral frameworks 
and mechanisms, if effectively implemented, do serve the purported foreign 
policy goals.  
With regard to the Thai-Cambodian border conflict, the Abhisit 
government has chiefly relied on two bilateral mechanisms, namely, the 2000 
Memorandum of Understanding between Thailand and Cambodia on the Survey 
and Demarcation of Land Boundary (2000 MOU) and the Joint Boundary 
Commission (JBC). The JBC, established under the 2000 MOU, consist of two 
Co-Chairmen and other members appointed by their respective Governments. The 
JBC is responsible for the joint survey and demarcation of the land boundary. 
However, there is no official confirmation on any joint field work that has 
actually been carried out. Notably, in anticipation of any dispute arising out of the 
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interpretation or application of the MOU, the memorandum stipulates that both 
sides should settle points of difference peacefully by consultation and negotiation. 
Given the worsening situation along the border, it is unclear whether the MOU or 
JBC has exerted any positive effect on lessening the cross-border tension.  
 Thailand‘s insistence on bilateral approaches is also a step backward from 
its innovative ―forward engagement.‖ According to the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs, forward engagement is a softer and less confrontational grand strategy of 
Thailand‘s foreign policy which serves ―to expand the scope of cooperation to 
encompass all dimensions of mutual interests as well as to forge ties with 
countries across the globe so as to bring about sustainable peace and economic 
prosperity for our purposes.‖520 In other words, forward engagement enhances 
Thailand‘s regional and international role through ―proactive‖ and ―forward-
looking‖ economic cooperation that in turn engenders positive spillover to other 
realms of collaboration. Though global in outlook, forward engagement was 
initially regional in scope with priorities given to greater interdependence among 
the Mekong states. Western values such as freedom of speech, human rights, or 
democratization are not prioritized. Through this grand strategy, Thailand was 
able to weave a web of economic cooperation that has had a great impact on 
Myanmar‘s internal development. It has also been significant in relaxing one of 
the regional norms, namely, non-interference of other member state‘s internal 
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affairs.
521
 None of these are taking place with regard to Thai-Cambodian 
relations. The two sides have essentially refrained from constructively engaging 
each other. 
 
Feasibility 
The feasibility test evaluates whether Thailand can solve the conflict 
through bilateral means only. A separate but related question is whether Thailand 
can afford to delay solving the cross-border conflict. My analysis suggests the 
answer is clearly no. The bilateral framework is not working because one side can 
simply block the other and indefinitely protract the process. In this particular case, 
both sides are in effect vetoing one another. The constant cross allegation of ―the 
other side fires first‖ has not only prolonged the diplomatic crisis but also created 
confusion in the international audience. Yet, no matter which side actually fired 
first, the damage has already been done. Neither Thailand nor Cambodia is seen 
as genuine in their sincerity and commitment to solve the issue peacefully. 
Cambodia‘s effort at internationalizing the conflict has disadvantaged Thailand, 
especially when the Thai military categorically rejected ASEAN mediation. The 
failure of bilateral approaches has created an image of Thai belligerency that is 
incompatible with the ―peace loving nation‖ so often heard from King Bhumibol.    
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In addition, Thailand‘s refusal of ASEAN involvement is a slap on the 
face of both the regional grouping and the incumbent chair, Indonesia. Given that 
the bilateral approach is failing, the contradictory positions of the cabinet and the 
military render outside mediation difficult as one cannot reasonably expect that 
any agreement made with the Thai government will be kept. In particular, 
Indonesia‘s reputation and authority as the ASEAN chair, mediator, and meeting 
facilitator are also undermined by the fiasco. The cordial relations developed in 
the past two years between the Abhisit and Yudhoyono governments may be 
strained. When the international community criticized steps taken by the Abhisit 
government and the military against ―red shirt‖ protesters, Indonesia refrained 
from commenting on Thai democracy and the institutional makeup of the state. It 
is ironic that the Thai Ambassador to Indonesia, Thanatip Upatising, earlier 
expressed that ―Thailand would be 100 percent behind Indonesia in many parts of 
international agendas… You can always count on us.‖522 
Lastly, the seemingly endless military skirmishes at the border have 
greatly jeopardized peace and stability in the border area. The villages adjacent to 
the disputed area are the victims of all. Given that the most accessible entrance to 
the Preah Vihear temple is on the Thai side, villagers are able to earn a living by 
providing services to the tourists. Since the escalation of the military clashes in 
mid 2008, border crossings and the adjacent state parks were closed 
intermittently. Foreign embassies have also been warning their nationals to avoid 
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visiting the temple in case of open hostilities either at the temple site or in its 
vicinity. Resentment deepens as the villagers are increasingly impatient about the 
government‘s inability to keep the situation under control, and more importantly, 
increasingly infuriated as politicians continue to politicize the issue without 
regard to the villagers‘ wellbeing. 
 
Acceptability 
The suitability and feasibility tests indicate the Thai insistence on solving 
the conflict through bilateral negotiations is unproductive. Although it is within 
Thailand‘s right to be resolute about how it prefers to engage other countries, such 
insistence has actually become an impediment to the solving the problem 
smoothly. Why, then, does Thailand continue to allow the conflict to escalate 
without implementing any constructive solutions? 
 Most observers attribute the key reason to be divided domestic politics as 
for Thailand‘s ineffective response to the conflict. On the one hand there is the 
ultra nationalist PAD aided by the Thai Patriots Network demanding a tougher 
stance against Cambodia‘s provocation. These groups fan nationalist fervor by 
politicizing the militarized conflict along the Thai-Cambodian border for more 
than two years. Stressing that Thailand has already lost its sovereignty over the 
Preah Vihear Temple, Phu Makua hill, Keo Sikha Kiri Svara pagoda and Ban 
Nong to its neighbor, PAD considers the government‘s inability to retrieve the 
land now occupied by Cambodia as dereliction on the part of the prime minister. 
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A PAD spokesperson even announced plans to lodge lawsuit against the prime 
minister for negligence of duties as well as to seek impeachment should it secure 
enough parliamentary support.
523
 
 On the other hand, there is the military taking control of the border. The 
Thai military has long been one of the most important actors in Thai politics. The 
Thai military possesses strong traditions of political intervention that have been 
deeply ingrained into the officer corps‘ worldview.524 Political interventionism is 
justified on the ground that the military, as prescribed by the Constitution, is 
tasked with myriad roles and responsibilities. Among others, it is the chief 
protector of national sovereignty, national territory, the Monarchy, democratic 
institutions, and national security. Accordingly, the status of the armed forces has 
been elevated beyond the military arm of national defence to a principal policy 
decision maker. The linkage among the institution of the Monarchy, state religion 
and the military further accentuate the importance of the Armed Forces.  
 Yet, it is puzzling that as the defender of national security and sovereignty 
the Thai military would obstruct the diplomatic measures initiated by the civilian 
government to retrieve the contested land. Thai specialist, Pavin 
Chachavalpongpun, asserts that the dispute actually ―gives the military an 
excellent opportunity to remain in the political limelight.‖525 This explains the 
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eagerness of the military to set the course for Thai-Cambodia relations. Others 
observe an undercurrent of attempts by the military backed elite to create a crisis 
that could be used for delaying an election, one the Abhisit government finally 
called and scheduled to take place in early July this year
526
. Against the backdrop 
of a looming election, some analysts believe the escalating dispute is a product of 
conspiracy as the hawkish elements within the government and the top brass 
military leaders are ―whipping up the nationalist fervor by provoking the fighting 
to show a strong hand to curry favor with hard-line voters in the upcoming 
poll.‖527 Whichever the reason, it is a win-win situation for both the government 
and the military to showcase patriotism and a united Thailand by not caving into 
Cambodian demands in particular and international pressure in general. 
 Conspiracy or not, the border conflict does drive public opinion in 
Bangkok. The loss of the temple to Cambodia represents the worst kind of ―lost 
territory‖ because Siam once exercised suzerainty over its Khmer neighbor, and 
modern day Cambodia has always been considered a weaker state.
528
 Criticism 
was directed at the prime minister when he openly ―reminded‖ the PAD led 
demonstrators during a live-telecast session that Thailand had lost sovereignty 
over the temple by the 1962 World Court ruling under Field Marshal Sarit 
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Thanrat.
529
 ―We should destroy them…We are bigger and stronger, we can wipe 
them out… They shot at us first,‖ shouted one angry Bangkok resident530. The 
Thais are ready to go to war because ultimately, it is not about politics, not about 
the lost territory, but all about saving face.  
Although it is difficult to translate or define the concept of face, it can be 
loosely understood as ―respectability and/or deference which a person can claim 
for himself from others.‖531 When applied to inter-state interaction, the desire to 
gain face, to avoid losing face, and to save face when it is threatened can be a 
powerful motive steering policy makers to directions they would otherwise not 
have pursued. ―In some instances, protecting against loss of face becomes so 
central an issue that it swamps the importance of the tangible issues at stake and 
generates intense conflicts that can impede progress toward agreement and 
increase the costs of conflict resolution substantially.
532
 The military immediately 
cancelled defence minister General Prawit‘s trip to Phnom Penh for truce talks to 
protest the ―false reporting‖ by the Cambodian media on Thai admission of defeat 
and loss in the latest round of military clashes in April.
533
 Seen in this light, 
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military clashes are likely to continue along the Thai-Cambodian border as neither 
Hun Sen nor Abhisit can afford to lose face by granting concessions to the other.  
 Lastly, while most research and media reporting focus on the political and 
cultural value of the Preah Vihear temple, the strategic value of the temple and its 
surrounding 4.6 square kilometer land is rarely discussed. The temple is located 
on a steep cliff overlooking northern Cambodia and is about 150 miles north of 
the Cambodian capital. ―If Thai forces can dominate Preah Vihear, or its 
surrounding territory on Thailand's eastern border, they would enjoy a high 
ground position against Cambodia, making both sides wary of each other's 
military forces close to the Dangrek Mountains' cliffside zone.‖534 The temple is a 
formidable fortress as both the pro-US Lon Nol Troops and the Khmer Rouge 
guerilla forces used the temple as the ―last stand‖ until they were driven out.535 
Because of its strategic value, any change regarding the use of the temple 
becomes a sensitive issue to both Thailand and Cambodia. In the two letters to the 
UN Security Council, Abhisit expressed grave concern about the use of the 
temple by Cambodia for military purposes, and later the Thai Foreign Minister 
pointed to the military use of the temple as deplorable and in violation of 
international law.
536
 It also explains why Thailand rejected the Cambodian 
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proposal calling for a UN buffer zone in the disputed area for fear of losing 
strategic and military advantage. 
 
Conclusion 
 This chapter traces the development of the Thai-Cambodian border 
conflicts as the events unfold. Starting from the first flare up, the conflict has 
continued for two and half years with an estimated death toll of 17 people and 
thousands of others displaced. Whether it is to protect sovereignty, salvage 
domestic political support, uphold military supremacy, secure strategic advantage 
at the border, or simply to save face, Thailand has behaved in stark contrast to the 
image of a ―peace loving nation‖ and instead acted with belligerency. Diplomatic 
maneuvers at lessening the cross-border tension are at best on paper only. The 
cross allegations of ―aggression‖ and ―invasion‖ lead the two sides to the 
offensive. Although the two governments have reached a ―roadmap‖ in the form 
of ―a package proposal‖ on how to move away from bloodshed to cordiality, there 
is no guarantee that the two countries can work out their differences and come to 
a ceasefire agreement. Unfortunately, the tragedy of Preah Vihear is that political 
leaders have chosen to emphasize what is disputed about the temple's history 
rather than its potential as a "connector" between the two neighboring countries in 
                                                                                                                                     
d‘affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of Thailand to the United Nations, accessed May 13, 
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the form of joint cultural and economic development of the remote border 
regions.
537
  
The Thai insistence on keeping the issue at the bilateral level at the 
expense of prolonged militarized conflict and mounting casualties is an indication 
of how a multilateral mechanism is perceived by the Thai strategic elite. Frankly, 
multilateral involvement is ―unnecessary,‖ and far from being a norm in 
Thailand‘s strategic calculation. The Thai behavior dampens prospects for any 
conceivable support to be expected from Thailand for the establishment of 
regional cooperative security architecture. ASEAN is also shaken by how its plan 
for community building might be jeopardized by militarized inter-state conflict. 
When it comes to sovereignty and territorial integrity, the norms of non-
interference in other member states‘ internal affairs actually works against 
ASEAN‘s good intention to facilitate communication. It is an irony that after 43 
years, intramural distrust still runs deep beneath the blue flag of the Association.     
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Chapter 8 
CONCLUSION 
 
Although not confronted with one single conventional threat that is 
destructive enough to unite the whole region, Southeast Asia today is 
encountering an infinite number of non-traditional security threats. These new 
sources of ―insecurity‖ include, but are not limited, to terrorism, organized 
transnational crime, piracy, pandemic diseases, energy security, and economic 
security. However, as evinced by the latest Thai-Cambodian militarized 
confrontation over the Temple of Preah Vihear, the likelihood of conventional 
threats reoccurring cannot be conclusively ruled out either. It is clear that the 
region is experiencing an increasing degree of security interdependence that 
requires the attention and collaboration from all states to solve the existing and 
emergent security problems facing the region.  
In light of the fact that it is beyond the capacity of any one state to tackle 
these issues alone, a cost/benefit analysis strictly from an economic standpoint 
would suggest that multilateral security cooperation with pooled resources in 
information sharing, capacity building, and the provision of equipment, 
technology, funding and training is deemed the most suitable policy choice for the 
ASEAN states. Yet, Southeast Asian states defy the conventional understanding 
on small state behavior. Judging from the absence of enthusiasm in speeding up 
the institutionalization of cooperative security, the Southeast Asian states, unlike 
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their European counterparts, eschew corporatist politics and instead prefer 
unilateral, state-centric, offense-ready security provisions. 
This dissertation has explored the situation that any unilateral attempt at 
security seeking runs the danger of creating a security dilemma, undermining the 
already fragile intramural trust among the ASEAN states. Still, ASEAN members 
remain reluctant to see the emergence of any concrete cooperative security 
architecture in the region. The lack of concerted cooperative security architecture 
or any progress toward crafting one runs counter to the Association‘s vision to 
create a ―regional security complex‖ as envisaged in the ASEAN Political-
Security Community Blueprint.
538
 
 
Strategic Culture, Small States, and ASEAN 
 This dissertation seeks to examine the above mentioned puzzle from the 
premises of strategic culture. The concept of strategic culture is best understood 
as bounded rationality.  It complements the rationality assumption but ―insists that 
rationality must be understood within a cultural context.‖539 Bounded rationality 
in this context is formed by the recurrent and patterned social arrangements that 
appear to subconsciously condition the world view of a state‘s strategic elites. 
Specifically, the concept explores how this world view influences their strategic 
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choices at the highest political level
 
and policy options at the operational or 
tactical level
540
. Operationally, strategic culture functions as an intervening 
variable that affects the strategic option evaluation process. For cross-country 
comparison, the concept of strategic culture is approximated by numerically 
measuring the push and pull between two opposing forces: the propensity to 
conflict vs. the propensity to cooperate. The author concedes that quantitative 
measures for any ideational variable have limitations. It is at best an 
approximation of one part of the culture, strategic culture in this case. 
Nevertheless, numerical representation may be a useful and tangible tool for 
cross-country comparison. After all, it is not the absolute number generated for 
each country that matters but rather a comparison among these numbers. These 
comparisons show that small states in Southeast Asia do not emphasize 
multilateral security collaboration. 
 The primary goal of this dissertation has been to study small state strategic 
culture with special reference to the attitude of the ASEAN states toward 
institutionalizing regional cooperative security architectures. The choice of 
Singapore, Thailand, and Malaysia is justified on the ground that they all meet the 
definitional requirement of objective smallness and self-perceived smallness. 
Moreover, the corporatist strategies practiced by their European peers in a similar 
environment of high security interdependence are not exhibited in these three 
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founding nations of ASEAN. In the quantitative case studies, computer assisted 
content analyses of security, defence, and foreign policies show that all three 
small Southeast Asian states exhibit a higher tendency for conflict. Multilateral 
cooperation is at best selective. Bilateral means is still the preferred policy 
approach when dealing with other states.  
In the case of Singapore, a focus on self-reliance with minimum 
dependence on external partners reflects the realist perception of a Hobbeisan 
world where zero-sum conflict is inevitable. The discourse of survival and the 
analogy of a red little dot in a Malay sea reinforce each other to project a grim 
picture on Singapore‘s security environment. Dire security concerns over the lack 
of strategic depth and reaction time, and smallness in resources (money, 
manpower, and material) are further compounded by the negative spillover effect 
of security issues originating from neighboring states. To shore up this 
―regionally-based defence need,‖ Singapore is dedicated to maintaining 
sophisticated forces and an ―integrated warfare‖ doctrine with emphasis on 
forward and expeditionary defence capabilities in the latest round of information-
led RMA. Singapore‘s identification with western interests does not assuage the 
volatile relations the country has with its neighbors either. Singapore‘s worst-case 
scenario security calculation, though often criticized as over-exaggeration by its 
neighbors, is amply illustrated in how the littoral state securitizes the Malacca 
Strait. Maritime security and navigational safety are synonymous because it is 
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difficult to make the distinction between piracy and terrorism as the latter may 
launch attacks in the guise of the former. 
 Three prominent situational considerations undergird the making of 
Thailand‘s security and defence policies: internally focused threat perception, 
developmental nationalism, and resilience of the military apparatus. Although 
many of the security issues are transnational in nature such as human trafficking 
and illicit drug trade, Thailand is more focused on addressing problems within its 
border. The militarized Thai-Cambodian border confrontation over the Temple of 
Preah Vihear and the Thai rejection of ASEAN mediation reflect one unchanging 
feature of international relations in Southeast Asia, namely, national sovereignty 
and territorial integrity are still cherished jealously among the regional states. The 
military‘s role in national development rationalizes its control of politics by 
elevating its status beyond the military arm of the government to the status of 
nation builder. Moreover, by proclaiming itself the protector of the institution of 
Monarchy, religion and culture, the military seeks to perpetuate and further 
solidify its influence in the political realm. The military‘s influence appears to be 
invincible as it is not only able to aggrandize its organizational interests, but also 
to vie with the central government in setting the course for Thai foreign policy, as 
evident in its involvement in the Thai-Cambodian confrontation. 
 In Malaysia‘s case, conceptual content analysis delineates a strategic 
culture leaning toward the Hobbesian end of the spectrum with a much stronger 
disposition to conflict than to cooperate. The need to protect its geo-economic 
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interests and prevent any conflict or disruption of peace from taking place on 
Malaysian soil have convinces Kuala Lumpur to adopt conflict prevention, apply 
the military doctrine of access denial, and most importantly, develop a credible air 
force equipped with added surveillance and early warning capabilities. The 
disposition to conflict is most visible in Malaysia‘s dichotomous worldview of big 
vs. small, North vs. South, West vs. East, core vs. periphery, and the developed 
vs. the less developed. Its self-proclaimed Third World Spokesmanship and 
Champion for the Islamic Community demonstrate that Malaysia will not blindly 
cater to foreign demands. As ―a small developing country player,‖ Malaysia can 
also compete with others and exercise influence in setting the international 
agenda. This strong stance is vividly displayed in Malaysia‘s determination to 
prevent further erosion of its maritime sovereignty even at the expense of 
forestalling cooperative security mechanisms that may enhance the economic well 
being and strategic position of the state. 
 Of the eight institutional categories, non-ideational factors (POLIT, 
MILIT, ECON, and LEGAL) weigh more heavily relative to the ideational ones 
(DOCTRINE, RELIG, EXPRSV, AND ACADEM) in constituting the three small 
states‘ strategic cultures. Specifically, political, military, and economic concerns 
trump other factors to be the more prominent drivers of Singapore, Thailand, and 
Malaysia‘s security, defence, and foreign policies. Given the high degree of 
security interdependence in the region, a large part of the political, military, and 
economic concerns actually stem from the neighbors. Cross-border security issues 
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such as contraband trade, small arms trafficking, and extremist movements are 
high on each government‘s agenda. These states are also confronted with 
―everyday security challenges‖ such the government‘s domestic legitimacy, social 
unrest, and separatism both within its border and in the neighborhood. Although 
the challenges are primarily domestic, these may weaken state capacity in the 
long run if left unaddressed. More importantly, ―everyday security challenges‖ 
have the potential to spill over and affect countries nearby. 
These concerns are exacerbated by a heightened sense of vulnerability of 
being a small state, differences in regime type, and more importantly, lingering 
intramural suspicion based on past grievances. Yet, all three governments are less 
inclined to devise multilateral mechanisms that are conducive to solve trans-
boundary security challenges. Although the ASEAN states are nominally united 
vis-à-vis external powers, the qualitative case studies on the evolving maritime 
security regime in the Malacca Strait demonstrates that extra-regional powers are 
not only invited by Singapore to hedge against other extra-regional powers such 
as China, but more importantly, for Singapore, extra-regional security partner 
provide political backing vis-à-vis the other two littoral states.  
 
The Prospects of the ASEAN Political and Security Community 
 In an effort to strengthen regional integration and ASEAN centrality in 
regional cooperation, The Declaration of the ASEAN Bali Concord II establishes 
an ASEAN Community scheduled to be completed by 2020. The Community 
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comprises three pillars, namely, the ASEAN Political-Security Community 
(APSC), the ASEAN Economic Community (AEC), and the ASEAN Socio-
Cultural Community (ASCC). Recognizing the imperative for a regional 
architecture for comprehensive security, the ASEAN leaders decided at the 12
th
 
ASEAN Summit in the Philippines to accelerate the community building project 
by 2015. Three documents are particularly pertinent to the realization of the 
APSC:  The ASEAN Security Community Plan of Action, the Vientiane Action 
Programme (VAP), and the ASEAN Political-Security Community Blueprint. 
While the Plan of Action lays out the principles to realize the objectives of APSC, 
the VAP identifies the measures to be taken in 2004-2010, and the Blueprint 
provides a roadmap and timetable for the activities needed to accelerate the 
establishment of the APSC by 2015
541
. 
 Broadly, the APSC is built around three key characteristics. First, the 
APSC is to be a rule-based community of shared values and norms. The Plan of 
Action specifies that any norm or value setting activity must not deviate from the 
six fundamental principles: 1) non-alignment; 2) fostering peace-oriented attitudes 
among ASEAN members; 3) conflict resolution through non-violent means; 4) 
renunciation of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction (WMD); 
5) avoidance of arms race in the region; and lastly, 6) renunciation of the threat or 
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the use of force. These principles largely resonate with the assorted regional 
norms commonly known as the ASEAN Way. Yet, the explicit call for fostering 
peace-oriented attitudes lays bare the fact that such ―attitudes‖ are not widely 
shared among ASEAN member states. If peace-oriented attitudes are not the 
predominant norms in the region, the default policy instrument for conflict 
resolution may stray from peaceful means. In a security environment of deep 
intramural distrust, the renunciation of the threat or the use of force may not be 
easily achieved as member states continue to hold onto their sovereign rights to 
pursue their individual foreign policies, strategic postures, and defence 
arrangements. 
 Second, the APSC shall be a cohesive, peaceful, stable and resilient region 
with shared responsibility for comprehensive security. The concept of 
comprehensive security ―goes beyond the requirements of traditional security but 
also takes into account non-traditional aspects vital to regional and national 
resilience, such as the economic, socio-cultural, and environmental dimensions of 
development.‖542 Central to the development of this cohesive, peaceful, and stable 
community is the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) process in support of APSC. 
The Blueprint identifies the need to strengthen the necessary institutional 
framework within the ARF for conflict prevention, confidence building measures, 
preventive diplomacy, and post-conflict peace building. The ARF Experts and 
Eminent Persons readily admitted in their first meeting in 2006 that ―[d]espite its 
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progress, the ARF lacks some of the institutional structure and cohesion among 
members to respond effectively to regional security concerns and challenges.‖543 
According to Rodolfo Severino, the Secretary-General of ASEAN from 1998 to 
2002, not all ARF participants share the view that the ―forum‖ should be 
upgraded to ―an institution of implementation.‖544  
 While it is widely acknowledged that the ARF has not moved forward 
from its initial confidence building phase to the development of preventive 
diplomacy, there are divergent views on the actual success of the ARF in 
dispelling mutual suspicions among the participants. Other than its slow pace in 
promoting mutual confidence, the Paper on the Review of the ARF also points out 
several functional deficiencies of the Forum that are in need for improvement. 
ARF participants agreed in 2008 to adopt the recommendations from the Review, 
including ―the need to strengthen the role of all ARF participants; enhance 
practical cooperation; maintain the moratorium on membership; focus on concrete 
areas of cooperation; enhance the role of the ARF Chair and the ARF Unit… and 
improve the ARF's operating mechanisms.‖545 Most importantly, ARF has to 
become an ―action-oriented‖ body before it can competently fulfill the operational 
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arm of the APSC. Functional deficiencies notwithstanding, the Forum is after all 
the only venue inclusive enough to accommodate different, sometimes clashing, 
security interests, strategic calculations, and threat perceptions among regional 
and extra-regional participants.  The maturation of the APSC depends greatly on 
the institutionalization of the ARF. Yet, the lack of consensus on the pace and 
extent of institutionalizing the Forum demonstrates that confidence building in the 
ARF is still far from completion, let alone being the supporting mechanism of the 
APSC. 
 Lastly, the APSC is to be a dynamic and outward-looking region in an 
increasingly integrated and interdependent world. The ultimate goal of the APSC 
is to ―ensure that the people and Member States of ASEAN live in peace with one 
another and with the world at large in a just, democratic, and harmonious 
environment.‖546 Although a consolidated APSC aims to bring regional political 
and security cooperation to a higher plane, ASEAN is careful to emphasize that 
the Community is by no means a defence pact, military alliance, or a joint foreign 
policy consortium. Yet, the Plan of Action stipulates that to better address future 
security challenges, ―ASEAN Member Countries share the responsibility for 
strengthening peace, stability and security of the region free from foreign military 
interference in any form or manifestation‖. In other words, the region must retain 
a nominal unity, however illusive, to fend off external intervention even when 
intramural relations are volatile. 
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 Overall, the three qualitative case studies paint a rather bleak and 
pessimistic picture of the APSC completion by 2015. Whilst observers are 
sanguine about how genuine operationalized cooperative security may result from 
the current Malacca Strait Patrol arrangement, underneath the veil of cooperation 
is a strong sense of intramural rivalry among the three littoral states. The Thai 
refusal of ASEAN intermediation in its militarized border conflict with Cambodia 
and the latest diplomatic flare up between Vietnam and China with Hanoi 
conducting live-fire naval exercises all challenge ASEAN‘s ability to mitigate 
tensions, prevent disputes from arising, or enforce pacific settlement of disputes 
between/among member states. Without a central institution, the APSC is at best 
another addition to the multitudes of well-intended, yet unoperationalized, 
security arrangements in the region. At its current stage, the APSC appears to be a 
policy instrument created only to reinforce ASEAN‘s centrality in charting the 
region‘s security architecture. In itself, this is no small accomplishment. 
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